


A STUDY OF UNIVERSALS

SUSHANTA SEN

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A STUDY OF UNIVERSALS

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WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

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TO MY REVERED TEACHER
PROFESSOR KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA
a philosopher and a man

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PREFACE

Sheer antiquity of a problem does not command any respect to a philosopher of the twentieth century. Contemporary philosophy tends to be sceptical of many old philosophical problems, and it is sceptical of philosophy (in the sense of metaphysics) itself. It asks whether the perennial problems of philosophy are as real and urgent as the ancient philosophers have thought them to be, and it suggests that many of them are spurious and undeserving of attention. This attitude towards philosophy has prompted many contemporary thinkers to dismiss the problem of the ontological reality of the universal as either verbal or non-sensical. But I doubt whether such an age-old philosophical query can be disposed of in the way in which the contemporary critics of philosophy have tried to do. The most they can do is to show that *on certain interpretations or formulations*, the problem is verbal or non-sensical, not that the problem itself properly stated is unreal or unworthy of attention. I think that the problem of the ontological reality of the universal, rightly posed, is still a real (as opposed to verbal) and fundamental problem ; for to understand universals is to understand the scientific problem of classification of natural objects and the epistemological problem of conceptual cognition.

The problem of universal has been dealt with both in Indian and Western philosophies in their own characteristic fashions. The philosophers of both the countries are broadly divided into two camps—realism and nominalism—on the question of the ontological status of the universal. A realist like a Naiyāyika or Aristotle advocates the ontological reality of the universal on the ground that it serves to group the particular objects of our daily experience into some neat and well divided natural classes. The universal is, according to the realists, the common character which repeats itself identically in the individual members of a given class ; and since it is the only abiding entity recurring identically amidst change, it makes recognition and other kinds of conceptual cognition possible. But a nominalist like a Buddhist or Hobbes is aggressively hostile to admitting any such universals in the natural world. He is of opinion that the external world is composed of entities which are strictly particular and they cannot share any identical element in common. What we call universals, urges a nominalist, are nothing but our own contrivances. We classify natural objects according to our own pragmatic or subjective necessity, but no objective principle is

followed for the purpose of classification of natural objects. A good number of Western nominalists base their doctrine of the denial of objective universals on what is usually known as Resemblance or Similarity theory. They try to show that the fact that the external objects of nature do not possess any identical universal in common is not incompatible with their being similar as a matter of actual experience and this similarity or resemblance holding among different particular objects is responsible for their being grouped together under a definite class. This phenomenon of similarity also explains successfully the possibility of conceptual cognition.

In my present work, I have tried to show that both the theories of realism and nominalist are one-sided and dogmatic, as both of them fail to do justice to some obvious facts of experience. When the Western nominalists, for example, assert that the relation of resemblance is the *ultimate fact* of experience on which the natural classification of objects rests, they commit two fundamental errors. First, they neglect the so-called cases of 'exact-resemblance' an analysis of which finally leads us to the admission of universals in the shape of specific identical qualities. Two exactly resembling shades of colour of two postage stamps of the same issue and denomination not merely resemble each other but are identical, since we cannot detect any difference between them. It is true of course that so far as their spatio-temporal settings are concerned they are different, but if their *quality* only is taken into account they should be regarded as identical. Secondly, the nominalistic doctrine of the denial of *objective* universals is based on the forgetfulness of the fact that the resemblance itself is a recurring relation which holds *objectively* among individual members of a given class, and it provides us with as much an objective foundation for the classification of natural objects as the self-identical universals are supposed to give. For a good practical reason it cannot be maintained of course that one and the same relation of resemblance holds identically among individual members of *different* classes. To hold that the relation of resemblance between two resembling cows is identically the same as that between two resembling horses is to indulge in anomaly and chaos, since that would not differentiate a *resembling cow* from a *resembling horse*. But still it cannot be denied that a cow resembles another cow and this relation of resemblance very frequently recurs in our experience which serves to group the

individual cows under a definite class. Whenever a particular animal, e. g., a cow, is present before me, I immediately classify it as a member of the cow-class, because I detect some points of similarity between it and the other such animals I had experienced before. There is nothing subjectivistic or pragmatic in the classification of objects on the basis of observed resemblance. The things of nature would have remained classified in the same way on the basis of resemblance as we see them now, even if there were no human minds to discover them. I have discussed all these points in elaborate detail in the chapter VII of my thesis. These considerations have led me to think that the different recurring relations of resemblance holding among individual members of different classes are as much objective universals as the different recurring identical qualities are. When a Western nominalist tries to annul the existence of *objective* universals by means of his favourite instrument of the relation of resemblance, he appears to forget that he is already working with certain objective universals in his hand (namely the recurring resemblances themselves).

In advocating the view that the different relations of resemblance holding amongst individual members of various classes are themselves universals, I have used the word universal in a somewhat novel sense about which difference of opinion would naturally be expected. In the history of philosophy—both in India and West—the word universal (*sāmānya*) is generally used in the sense of recurring identical qualities. But my contention is that the word universal should not be taken in a univocal sense, it is rather equivocal. The question 'what is a universal', cannot be answered, I suppose, in one sentence, but needs two. Universals are (i) natural recurrences revealed in our experience and (ii) universals are *objective* principles of grouping and classifying. These two sentences are not, however, wholly independent, since a natural recurrence can itself be used as a principle of grouping and this justifies in talking of our theory as *one* theory of universal. Judged by this two-fold criterion of the definition of universal, the different relations of resemblance holding among the individual members of different classes should be treated as universals, since they recur in our experience and they also provide the objective foundation for the classification of natural objects. When interpreted in this way, the Western nominalism with its weapon known

as Resemblance or Similarity theory defeats its own purpose, since in its zeal to dispose of objective universals in the natural world over and above the particular objects of experience, it pre-supposes a set of objective universals at the outset.

But to say that nominalism is self-defeating in its purpose is not to give way to the traditional realistic theory of universal. For traditional realism has its own defects too and it does not always square with the facts of experience. The orthodox realists try to reduce the phenomenon of resemblance to qualitative identity and hold the view that self-identical universals are always the basis of classification of natural objects. But in doing so they are so much pre-occupied with the phenomenon of 'exact resemblance' which can really be reduced to qualitative identity that they seem to forget the fact that there are also degrees of resemblance—that the objects of nature resemble one another 'more' or 'less', a fact which can not in any way be accounted for by the objects' possession of an identical quality in common. The different shades of the colour blue, for example, resemble one another 'more' or 'less' in being blue. But try as we may, we can neither experience nor abstract in thought an identical blueness which is shared in common by the different shades of blue. In this respect, therefore, the contention of the Western nominalists that the relation of resemblance is the *underived ultimate* basis for the classification of objects should be taken to be true.

The above considerations have led me to think that one should go beyond both realism and nominalism to formulate an adequate theory of universal. This does not mean of course that one should reject both these theories in toto and take recourse to a third theory which is usually known as conceptualism, a theory which holds 'that the universals are not extramental realities but merely the mental concepts of our understanding. The theory of universal which I have tried to vindicate in my thesis is, on the other hand, strictly realistic, since I do not deny the extra-mental reality of the universals in the natural world. What I have tried to do is to give a new connotation of the word universal, at which I have arrived through a thorough criticism of both realism and nominalism.

The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter deals with the defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of the universal as given by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system which is largely representative of Indian realism. The second chapter is devoted to a study of the

nature of *samavāya* relation, since this relation is supposed by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers to be the only relating tie between the universal and its corresponding particulars. The third chapter deals with the view of the universal as advocated by the Mīmāṃsā realists. The Mīmāṃsakas, though admitting with the Naiyāyikas the ontological reality of the universals, differ from them on the question of the relation between the universal and its corresponding particulars ; and I have tried to show that the Mīmāṃsakas' answer to the said question is in no way philosophically better than that offered by the Naiyāyikas and hence it should be rejected as untenable. In the fourth chapter, I have tried to make a case for the Buddhist nominalism without a clear understanding of which the standpoint of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism can not be properly appreciated. The Buddhist thinkers spare no pains in attacking the ontological reality of the universals as advocated by the realists, and in this chapter all the arguments given by the Buddhists in support of their contention have been sympathetically considered in order to get a clear picture of their point of view. But in the next chapter (chapter V) I have tried to expose the fundamental weakness of Buddhist nominalism in favour of Nyāya realism. The sixth chapter simply explains the different counteracting conditions (*bādhakas*) of the universals as given by the Nyāya system. So far I have tried to confine my study mainly to Indian philosophy and no attempt has been made to discuss the realism-nominalism controversy from the perspective of Western thought, except, of course, by way of some passing references to it. But in the chapter VII, I have subjected a typical version of Western nominalism, which is generally known as Similarity or Resemblance theory, to a searching analysis and I have tried to show both its elements of truth as well as its points of error. In the chapter VIII, which is the concluding chapter of my thesis, I have given a resumé of what has been discussed in the previous chapters and on the basis of that I have tried to state my positive conclusions.

The present work is a revised edition of my Ph. D. thesis approved by the Visva-Bharati University. I should like to record here my sincere gratitude to my illustrious teacher and mentor of my thesis, Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya, to work under whose inspiring guidance had always been a philosophical experience with me. I am very deeply indebted to him, both academically and personally, much more than what I can readily express. This humble volume is

respectfully dedicated to him as a token of my gratitude, reverence and admiration.

I am grateful to my learned colleague, Sri Prodyot Mukherjee with whom I had the opportunity to discuss some of the topics dealt with in this book and I was immensely benefited by these discussions. I am also thankful to Dr. Kalyan Bagchi, the then Secretary of Visva-Bharati Research Publication Committee, who took the troubles of making every arrangement to get the thesis published. I shall fail in my duty if I don't mention the name of Professor Santosh Sengupta, Head, Department of Philosophy and Religion, Visva-Bharati, whose encouragement and help I was never deprived of. Finally, my thanks are due to Sri Sitikantha Bhattacharya, Superintendent, Visva-Bharati Press, without whose active help and co-operation the printing of this book would have been much more delayed.

Visva-Bharati,
Santiniketan
December 1978.

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CHAPTER—I

DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS (LAKṢAṆA) OF UNIVERSALS

Though there has been much heated controversy in Western philosophy as to the nature of the universal (*sāmānya*) and many conflicting theories have been put forward on it, yet very seldom do we find there an attempt to formulate an exact and precise definition of the universal. In this respect, the credit goes entirely to the Indian philosophers, especially to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers and the Mīmāṃsakas in whose systems the existence of the universal as a separate ontological category (*padārtha*) has been admitted.

Generally it is thought that "the universal is a class-character which is common to, or identical in, many objects whose membership of the class is thereby determined."¹ Goutama, the author of the *Nyāya-Sūtra*, defines the universal almost in the same way: "The universal is that entity which produces the notion of identity" in our mind.² When a particular animal is present before me, I immediately recognise it as a cow, i. e., I immediately classify it as belonging to a class named as cow. Now, this immediate classification is impossible unless I have experienced a common character (*gotva*) in the cow in question, a common character which is shared by all other cows of the world as well. If it were not the case, I could not have classified it with other cows. This experience of an identical common character (*gotva*) present in all cows does not come to be contradicted, and, since according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, uncontradicted experience is the only criterion of reality, there must be some objective correlative corresponding to my experience of identity and this is what is known as universal (*sāmānya*).

But though the category of universal was postulated originally to account for the notion of commonness or identity (*anuvṛttipratyaya*) in the individual members of a class, it was realised afterwards that everything that produced the notion of commonness could not be said to be a universal. For instance, when there are a number of men, each carrying an umbrella, there is a notion of commonness caused by the umbrella. But the umbrella, being a substance, cannot be regarded as a universal. Moreover, the universal was conceived in the

1. Hoernle's article "Concerning Universals" published in *Mind* 1927, p. 180.

2. *Samānaprasavātmikā jāti. Nyāya-Sūtra*, 2. 2. 69.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system as an eternal entity (*nitya*) which is devoid of any temporal origination and decay. If, therefore, there is any character of a thing which produces the notion of commonness, but which is of transitory nature (*anitya*), it cannot be held to be a universal. For instance, the citizenship of Ayodhyā (*Avodhyā-vāsitva*), which causes a notion of commonness amongst all the citizens of Ayodhyā, cannot be called a universal, for one might leave Ayodhyā and become a citizen of some other town. It was therefore held at a later stage that, not all the characters which cause the notion of commonness, but only such, of them as could be regarded to be eternal (*nitya*) are to be termed as universals. The other non-eternal characters of things which produce the notion of commonness are called *upādhis* to distinguish them from the real *sāmānyas*. An *upādhi* is said to be that characteristic of a thing which has been added to it *ab extra* (*āgantuka dharma*) and can, at anytime, cease to qualify the thing in question. But the universal is a non-adventitious (*anāgantuka*) and natural character (*svābhāvika dharma*) of a particular object which is shared by all other objects belonging to the same class and is responsible for producing the notion of commonness in our mind.³ The "character of being a cook" (*pācakatva*) produces a notion of commonness in our mind so far as the individual members of the cook-class are concerned. But still it cannot be regarded as a real *sāmānya* in view of the fact that it is not a natural and non-adventitious *dharma* of an individual cook, since a cook can no longer be said to be a cook when he is not actually engaged in the act of cooking. Hence "the character of being a cook" (*pācakatva*) is an *upādhi*, not a *sāmānya* of the individual cooks concerned. Śivāditya Miśra remarks that *sāmānya* is of two kinds: (i) *jati*, e. g., *sattā* (existence), *dravyatva* (substantiality), etc., and (ii) *upādhi*, e. g., the 'character of being a cook' (*pācakatva*).⁴ The universal which is conceived to be an objective and eternal reality, is here called *jāti*, a term which is in vogue (in place of *sāmānya*) in the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature. Later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika manuals, however, do

3. *Samānānām bhāvaḥ svābhāviko nāgantuko dharmah sāmānyamityarthaḥ*. Udayana, *Kiraṇāvalī* (Bengali translation by Gourinath Śāstrī,) Part I, p. 221.

4. *Saptapadārthī* (Gurumurti edition), p. 37, section 41,

not refer to two kinds of *sāmānyas*; to them *jāti*, the eternal objective reality, alone is *sāmānya*; the other one, viz., *upādhi*, is not regarded as a kind of *sāmānya*.⁵

Though the distinction between *jāti* and *upādhi* is a typical doctrine of the syncretist school of *Nyāya*, it was not originally envisaged by Goutama, the author of the *Nyāya-Sūtra*. He defines universal simply as the cause of our knowledge of identity or commonness in a class of particular objects. But Kanāda, the author of the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, upholds the opinion that in our knowledge of a particular object both identity (*nyūyṭtipratyaya*) and difference (*vyāyṭtipratyaya*) stand prominent to our mind; we feel a particular cow sharing an identical character with all other cows of the world and also different from dogs, horses etc., and the universal is the cause of both these notions of identity and difference. In support of this view, we may refer to the highly controversial aphorism of Kanāda: "*Sāmānyam viśeṣa itī buddhyapekṣam*" (*Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, 1. 2. 3.). This *sūtra* of Kanāda has given rise to much controversy among the modern scholars as to the true nature of the universal and the word '*buddhyapakṣa*' (relative to understanding) is the source of all these confusions. They cite this particular aphorism of Kanāda to show that originally the system of Vaiśeṣika did not recognise the categories of universal (*sāmānya*) and particularity (*viśeṣa*) as extramental realities; these were merely subjective categories depending for their existence on our reason or understanding (*buddhyapekṣa*).⁶ But this seems to be far from the correct interpretation of the *sūtra*. It strikes at the very root of the utterly realistic attitude of the Vaiśeṣika system. The true and unbiased interpretation of the *sūtra* is that, a universal which exists extra-

5. For a full and comprehensive discussion on the distinction between a *jāti* and an *upādhi*, see Kuppaswami Shastri, 4 *Primer of Indian Logic*, pp. 19-20.

6. "In the *sūtra* 1. 2. 3. *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are declared to be subjective categories in comparison with the first three objective categories (cf. 1. 2. 7.):

Faddegon, *Vaiśeṣika System*, p. 117.

"To him (Kanāda) the conception of generality was a mental creation depending on the mode of cognition."

Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 192.

mentally may be viewed either as a generic character (*sāmānya*) or as a specific character (*viśeṣa*). The universal potness (*ghatatva*) inherent in all pots may be conceived either as a synthetic principle assimilating all individual pots under an identical mode of being, or, as a differentiating character which distinguishes pots from other things which are not pots. Now, whether we should regard a universal as a synthetic principle, or as a differentiating character depends solely upon our thought (*buddhyapakṣ*), but the universal itself is not a mind-dependent entity. The term *viśeṣa* in the *sūtra* in question should be distinguished from "*antya-viśeṣa*" which is used by Kanāda to denote the category of particularity.⁷ Prof. Radhakrishnan observes: "we cannot class Kanāda as a conceptualist, since he admits *sāmānya* as an element of the real. Extreme conceptualism holds that universals exist only in the mind. The general qualities signified by the *sāmānya* are as real as the individual peculiarities, though our thought discriminates the common qualities and gathers them into the universal notion."⁸

Now, leaving aside for the present purpose all these digressional discussions as to the nature of the universal (whether it is real or conceptual) which will be discussed later on, let us come to our point in question, i. e., the defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of the universal. We have already seen that Goutama defines the universal as the cause of identity-knowledge (*samānaprasavātmikā jāti*). But Kanāda supplements the definition by saying that *sāmānya* is not only the cause of our identity-knowledge but also the cause of the knowledge of difference (*sāmānyam viśeṣa itī buddhyapekṣa*), Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāyabhāṣya* accepts the definition as given by Kanāda and following Kanāda's line he designates the universal as "*sāmānya-viśeṣa jātī*".⁹ Uddyotakara in his *Nyāya-vārtika* has not given any new *lakṣaṇa* of the universal. He simply explains the words of Vātsyāyana. But Vācaspati Miśra is of opinion that all that has been said about the

7. Tacca vyāvṛtter api hetutvāt sāmānyam sad viśeṣākhyām api labhate. *Prasastapādabhāṣya* (Benares, 1895), p. 11.

8. *Indian Philosophy* (Vol. II), p. 214.

9. Yo'rtho'nekatra pratyayānuvṛttinimittam tat sāmānyam. Yacca keṣāñcidabhedam kutaścithbhedam karoti tat sāmānyaviśeṣo jātiriti. *Nyāyabhāṣya*, on the *sūtra* 2. 2. 69.

universal in the *Sūtra*, *Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika* do not express the real *lakṣaṇa* of *sāmānya*. They are simply intended to distinguish the universal from the individuals and their forms (*ākṛti*).¹⁰

The real *lakṣaṇa*¹¹ of the universal can be found in the writings of Praśastapāda, a famous Vaiśeṣika thinker, who for the first time in the history of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature gave a regular and systematic shape to the theory of universal. He defines the universal as that entity which is eternal (*nitya*), one (*eka*) and exists in many particular objects (*anekavṛttiḥ*).¹² Udayana in his *Kiraṇāvalī* and almost all other later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers have accepted Praśastapāda's definition of universal without any reserve and we shall now elaborate that universally accepted definition.

Following Praśastapāda, Udayana defines the universal as that eternal entity which, inspite of its numerical unity, resides in many particular objects (*anekavṛttiḥ*).¹³ This definition carefully avoids the fallacy of *ativyāpti* (too wide a definition) by excluding the relations of *saṃyoga* (conjunction) and *vibhāga* (disjunction) from its scope. Like the universal, the relations of *saṃyoga* and *vibhāga* are also said to exist in many particular objects (*anekavṛtti*) conjoined or disjoined by them. For example, when we say "the book is on the table" the preposition 'on' represents the relation of conjunction (*saṃyoga*) between the book and the table, which exists in both of them as their qualifying attribute. But in spite of its *anekavṛtti*va, the relation in question cannot be included within the category of *sāmānya* for two reasons. First, like the universal, it is not numerically one (*eka*) but many (*aneka*). When a universal is said to be present (*anekavṛttiḥ*) in its corresponding particulars, it is the self-

10. Vyaktyākṛtibhyāṁ bhedakatvamātreṇa caitallakṣaṇaṁ natu sarvathā veditavyam.

Vācaspati Miśra, *Tātparyatīkā* (Calcutta Sanskrit Series, 1936), p. 693.

11. *Lakṣaṇa* is said to be that uncommon characteristic (*asādharaṇa dharma*) of a thing which is free from three kinds of logical fallacy : (i) *avyāpti* (fallacy of too narrow a definition), (ii) *ativyāpti* (fallacy of too wide a definition) and (iii) *asambhava* (impossibility)

12. *Padārthadharmasamgraha* (Chowkhamba), p. 311.

13. *Nityamekamanekavṛttiḥ sāmānyam*.

Kiraṇāvalī (Bengali translation by Gourīnāth Śāstrī), p. 221.

same universal that characterises all of them. But the relation of conjunction differs numerically from instance to instance. For example, the *saṃyoga* relation which holds between the book and the table is numerically different from that which holds between a cup and the milk contained in it, because these two cases of conjunction are felt to be different. Secondly, while the universal is eternal (*nitya*), the relation of conjunction is non-eternal (*anitya*) having origination and destruction in time. When a book is placed on a table, the relation of conjunction begins anew, and when it is removed from the table, the relation in question ceases to exist. For these reasons, the relation of *saṃyoga* (and *vibhāga* similarly), in spite of its *anekavṛttitva* cannot be designated as universal.

Next comes the question of the oneness (*ekatva*) of the universal. The universal is said to be one (*eka*) though it resides in many particular objects. But what exactly is meant by the word 'one' (*eka*)? If it means numerical unity as opposed to duality of any kind (*advitīya*), the definition of the universal would involve the fallacy of *ativyūpti* (too wide a definition), since it would include then absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) and the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) within its scope. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, both absolute non-existence and inherence are eternal (*nitya*) and one (in the sense defined above) and they are related to many objects (*anekavṛttih*) by the relation of *svarūpa*.¹⁴ So both of them fulfil the conditions of being included into the category of *sāmānya*, which obviously cannot be done; since, like the universal, these are also declared by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers to be the irreducible objects of our knowledge (*padārtha*). Confronted with this difficulty and with the intention of avoiding the inevitable fallacy of *ativyūpti*, Vardhamāna, a famous Vaiśeṣika commentator, invests the word *eka* with a technical connotation. According to him, the word

14. *Svarūpasambandha* is a peculiar kind of relation recognised by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers where one or the other of the related (*sambandhi*) itself acts as a relation in question and the relation is not something over and above the things related. This kind of relation is supposed to exist between non-existence (*abhāva*) and its different particular loci (*anuyogī*) and also between the relation of *samavāya* and each of the terms related by it.

eka means *asahāya*, that is, the knowledge of which is not logically dependent on and determined by anything else other than itself (*anyānirūpya*). Though both absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) and the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) are one (*eka*) in the sense of non-dual (*advitīya*), their knowledge is not independent and undetermined in the sense defined above. Non-existence (*abhāva*) is not something a meaningless metaphysical blank or airy nothing. It always implies a positive counterpart (*pratiyogī*) and unless we have prior knowledge of this counterpositive, we cannot have any knowledge of its non-existence also. If we do not know what a pot is, we cannot understand what its non-existence means. Hence the knowledge of non-existence always depends on and is determined by the knowledge of its counterpositive (*pratiyogī*). Again, any knowledge of relation (*sambandha*) presupposes the knowledge of the things related by it (*sambandhi*). *Samavāya* is a kind of relation. So the knowledge of it must also be determined by the knowledge of its relata. Hence neither absolute non-existence nor *samavāya* is *eka* in the technical sense of the term defined above, and therefore they cannot be included within the definition of the universal. But the universal has no such determinants (*sahāya*) in this sense. The knowledge of the universal and that of the particular are simultaneous, neither any one of them determines or logically depends upon the other. It is true that we have the knowledge of the universal in a particular locus (object), still they are not related with each other as the determined and the determining (*nirūpyanirūpaka*). If they were related so, there should have been a temporal gap between their knowledge which is not warranted by our actual experience. We have the knowledge of the universal potness (*ghatatva*) along with the knowledge of the individual pot. Hence though the individual pot is the revealer (*abhivyāñjaka*) of the universal potness, it cannot be the determining factor (*nirūpaka*) of the knowledge of the latter. In this sense, the universal is said to be one (*eka*), and if this sense of the word *eka* be taken, the definition of the universal would no longer involve the alleged fallacy of *ativyāpti* by including *atyantābhāva* and *samavāya* within its scope.¹⁵

15. Anekavṛttitvamanekādhāratvaṁ taccābhāvasamavāyayorapyastityata uktamekamasahāyam. Abhāvasamavāyayośca pratiyogisambandhinou sahāyāvityapare.

Vardhamāna, *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* (Asiatic Society), p. 120.

Now, with this technical connotation of the word *eka*, the definition of the universal would be something like this : the universal is that eternal entity which resides in or is related to many particular objects and the knowledge of which is not logically dependent on or determined by anything else other than itself.

But though in some cases the knowledge of the universal is not determined by anything other than itself (*anyānirūpya, asahāya*), it cannot be said that the process is always the same. We cannot immediately recognise a man to be a *brāhmaṇa* as we can immediately recognise a particular animal to be a cow when present before me. On the other hand, if we know him to be the son of a *brāhmaṇa* from some source or other, then and only then, can we recognise him to be a *brāhmaṇa*. Jayanta says that the caste-universals, like *brāhmaṇatva*, are cognised by perception aided by somebody's declaration.¹⁶ Śrīdhara says that the caste is perceived by tradition that one's parents and ancestors were of the same caste.¹⁷ Hence the knowledge of the caste-universals like *brāhmaṇatva* cannot be said to be undetermined and independent (*asahāya*); it is relative to, dependent on and determined by the knowledge of the casts of one's parents and ancestors. This being so, Udayana's definition of the universal as modified above in the light of Vardhamāna's interpretation of the word *eka* will be exposed to the fallacy of *avyāpti* (too narrow a definition), since it will exclude then *brāhmaṇatva* and other genuine caste-universals from its scope. So it cannot be regarded as an improvement upon the definition of the universal as given by Udayana.

But Udayana's definition, as has been already pointed out, has its own difficulty. If the universal is one (*eka*), eternal (*nitya*) and exists in many particular objects (*anekavṛttih*) in the sense in which Udayana defines these terms, the definition in questions would equally apply to the categories of *atyantābhāva* and the relation of *samavāya* as well, since both these categories are also said to be

16. Upadeśa-sahāya-pratyakṣa-gamyatvāt.

Nyāyamañjarī (Chowkhamba, 1936), Part 1, p. 204.

17. Yadā tu mātā-pitros tat pūrveṣāṃ ca vṛddha-paramparayā viśuddham brāhmaṇatvam avasitaṃ tada brāhmaṇo 'yam iti pratyakṣaṇaiva pratīyate.

Nyāyakandaḥ (Benares, 1895), p. 13.

eternal, one and existing in many particular objects. It would thus involve the fallacy of *ativyāpti* by including those categories which cannot and should not be included within its scope. A need was therefore felt to reformulate the definition of the universal which would be free from the loophole just pointed out, and it was realised that the alleged difficulty in Udayana's definition arises due to the fact that though it has been said in the definition that the universal resides in many particular objects (*anekavyṛttiḥ*), the precise mode of its relation with its corresponding particulars has not been clearly stated in it. In order to overcome this drawback the phrase *anekavyṛtīva* in the definition in question was replaced by the phrase *anekasamavetatva* and the universal was redefined as that eternal entity which is related to many particular objects by the relation of inherence (*nityatve sati anekasamavetatvam*).¹⁸ This definition has been accepted by all the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers as the true definition of the universal, because it is free from all the logical difficulties mentioned above. It no longer commits the fallacy of *ativyāpti* by including absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) and the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) within its scope, because though *atyantābhāva* and *samavāya* are said to be eternal (*nitya*) and related to many particular objects (*anekavyṛttiḥ*), the relation which holds between them and their corresponding particulars is not one of *samavāya* but *svarūpa*, a peculiar kind of relation admitted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.¹⁹ Hence the definition of the universal in question cannot be extended over to them. Again, it does not commit the fallacy of *avyāpti* by excluding the aforesaid, *brāhmaṇatva*, a genuine universal, from its scope, because "the characteristic of not being determined by others" (*anyānirūpyatva*, *asahāyatva*) is not a part of the defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of the universal. Like the universal potness (*ghatatva*), the universal *brāhmaṇatva* is also eternal and related to all individual *brāhmaṇas* by the relation of inherence. Hence it is as true a universal as the universal potness.

The word *aneka* in the given definition of the universal is important and if it is dropped, that would lead us to the fallacy of *ativyāpti*, since the definition would include then the size of *ākāśa* (*gagana parimāṇa*) within its scope. The size of *ākāśa* is eternal and

18. Viśvanātha, *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse 8.

19. *Supra*, footnote 14.

inheres (*samaveta*) in the *ākāśa* as its attribute. But since the number of *ākāśa* is one and not many, its size cannot be *anekasamaveta* like the universal. In order to avoid this difficulty, the word *aneka* has been added to the definition.

It may be urged by an opponent that in accordance with the given definition of the universal, the conjunction (*saṁyoga*) between two ubiquitous entities (*vibhūdṛavyas*) like the soul and *ākāśa* should be regarded as universal, because such conjunction is eternal (*nitya*) and resides in more than one object by the relation of inherence (*anekasamaveta*). As an answer to this objection, it may be pointed out that most of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers deny the very possibility of the relation of conjunction (*aja-saṁyoga*) between two eternal all-pervading substances. They are of opinion that the relation of conjunction holds between two substances only when they can and normally do exist in separation from each other (*yutasiddha*). When two such separately existing substances come into partial contact with each other due to motion, the relation of conjunction emerges into being; when they are separated again the relation in question becomes destroyed. But two ubiquitous substances, e. g., the soul and *ākāśa*, can never exist in separation from each other. They, being all pervading, are always found to be related with each other. Hence the relation between two *vibhūdṛavyas* cannot be one of conjunction (*aja-saṁyoga*)²⁰ The alleged fallacy of *ativyāpti*, therefore, cannot be imagined in the definition of the universal.

20. Nāstyajah saṁyogo nityaparimandalsvat pṛthagānabhidhānāt.
Praśastapāda, *Padārthadharmasamgraha*, p. 140.

Some later Nyaya thinkers, however, being influenced by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, admit the reality of eternal conjunction (*aja-saṁyoga*) between the ubiquitous substances like the soul and *ākāśa* on the ground that, since these substances are all-pervading (*vibhu*) and therefore are in simultaneous conjunction (*saṁyoga*) with all other things of limited magnitude (*mūrta dravyas*) of the world, they themselves are to be taken to be indirectly conjoined with one another. Vide, Umesh Miśra, *Conception of Matter, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* p. 48. But this argument does not seem plausible to us. For a further discussion on the possibility of eternal conjunction between the ubiquitous substances, see Ch. II.

Hence, in so far as the defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇas*) of the universal are concerned, we find that the universal is a separate extramental category (*padārtha*) which is eternal (*nitya*), one (*eka*) and exists in many particular objects by the relation of inherence (*anekasamaveta*). It has also been conceived as the cause of the notion of identity in our mind (*anugatapratyaya-kāraṇa*).

CHAPTER—II

THE NATURE OF SAMAVĀYA

We have already seen in Chapter I that a great many difficulties arose in the definition of the universal so long as we did not introduce the concept of *samavāya* as a relating principle between the universal and its corresponding particulars. Hence it is necessary to investigate the nature of this relation and to see how far it is logically relevant to admit the reality of this relation as a separate category (*padārtha*) in connection with the problem of universal. In the present chapter, our discussion will be mainly confined to the investigation of the nature of *samavāya*, while the question of the logical relevance of this concept with regard to the problem of universal will be discussed in the next chapter entitled "The Mīmāṃsā view of Universal".

In all probability, the conception of *samavāya* at first originated in connection with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation. Kaṇāda originally defines *samavāya* as a relation between a (material) cause and its effect.¹ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school advocates the doctrine of *asat-kārya-vāda*, according to which the effect (*kārya*) does not exist (*asat*) in its material cause prior to its production. The effect comes into being *de novo* and is quite other than the material cause. But once the effect is produced, it resides in its material cause by the relation of *samavāya*. That is why the material cause has been termed in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system as the *samavāyī kāraṇa* of its effect. Thus the 'threads' are the material cause of a 'cloth'. But the cloth does not pre-exist in the threads. When a cloth is produced out of threads, it is an entirely new product and a new substance (*dravya*) too. After its production the cloth abides in the threads, the relation between the two being one of *samavāya*. It is a peculiar feature of *samavāya* that it relates two different material substances—the threads and the cloth—in such a way that both of them occupy the same position in space.² Occupation of the same space by two different objects is conceivable when one of the related objects

1. Iḥedam iti yataḥ kārya-kāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyāḥ.

Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra, VII. ii. 26.

2. deśa-bhedaś ca tayoṛ nāsti.

Jayanta Bhatta, *Nyāyamañjarī* (Benares, 1936), Part I, p. 285

is a substance and the other is a non-substance, e. g., a quality. But how is it possible in the case of two material substances to occupy the same space without violating the logical law of contradiction? The only answer that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school can give is that this miracle is done by *samavāya* owing to its magic power (*mahimā*)³.

While Kaṇāda includes only causal ties in the relation of *samavāya*, Praśastapāda extends the scope of this relation and brings some non-causal ones also under it. He defines *samavāya* as the relationship subsisting among entities that are inseparable, standing to one another in the relation of the container and the contained and being the basis of the idea "this is in that".⁴ In accordance with this definition, the relation of *samavāya* holds only where two conditions are fulfilled simultaneously, viz., (i) when the relation holds between two inseparable (*ayuta-siddha*) entities, and (ii) when it is a relation between a container and a thing contained (*ādhārāśrēya*). The concave and the convex sides of a tumbler are inseparable but one of them does not contain the other. Again the relation between a cup and coffee in it is a relation between container and the contained but it is not an inseparable relation, since the relation ceases to be as soon as we spill the coffee out of the cup. Hence in neither of these cases the relation is one of *samavāya*. But the two conditions required for a relation to be *samavāya* are simultaneously fulfilled by the relations between (i) a substance and its attributes (*dravya* and *guṇa*), (ii) a substance and its activity (*dravya* and *karma*), (iii) a universal and its corresponding particular (*jāti* and *vyakti*), (iv) a whole and its parts (*avayavī* and its *avayavas*) and (v) particularity and eternal substances like space, time, material atoms etc. (*viśeṣa* and *nitya dravyas*). Hence the relationship subsisting between such entities is one of *samavāya*.

Samavāya is not the only connecting relation admitted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, there being others like *samyoga*, *svārūpa* etc.,

3. See Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandaḥ* (Benares, 1895), p. 316.

4. *Ayuta-siddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayaḥ sa samavāyaḥ*.

Praśastapāda-bhāṣya (Benares, 1895), p. 14.

and unless we interpret *samavāya* in contradistinction from them, we cannot claim to have understood its nature completely. It can be legitimately asked in this connection—is it absolutely necessary to assign to *samavāya* that independent ontological status, which has been given to it by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers in their seven-fold list of categories (*sapta-padārthas*)? Can it not be reduced to any one of the above-mentioned connecting relations recognised by them? Can it not be shown that the function which the *samavāya* relation is supposed to perform in the ultimate scheme of the universe can equally be performed by either the relation of *saṁyoga* or *svatūpa*? If it can be done so, the concept of *samavāya* becomes easily eliminated from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika list of categories as an unnecessary redundant hypothesis. That will be, after all, in consonance with the principle of parsimony (*lāghava*), a principle which is so much relied upon and referred to by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers themselves. To this, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers answer that the proposed reduction of the relation of *samavāya* to either of *saṁyoga* or *svatūpa* is not permissible in view of the essential difference of nature between *samavāya*, on the one hand, and *saṁyoga* and *svatūpa*, on the other. The irreducible ultimacy of the relation of *samavāya*, therefore, has to be admitted. That the *samavāya* relation cannot be reduced to or replaced by the relation of *saṁyoga* can be shown in the following way.

The relation of *saṁyoga* (conjunction) holds exclusively between two substances (*dravyas*) which normally do exist in separation from each other occupying different positions in space. They become related accidentally owing to the movement of either or both of the relata. The relation holding between the branch of a tree and a bird seated on it is a typical example of the *saṁyoga* relation. The relation of *samavāya*, too, holds between two substances but only when they satisfy a special condition, the condition being that the substances related by *samavāya* must stand in the relationship of material cause and its effect. But over and above this (i) relation between two substances, the *samavāya* relation holds also, as we have indicated already, (ii) between a substance and a non-substance, as in the case of a quality (*guṇa*), movement (*karma*), universal (*sāmānya*) and *viśeṣa* residing in their corresponding substances, and (iii) between two non-substances, as in the case of a universal residing in its corresponding qualities and movement. Now let us

take any one of the above cases of *samavāya* relation and see whether it can be adequately replaced by the relation of *saṁyoga* (conjunction). The relation between the universal cowness (*gotva*) and its corresponding particular substance, a particular cow (*go*), is said to be one of *samavāya*. Now, if it be urged that the relation in question is not *samavāya* but one of *saṁyoga*, the following difficulties will inevitably creep in. The *saṁyoga* relation is always caused by the movement (*karma*) of either or both of its relata. But the cause of the supposed relation of conjunction between the universal cowness and the particular cow cannot be attributed to any one of them. It cannot be caused by the movement of the universal cowness (*gotva*), because the universals are, by definition, devoid of any kind of motion, the phenomenon of movement being exclusively reserved for the substances (*dravyas*) only ; and though the individual cow, being a substance, is capable of movement, the cause of its relation with its corresponding universal cannot be ascribed to it either due to the following reason. The substance (*dravya*) is said to be the inherent cause (*samavāyi kārāṇa*) of its motion (*karma*) and the very notion of cause implies that it must precede its effect (*niyata pūrvavartī*) at least by one moment in the order of time. Now, if the movement of the particular cow is supposed to be the cause of the so-called relation of conjunction (*saṁyoga*) between it and the universal cowness, then it must be admitted that the relation takes place a moment later the individual cow is born, since the cow, being the inherent cause (*samavāyi kārāṇa*) of its motion, must be devoid of it at the first moment (*ādya kṣaṇe*) of its birth. This commits us to the conclusion that the universal cowness cannot be related to the individual cow at the very moment when the cow is born first. But this conclusion directly contradicts our immediate experience of a cow. As soon as a cow is born, we immediately recognise it as a cow, and this immediate recognition of the cow as a cow would be impossible unless we directly apprehend the universal cowness to be related to it right from the beginning. Hence the relation between a universal and its corresponding particular cannot be one of *saṁyoga*. It is other than the *saṁyoga*. It is *samavāya*.

One of the essential differences between *saṁyoga* and *samavāya* which prevents the latter from being reduced to the former is that while the *saṁyoga* relations are numerically different from instances

to instances (*aneka*), the relation of *samavāya* is always one (*eka*). The conjunction (*saṃyoga*) which holds between 'a man' and 'a stick in his hand' is numerically different from that which holds between 'the branch of a tree, and 'a bird seated on it'. These two cases of conjunction, a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinker urges, are felt to be different, a feeling which never comes to be contradicted; and as uncontradicted experience is the only criterion of reality, their numerical duality has to be admitted. But the relation of *samavāya* which holds between a universal and its corresponding particulars is identically the same with that which holds between a substance and its attributes. One and the same *samavāya* reveals itself in diverse situations mentioned already. The plurality of the *samavāya* relation is rejected by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers on the strength of the law of parsimony (*lāghava*). They are of opinion that one inherence (*samavāya*) is enough to account for all notions expressed in different situations—"this subsists in the abode". Therefore, it is unnecessary and going against the *lāghava* formula to postulate different inferences between the aforesaid diverse kinds of entities amongst which the relation of *samavāya* is supposed to hold. It is interesting to note here that by appealing to the same principle of parsimony, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Advaita Vedantins did away with the relation of *samavāya* altogether replacing it by the relation of *svatva*. *Svatva* is said to be a peculiar kind of relation between two entities where one or the other of the relata itself acts as a relation and the relation is not something over and above the related terms. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Advaita Vedantins argue that it would be more in keeping with the principle of parsimony if the relation of *samavāya* be dropped from the list of categories (*padārthas*) altogether and be maintained that the relata of the so-called *samavāya* relation are related with one another by the very nature of their corresponding substrata (*svatva*) themselves. But as against this Viśvanāth, a famous Naiyāyika, points out that it is rather the position of the Bhāṭṭas and the Advaitins than that of his own which contradicts the principle of parsimony. He argues that if an effect were held to be subsisting in its material cause, or qualities, movements etc. subsisting in their substances by the very nature of their substrata (instead of *samavāya* relation), then the substrata being endless, relations would also be endless. It would thus, lead to needless multiplication of assumptions (*kalpanā-gaurava*)

and therefore, for the sake of brevity, it was better to assume one separate relation called *samavāya*⁵.

The unity of *samavāya* has been made a point of attack by the opponents of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Praśastapāda records such an objection raised by the opponents: "If *samavāya* is one, the *samavāya* of *dravyatva* (the universal of substance) and that of *guṇatva* (the universal of quality) being the same, the universal *dravyatva* will reside in the qualities also, and *guṇatva* in the substances also. This will give rise to confusion of objects."⁶ To this objection Praśastapāda replies: "Although *dravyatva* and *guṇatva* have the same *samavāya*, there is the difference of potentiality of manifestation (*vyaṅgya-vyāñjaka-śakti*), on account of which there will be a restriction in the relation of the container and the contained (*ādihāra* and *ādheya*)"⁷ Śrīdhara comments that "the potentiality of manifesting *dravyatva* resides only in substances, and therefore, the universal *dravyatva* will reside by *samavāya* relation only in substances and nowhere else."⁸ But it would mean that besides the universal *dravyatva* which resides in a substance, there is another feature called 'the potentiality of manifesting *dravyatva*' which also resides in substances side by side with *dravyatva*. An opponent may point out here that this is an instance which shows how the exponents

5. Viśvanātha, *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, on verse 11.

It is, however, doubtful if the assumption of *samavāya* actually leads to brevity. As a matter of fact, acceptance of a new category involves more assumptions (*gaurava*) than the acceptance of the relation in the form of substrata which, although endless, do not involve the assumption of a new category.

6. Nanu yady-ekaḥ samavāyo dravya-guṇa-karmaṇām dravyatva-guṇatva-karmatvādi-viśeṣaṇaiḥ saha sambandhaikatvāt padārtha-saṁhāra-prasaṅga iti.

Praśastapāda-bhāṣya (Benares, 1895), p. 327.

7. Dravyatvādīnām api samavāyaikatve 'pi vyaṅgya-vyāñjaka-śakti-bhedād ādhārādheya-niyama iti.

Ibid.

8. Dravyatvābhivyāñjikā śaktir dravyāṇām eva tēna dravyeṣv eva dravyatvaḥ samavaiti nānyatra.

Nyāyakandah (Benares, 1895), p. 328.

of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in spite of their insistence on the principle of *lāghava* in proving the unity of *samavāya*, are apt to forget it and make any number of bold assumptions to meet a difficult situation. Hence the answer of Praśastapāda to the objection in question is not convincing at all. Viśvanātha, realising the inadequacy of Praśastapāda's answer, meets the objection of the opponent—that *samavāya* being one, the *samavāya* of colour should be present in the air also,—by pointing out : "although the *samavāya* of colour is present in the air, yet there is no colour in the air,"⁹ and, therefore, there is no cognition of colour. But all this is mere verbal jugglery. How can *samavāya* of colour be conceived without the presence of colour? In view of these difficulties, the later Naiyāyikas refuse to view *samavāya* as one.¹⁰ The position of the Naiyāyikas, therefore, that the relation of *saṃyoga* is numerically different from instance to instance while that of *samavāya* is identically the same, cannot be effectively maintained.

Another most important difference between the relation of *saṃyoga* and that of *samavāya*, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers lies in this that while the former is transient (*anitya*), the latter is eternal (*nitya*). Two or more substances related by *saṃyoga* can always be separated.¹¹ As a result of this separation, the relation itself is destroyed, but the things or terms related by it do not suffer any change or modification. The relation between the branch of a tree and a bird seated on it is one of *saṃyoga*. So long as they are conjoined in this way, their conjunction subsists in both the branch and the bird as their qualifying character (*guṇa*). But as soon as the bird flies away from that branch the relation of conjunction

9. Tatra rūpa-samavāya-sattve 'pi rūpābhāvat.
Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, on verse, 11.

10. See Dinakari on *Muktāvalī* (Nirnaya Sagara Press) 1916, p. 86.

11. This is not true, of course, in the cases of *saṃyoga* relation between all pervading (*vibhu*) *dravyas* like *ākāśa* and *ātman*. These entities are said to be eternally conjoined with each other which can never be separated. But the concept of eternal conjunction (*aia-saṃyoga*) is emphatically denied by most of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers. See Dinakari on *Muktāvalī* p. 73. The reason for this denial will be discussed later on.

holding between them becomes destroyed ; but the destruction of this relation does not destroy or affect the reality of either the branch or the bird. The things related by *samavāya* cannot always be sundered in this way, e.g., atoms of earth and its fragrance ; but where they can be, one at least of them suffers destruction as the result of such sundering. But the relation itself, though it ceases to be revealed through that particular instance, continues to be ; and is revealed through other similar instances. The relation between the universal cowness (*gotva*) and the individual cow (*go*) is, for example, one of *samavāya*. Now, normally this relation between them cannot be separated unless the individual cow dies. But when the individual cow dies and therefore becomes dissociated from its corresponding "cowness", the relation of *samavāya* as such is not destroyed along with it ; it simply ceases to be revealed there due to the absence of one of its relata, viz., the individual cow. It continues to reveal itself in the cases of relation between "cowness" and other living individual cows. Hence unlike the *saṃyoga* relation, the relation of *samavāya* is eternal (*nitya*) and does not admit of either origination or decay.

Śaṅkara Miśra, a famous Vaiśeṣika thinker, has formulated an argument to prove the eternity of *samavāya*¹². He argues that since the cause of *samavāya* relation cannot be ascertained, it is to be regarded as uncaused and therefore eternal. If it were an effect, it must have a material cause. If it had a material cause, it would be related to its cause either by itself, or by another inherence, since the relation between a material cause and its effect is always one of inherence. But as no entity can be both a substrate and its content at the same time, inherence cannot be related to its material cause by itself, because it would be then the substrate of itself. Nor can inherence be related to its cause by another inherence, since in that case, the relation of inherence, in order to be related to each of its relata, would require a third inherence and this process would be multiplied indefinitely. It would, thus, involve the fallacy of vicious *regressus ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*). So, inherence is to be regarded as uncaused, and therefore it is eternal.¹³

12. *Upaskāra* (Gujrati Press, 1913), VII. ii. 26.

13. The later Naiyayikas, however, following the Prābhākara Mimāṃsakas, refuse to view *samavāya* as eternal.

See G. N. Jha's *Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*. p. 92.

Inherence (*samavāya*) is said to be a relation between two inseparable entities (*ayuta-siddha*), while the relation of *saṃyoga* (conjunction) holds between two such entities as can normally exist in separation from each other (*yuta-siddha*). In order to clarify the meaning of the term inseparableness (*ayuta-siddhata*), Śrīdhara remarks that the things related by *samavāya* occupy the same position of space in such a way that they appear as if they were blended together like an iron ball and fire.¹⁴ But the case is quite otherwise with the *saṃyoga* relation. Here the relata, normally occupying different positions of space, become related accidentally due to the movement of either or both of them. Even when they are related in this way, they cannot occupy the same position of space like the relata of the *samavāya* relation. Conjunction (*saṃyoga*) is not interpenetration of one substance with the other. It is the partial contact between two substances. One of the essential differences, therefore, between the relation of *saṃyoga* and that of *samavāya* lies in the fact that while the former is a relation between two separable entities (*yuta-siddha*), the latter is a relation between two inseparable ones (*ayuta-siddha*). But the example of iron ball and fire used by Śrīdhara to illustrate the meaning of inseparableness does not seem to be appropriate, since the fire can exist apart from the iron ball and *vice versa*, the iron ball can exist apart from the fire. Jayanta, therefore, offers another meaning of the term "inseparableness" which seems to be more apt than that offered by Śrīdhara. He says that the alleged inseparable relation (*ayutasiddhasambandha*) is a peculiar kind of relation in which the relata of the relation in question, in spite of the fact that they occupy the same position of space, cannot but be related with one another. In other words, the relation of *samavāya* is necessary, while that of *saṃyoga* is adventitious and contingent. Jayanta makes this sense clear by way of answering an anticipated objection of the opponent. The opponent might urge that the very idea of a relation between two inseparables is self contradictory. "How can inseparableness (*ayuta-siddhata*) and relationship be reconciled? Only those objects which exist separately like a basket and a plum, or a man

14. Samavāyasya punar eṣa mahimā yad atra sambandhināv
ayaḥ-piṇḍa-vahnivat piṇḍibhūtāv eva pratiyate.

and a woman, can be related to one another. Inseparable things, however, being one and identical, which of them can be related to what?"¹⁵ Jayanta answers this objection that though the entities related by *samavāya* do not occupy different positions of space and are never seen without being related with each other, yet they should not be taken to be identical (*eka*). Our uncontradicted experience stands as a guarantee of their ontological distinction. In the cognition of an object like 'white cloth', whiteness appears as an entity separate from the cloth in which it is experienced as residing. An object of our experience which appears at first glance as one integral whole is thus resolved into two components. These two components, it is true, are not physically separable; but since perception guarantees their distinction which never comes to be contradicted, and as uncontradicted experience, according to the Naiyāyikas, is the only criterion of reality, their distinction has to be admitted. They are not physically separable, but ontologically distinguishable categories. That being so, there must be some device to unite them once again to give us a complete object of knowledge. That device is conceived in the form of inherent relation called *samavāya*.¹⁶ That is why it is said that the function of *samavāya* is to relate two entities which are (physically) inseparable (*ayuta-siddha*) from one another. Thus no contradiction is involved in this position.

The term *ayuta-siddha* has a technical connotation in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. It means that the *samavāya* is an inseparable relation between two such entities amongst which at least one of them is incapable of physically separate existence apart from the other. It has been remarked already that *samavāya* is a necessary relation, but this necessity has been conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers as one-sided necessity, that is, while one of the relata cannot exist apart from being related with the other, the other

15. Ayuta-siddhatā ca sambandhaś ceti katham saṃgacchate, prthaksiddhe hi vastuni kuṇḍa-vadaravad anyonyaṃ saṃbadhyete stri-puṃsavad vā. Ayuta-siddhe tu tad ekatvāt kiṃ kena saṃbadhyate.

Jayanta, *Nyāyamañjarī*, (Benares, 1936), Part I. p. 272.

16. Pratīti-bhedād bhedo 'sti deśa-bhedas tu neṣyate, Tenātra kalpyate vṛttiḥ samavāyaḥ sa ucyate.

Jayanta, *Nyāyamañjarī*, Part I, p. 285.

can exist on its own outside of this relation. Thus the composite whole (*avayavi*) cannot exist apart from its component parts (*avayavas*). But when the whole is destroyed, the parts can exist apart from it. But so long as the whole exists, it and its parts cannot exist apart from each other. A quality (*guṇa*) and a movement (*karma*) cannot exist apart from their corresponding substance (*dravya*). But the substance, being the material cause (*samavāyīkāraṇa*) of them, can exist by itself just a moment before the quality and the movement in question are generated within it. But so long as the quality and the movement persist, a substance cannot exist apart from them. A particular (*vyakti*) cannot exist apart from its corresponding universal (*jāti*). But the universals have been conceived in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system with some sort of autonomy of their own. At the time of cosmic dissolution (*pralaya*) when all the particular objects of the world are destroyed, the universals continue to exist in their own realm of existence. But so long as the particulars last, the universals cannot exist apart from them. Hence except in few cases, e. g., *viśeṣa* and eternal substances or the atom of earth and its fragrance where dependence is mutual, there is only one-sided dependence. The terms related by *samavāya* are ontologically quite distinct, but while one of them may exist by itself, the other cannot. This, however, is no disproof of the dependent term's ontological distinctness. The reason why one of the relata of the *samavāya* relation is not seen separately by itself is that it becomes related to its correlate as it comes to be. Its origination, as it is said, is contemporaneous with its relation : *Jataḥ sambandhaś ca iti eka kalaḥ*"¹⁷ A rose, being the *samavāyīkāraṇa* of its colour, exists by itself without being related to its colour just a moment before the said colour is generated within it. But as soon as the colour is generated, it gets related to its corresponding substance rose. This is why the colour of the rose, though ontologically a separate entity apart from the rose, is not seen without the latter.

17. Uddyotakara, *Nyāya-vārtika* (Benares, 1915), p. 236. Uddyotakara enunciates this principle in connection with the question of 'whole' and its 'parts'. Its applicability to all cases involving *samavāya* is clear from the other works on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

It might be objected that the definition of *samavāya* as an eternal relation between two inseparable entities involves the fallacy of too wide a definition (*ativyāptidoṣa*), since it includes within its scope the cases of eternal conjunction (*aja-saṁyoga*) between two ubiquitous entities (*vibhu dravyas*) like space and time (*dik* and *kāla*) or the soul and *ākāśa*. The concept of eternal conjunction (*aja-saṁyoga*) is endorsed by the Mīmāṃsakas especially by the Bhāṭṭas.¹⁸ They argue that if two entities A and B are simultaneously conjoined with a third entity C belonging to the same spatio-temporal order, then A and B themselves should be taken to be conjoined with each other.¹⁹ For example, we directly perceive in a moonlit night the conjunction of moonlight with the branch of a tree. Again, we can infer the conjunction of air with the very same branch from the movement of its leaves. Hence as both moonlight and air are conjoined with the same branch of a tree, they themselves will be conjoined with each other. Following the same line of argument, it is said, that the relation which holds between space, time and other ubiquitous entities is one of conjunction (*saṁyoga*), because all of them, being all-pervading, are in simultaneous conjunction with every other entities of limited magnitude of the world. And, as they are eternally existing entities (*nitya-dravyas*) devoid of motion, the possibility of their coming into conjunction at a particular point of time and that of their being disjoined at any time are easily precluded. This means that the relation of conjunction holding between them is to be taken as eternal, subject neither to origination nor to decay. But the very possibility of conjunction (*saṁyoga*) between these ubiquitous entities has been denied by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers on the following ground. They argue that the relation of conjunction holds only between those entities which can and normally do exist in separation from one another (*yuta-siddha*). Now, if the relation between two ubiquitous entities like space and time is held to be one of conjunction, then it must be admitted that before they were

18. Nityavibhūnām vyomakālādīnāṁ parasparasamīyogo nityaḥ.
Mānameyodaya (Theosophical Publishing House, 1933),
 p. 246.

19. See, the article *Samavāyalakṣaṇa vicāra* by Viśvabandhu Nyāyācārya published in the Bengali journal "Darśana" (Śrāvana, 1361 B. S.), p. 6.

conjoined they, too, had existed separately. If they had, what brought them into conjunction with one another? The relation of conjunction, it is said, is always brought about in two different ways. It may be brought about, in the first place, by the movement of any one or both of its relata (*karmaja saṁyoga*), and secondly, the conjunction of two 'parts' (*avayavas*) of two different 'wholes' (*avayavīs*) may bring those 'wholes' into conjunction with each other (*saṁyogaja saṁyoga*). But, since the eternal ubiquitous entities are partless and devoid of any kind of motion, neither of the two aforesaid ways can bring them into conjunction with one another. Their relation, therefore, cannot be one of conjunction (*saṁyoga*). Hence the supposed fallacy of too wide a definition (*ativyāpti doṣa*) with regard to the definition of *samavāya* will not arise at all.

Except in the cases of *samavāya* relation between a material cause and its effect where both the related entities are substances, the relation of *samavāya* generally holds between a substantive real and its positive adjectival character (*viśeṣaṇa*). Where the adjectival character is a negative one like the non-existence of movement (*kriyābhāva*) in a non-moving pot, its relation with its substantive real (pot) is not one of *samavāya* but *svarūpa*, a special kind of relation where one or other of the relata is itself the relation, and the relation is not something over and above the related terms. This relation of *svarūpa* cannot be treated on a par with or be reduced to that of *samavāya* in view of their essential differences in nature. The *samavāya* relation is eternal while that of *svarūpa* is non-eternal and subject to destruction. Had it also been eternal like *samavāya*, there would have been the cognition of non-existence of movement (*kriyābhāva*) in a pot even when the pot is impelled to motion by some external impact. But this is not the case. No one perceives the non-existence of motion in a moving pot. It cannot be said that the non-existence of movement (*kriyābhāva*) leaves a pot and goes away elsewhere when it acquires motion, since the category of non-existence, being incorporeal (*amūrta*) is, by definition, incapable of motion of any kind. Nor can it be said that its *kriyābhāva* become destroyed when the pot in question is impelled to motion, since it is perceived in other non-moving pots of the world. Non-existence of movement (*kriyābhāva*) should be taken to be numerically one in all its loci (*adhikarāṇa*). To hold that non-existence is numerically different from locus to locus would be to indulge in unnecessary multiplication of hypotheses (*kalpanā gaurava*).

So, if non-existence of motion becomes destroyed in a moving pot, then, this non-existence being numerically one, all other non-moving objects of the world, would at once be impelled to movement which is absurd. But if the non-existence of motion does not leave a moving pot, nor is destroyed, why don't we cognise it in the pot in question? The answer given by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers is that we do not perceive *kriyābhāva* in a moving pot simply because the external impact which impels the non-moving pot to motion destroys the relation of *svatūpa* which holds between the pot and its non-existence of movement (*kriyābhāva*). Now, the relation of *svatūpa*, it is said, is not something over and above the terms related by it. It is always in the nature of one of its relata—either the container (*ādīkaraṇa*) or the contained (*ādheya*). In the present case, it cannot be in the nature of *kriyābhāva* (non-existence of movement) which stands as the *ādheya* of the relation in question, since it is pronounced to be indestructible by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers. So it must be in the nature of the pot itself which is the *ādīkaraṇa* of the relation concerned. When a pot acquires motion by some external impact, this pot is said to be destroyed in the sense that a non-moving pot which stands as the *svatūpa* relation with its corresponding *kriyābhāva* is not identically the same pot which is in motion. The moment a pot acquires motion, it becomes an entirely new pot from the pot of the former moment which was at rest.²⁰ Hence it must be admitted that the relation of *svatūpa* is a non-eternal relation having its origination in time and is subject to destruction. This distinguishes it from the *samavāya* relation which is said to be eternal. So the relation of *svatūpa* cannot be a legitimate substitute for that of *samavāya*.²¹

Admitting the reality of the relation of *samavāya* as an irreducible ontological category (*padārtha*), the question naturally arises how is it known by us? On this question of the knowledge of *samavāya* relation, the Naiyāyikas differ from the Vaiśeṣikas. The followers of

20. *Ibid*, p. 9.

21. From the above discussion, it should not be understood, however, that the relation of *svatūpa* holds only between a substantive real and its negative adjectival character. It holds between many positive entities also.

the Nyāya school hold that *samavāya* is perceptible while those of the Vaiśeṣikas deny it. The Vaiśeṣika school puts forward the opinion that the *samavāya* relation lies beyond the possibility of sense-perception and it can be known only by way of inference.²²

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, an object can be perceived only if it comes in contact with the sense (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*). Senses being substances can have contact in the form of direct conjunction (*saṁyoga*) only with other substances. In the case of the perception of non-substances, i. e., qualities, universals etc., indirect sense-object contacts (*sannikarṣas*) have been postulated. In this case, our sense comes in contact with its object indirectly through the mediation of a third term that is related to both. For example, when we see a particular colour of a jar, say red, our visual sense comes in contact with the colour in question through the medium of the jar. The jar as a substance is directly conjoined (*saṁyukta*) with the visual sense on the one hand, and contains that red colour as an inherent attribute (*samaveta*) of it, on the other. Here the contact (*sannikarṣa*) between sense and object is due to the object's i. e., the particular red colour's inherence (*samavāya*) in a substance (jar) which is conjoined (*saṁyukta*) to sense. Hence this indirect sense-object contact is called *saṁyukta-samavāya* or a relation of inherence in what is conjoined to sense. In the case of the perception of the universal redness (*raktatva*) residing in the particular red shade of the jar, sense-object contact is more indirect than what we find in the preceding case. In it, the form of sense-object contact (*sannikarṣa*) is *saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*, i. e., inherence (*samavāya*) in a thing which is inherent (*samaveta*) in a substance which is directly conjoined (*saṁyukta*) to the sense. There is inherence (*samavāya*) of the universal redness in the particular shade of red colour which is inherent (*samaveta*) in the jar (the substance) which is conjoined (*saṁyukta*) to the eye. Six kinds of such sense-object contact (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*), including the first kind of direct contact in the form of conjunction (*saṁyoga*), are accepted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy.

22. *Samavāyasya pratyakṣa-varṇanam Nyāyamatenā, Vaiśeṣika-mate tu samavāyo 'tindriyaḥ.*

Laugākṣibhāskara, *Tarkakaumudī* (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1928), p. 8.

The sixth of these contacts is called "the relation of being an adjective" (*viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*) which is accepted in the case of perception of non-existence (*abhāva*). It is held that if any object, substance or non-substance, comes in contact with the sense by any of the first five forms of contact, and if there resides in that object any non-existence (*abhāva*) as its adjectival feature, the non-existence in question is perceived by the sixth form of contact, i. e., *viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*.

The followers of the Nyāya school point out that *samavāya* is equally an adjectival feature of the object in which something resides by that relation, and that *samavāya* also, therefore, like non-existence, is perceived by the sixth kind of contact. It appears that the Naiyāyikas conceived the sixth kind of contact mainly to explain the perception of non-existence against the Mīmāṃsakas who emphatically deny that non-existence is perceived. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, non-existence is comprehended by a separate means of knowledge called the non-apprehension or the non-existence of apprehension (*anupalabdhi* or *abhāva-pramāṇa*). In the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśavamīśra, a Mīmāṃsaka opponent points out that "to be an adjective" (*viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*) is no relation at all, because a real objective relation must be different from the objects related by it, and "to be an adjective" is not different from the adjective itself. Keśavamīśra does not rebut that assertion of the Mīmāṃsaka, but only offers the comment that the principle "only the objects related to the sense can be perceived" is applicable only to the case of positive objects. Non-existence being a negative entity may be perceived even without sense-object relation, merely by being an adjective.²³ Now, if only negative objects are perceived through this sixth kind of peculiar relation, i. e., *viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*, *samavāya* not being negative, cannot be perceived through it. Strangely enough, Keśavamīśra himself overlooked the implication of his own statement, and true to his allegiance to the Nyaya school, maintained, while describing the sixth kind of *sannikarṣa*, that

23. Bhāvāvacchinnatvād vyāpter, bhāvaṃ prakāśayad indriyaṃ prāptam eva prakāśayati na tu abhāvaṃ. Abhāvaṃ prakāśayad indriyaṃ viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva-mukhenaiveti.

Keśavamīśra, *Tarkabhāṣā* (Poona, 1937), p. 53.

samavāya is also perceived through that (*viśeṣaṇābhāva*) relation.²⁴ The Vaiśeṣika school, on the other hand, was conscious of the difficulty in establishing a sense-contact with *samavāya*, and was, therefore, content to hold *samavāya*, to be merely inferable.

In the light of distinction made in Western philosophy between external and internal relation, Radhakrisnan observes that the relation of *samavāya* is an internal relation.²⁵ There has been much heated controversy in Western philosophy as to the nature of external relation. Leaving aside all those subtle polemics, the points agreed upon by the proponents of external relation are mainly two. A relation between two terms is to be called external when (i) it is ontologically independent of and cannot be reduced to the terms it relates and (ii) when it does not bring any change or modification to those related terms.²⁶ Judged by this two-fold criterion of external relation, the relation of *samavāya* appears to be external, not internal relation as is supposed by Radhakrisnan.

In order to substantiate this point, the following digression seems to be inevitable.

Every perceptual judgment, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers hold, logically presuppose and is derived from a pre-judgmental immediate apprehension which is called by them indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*). In it, the ingredients of perceptual judgment are immediately presented to our senses without one being characterised by the other. The characterisation takes place a moment later at the judgmental level of perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*). The theory of *nirvikalpaka* perception serves an important purpose in the Nyaya-Vaisesika system. The system, as is well known, is realistic, and as such believes in the existence of objects indepen-

24. *Evam samavāyo 'pi, cakṣuḥ-sambaddhasya tantor viśeṣaṇābhūtaḥ (viśeṣya-bhūtaḥ' as printed in the text is wrong) paṭa-samavāyo gṛhyate—iha tantuṣu paṭa-samavāya iti.*

Ibid, p. 36.

25. "Relations are of two kinds : external, like conjunction (*sam-yoga*) or internal, like inherence (*samavāya*)."—*Indian Philosophy*, (Vol-II), p. 185, footnote no 2.

"It (*sam-yoga*) is external relation, while *samavāya* in internal relation" *Ibid*, p. 217.

26. Satischandra Chatterjee, *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 205.

dently of and outside the knowledge which refers to them. But if it be so, it becomes very difficult to account satisfactorily for the phenomenon of error. To avoid this familiar difficulty that faces almost all realistic systems, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers restrict the scope of their realistic postulate to what is known as the *nirvikalpaka* and maintain that the statement that whatever knowledge points to exists apart from that knowledge, applies only to that level of perception.²⁷ As regards the *savikalpaka* which is derived from the *nirvikalpaka*, it may or may not refer to a fact ; and whether it is true or false in a particular case has to be determined on entirely other grounds. Now, in this *nirvikalpaka* stage of perception, all the ingredients of the *savikalpaka* are directly given to the senses in such a way that one of them does not characterise the other. Thus when we perceive a 'red rose', the perception, it is assumed, is necessarily preceded by a presentation, in one *nirvikalpaka* perception, of the particular substance 'rose' (also the universal roseness), the particular quality 'red' (also the universal redness), and the relation of 'inherence' (*samavāya*)—each of them by itself and absolutely uncharacterised by the other. All of them must be real since, by hypothesis, we are then in direct contact with reality ; and an erroneous *nirvikalpaka* is a contradiction in terms.²⁸ In *savikalpaka* which involves judgment these ingredients are pieced together, and it accordingly gives us a determinate situation. The *nirvikalpaka* also includes the 'relation' but, as the relation there does not relate the terms as here, its content is regarded as multiple and discontinuous.

Such a view at once precludes the explanation that *samavāya* is not independent of the terms it relates and that it is only a mode or tate of them. Being intrinsically different it cannot fall inside the terms. Hence it is a relation of the external type.

But it might be objected that the relation of *samavāya*, though real and independent of the related terms, may yet modify them, and in so far as the modifying capacity of the relation is concerned,

27. This is according to Vācaspati Miśra only, especially in his critique of *anyathākhyāti* as in *Bhāmānī*. Many other Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers do not subscribe to this view.

28. See Śivāditya Miśra's *Sapta-padārthī* (Vizianagram Series), p. 25.

it is internal.²⁹ But such an explanation is inadmissible in view of the pluralistic metaphysics advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. This system is not only realistic, it is also pluralistic and postulates a manifold of ultimate entities—the atoms of the four kinds of elements', other *dravyas*, universals, etc. These entities are all simple and partless which altogether exclude the possibility of their being modified by any relation into which they may enter. It may however be thought that though ultimate entities may be unmodifiable, the objects derived from them, a 'jar' for example, which is constituted of the atoms of earth might admit of modification. This raises the whole problem of change and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika solution of it. As a matter of fact, the system rejects the very notion of change;³⁰ but it is not necessary for our present purpose to enter into that question. For *samavāya* relates eternal entities as well, for example, an 'atom of earth' and its 'odour' which are not modifiable; and since the explanation we give of it must be identical with the explanation in the other cases, change, even supposing that things that are not ultimate are subject to it, cannot be ascribed to *samavāya*. It accordingly follows that in all cases alike *samavāya* leaves the terms it relates entirely unaffected. In other words, it is an external relation like *saṃyoga*. The very fact that it is independent and relates ultimately simple factors show that it cannot be an internal one.

29. Compare for this type of internal relation, Joachim, *Nature of Truth*, pp. 11-12.

30. See Śāṅkar Miśra's *Upaskāra* (Gujarati Printing Press, Bombay, 1913), p. 275.

CHAPTER III

THE MĪMĀMSĀ VIEW OF UNIVERSAL*

The Mīmāṃsakas, both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras, are in perfect agreement with the Naiyāyikas in holding that the universal is a separate ontological category (*padārtha*) apart from the corresponding particulars. They almost dittoed the arguments of the Naiyāyikas to prove the existence of the universal as an independent object of our knowledge. But the controversy with the Naiyāyikas arises as soon as they come to the question of the relation between the universal and the corresponding particulars.

Strict adherence to the pluralistic conception of the universe led the Nyāya thinkers to uphold an absolute difference between the universal and the corresponding particulars, on the one hand, and other ontological categories advocated by them, on the other. But as soon as they split the universe into so many independent categories they were confronted with the problem of showing the relationship between them. Hence it was almost a logical necessity with them to postulate the concept of *samavāya* as a relating tie between the universal and the corresponding particulars, the substance and its qualities and so on.

It is here that the Mīmāṃsakas differ from the Naiyāyikas. Kumarila, the founder of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, denies the absolute difference between the universal and the particulars and proposes the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) between them. Hence, according to him, it is a needless prolixity to admit the reality of inherence as a separate relating category. But though Kumarila proposes the relation of identity between the universal and the particulars, his notion of identity should not be taken in the sense of absolute identity as proposed by Saṃkara. Saṃkara, in consonance with his philosophy of unqualified monism, is ruthlessly hostile to any kind of difference (*bheda*) whatsoever and brands all difference as illusion. But Kumarila and his followers are of opinion that both identity (*abheda*) and difference (*bheda*) are observed facts of experience and to preserve one of them at the cost of the other is to fight shy of a plain empirical fact. Hence identity, to him, always

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means identity admitting of difference (*bheda-sahiṣṇu-abheda*). If the universal 'cowness' (*gotva*) and an individual cow were absolutely different as maintained by the Naiyayikas, our perception would take the form *this and cowness*, instead of *this is a cow*; because such is found to be the perception in respect of a jar *and* a cloth which are absolutely different. Hence their identity must be admitted on the strength of experience. But, again, if they are absolutely non-different like the so-called two things indicated by a pair of interchangeable terms like "*hasta*" and "*kara*", the terms 'this' and "cowness" in the perceptual judgment "*this is a cow*" would turn out to be synonymous. But this is palpably preposterous in view of the different functions they perform in the act of perception. The act of perception involves both assimilation and discrimination. Perception is inclusive (*anuvṛtta*) as well as exclusive (*vyāvṛtta*). Inclusion depends on the reality of the universal, but the particular is the ground of exclusion. In the perception of the form *this is a cow* we have a cognition of *this* (*idambuddhi*) as well as that of cow (*śobuddhi*). The former has an individual for its object and the latter the universal. Hence the *this* and the *cow* cannot be absolutely non-different like the things indicated by the terms "*hasta*" and "*kara*". This two-fold character of perception points to the nature of the object as both universal and individual. The relation between them is one of identity-in-difference.¹

The Naiyayikas may object that the ascription of two contradictory qualities like identity and difference to the same object of experience at the same time is a plain violation of the Law of Contradiction. This law can be saved only on the hypothesis of absolute difference between the universal and the particular and by the acceptance of the concept of *samavāya* as a relating tie between them. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, however, like the Hegelians in the West, challenge the universal applicability of the law of Contradiction, and this is done on the evidence of experience. They are of opinion that when a conflict arises between logic and fact it is the fact which is to be retained at the cost of logic, and the perception of both identity and difference in the same object is an observed fact of experience. Again, the Bhattas hold that there is no contradiction in

1. *Mānameyodaya* (Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, 1933), pp. 234-35.

supposing the coexistence of two contradictory qualities in the same locus because of the relativity of different standpoints or perspectives. Devadatta is taller than Yajñadatta but shorter than Viṣṇudatta—here two contradictory qualities, tallness and shortness, are ascribed to the same person, Devadatta, without involving any logical fallacy. In the same way, Kumarila holds, *jāti* is not something different from the particulars comprehended by it. It is due to the point of view from which we look at a thing that we call it a *jāti* or a *vyakti*. But in essence they are identical in nature. It should be noted here that Kumarila's view of *jāti* is similar to that held by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system. This system regards a thing as the unity of the universal and the particular.² When we look at an individual from one point of view (*jāti* as identical with the individual) it is the individual that lays its stamp upon our consciousness and the notion of a *jāti* becomes latent; but when we look at it from another point of view (the individual as identical with *jāti*) it is the *jāti* which presents itself to consciousness, the aspect as individual remaining latent there. The apprehension of a thing as a *jāti* or an individual is thus only a matter of different points of view or angles of vision. Thus identity and difference relate to different aspects of the same object.

As against the above argument of the Bhāṭṭas, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers join hands with the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas in holding that one and the same act of cognition cannot apprehend both identity and difference. When we perceive the difference between the universal and the particular we must perceive the universal and the particular as distinct; when we perceive their identity we should perceive only one of them - either the universal or the particular. In the case in question a single object, the universal or the particular, would give rise to two cognitions - the cognition of both the universal and the particular and the cognition of their identity. But it is not possible for the universal to produce a cognition of its identity with the particular any more than for the particular to produce a cognition of its identity with the universal. It cannot, therefore, be said that both difference and identity are apprehended by one and the same act of cognition.

2. Sāmānyaviśeṣasamudāyo dravyam—*Vyāsabhāṣya* on *Yogasūtra*, III, 44.

Quite in harmony with this conception of *jñā* as identical with the particular, Kumarila and his school hold that the relation of *samavāya* is not anything which is distinct from the things themselves in which it is supposed to exist, but only a particular aspect or phase of the things themselves.³

The Bhāṭṭas put forward the following arguments to disprove the reality of *samavāya* as an irreducible object of our knowledge :

Even admitting the reality of *samavāya* as a relating category between the universal and the particulars, the question arises - Is *samavāya* absolutely non-different from its correlates or not? It cannot be said to be absolutely non-different, because in that case there would be no relation of *samavāya* at all as a distinct category as proposed by the Naiyāyikas. If, however, it be different, it must be either related to its correlates or not related. The second hypothesis is inadmissible on the strength of the structure of our perceptual judgement. Cowness is said to be inherent (*samaveta*) in the particular cow and we get the perceptual judgment in the form *this is a cow*. But had the hypothesis in question been true, the contents of our perception would have been a mere conglomeration of some discontinuous independent units and it would take the form *this, cowness and inherence*. Therefore, they fall back to the first of the two alternative hypotheses - the hypothesis, in other words, that *samavāya* is related to the terms it relates. But what sort of relation has it with each of its relata? It must be either one of conjunction (*saṁyoga*) or inherence (*samarāya*). But the relation of conjunction is inconceivable here, since conjunction holds exclusively between two substances. So the relation has, so far, to be one of inherence. But this also is to be rejected on the ground of vicious indefinite regress (*anavasthā*). If inherence be related to its relata by another inherence, then to explain the relation of this second inherence to each of the relata we will have to postulate a third inherence, and so on *ad infinitum*. It should be noted here that Bradley exposed the unreality of external relation by applying the same logic of infinite regress.

3. Abedāt samavāyo 'stu svarūpam dharmadharminoḥ - *Ślokavārtika*, p. *c.tyākṣasūtra*, pp. 149, 150,

In answer to the above objection the Naiyāyikas hold that the supposed fallacy of infinite regress in explaining the relation between inherence and its relata would not arise at all, since the relation between them is not another inherence, but just *svarūpa-sambandha* - a relation where any one of the relata is itself the relation and the relation is not something over and above the terms related.

But the Bhāṭṭas may at once retort that this is exactly their own position in regard to the relation between the universal and the particular, viz., that the relation between them is not something *ab extra*, but only a particular phase or aspect of the things themselves. If this be the position of the Naiyāyikas also, why do they proceed a step forward and admit it? Why don't they discard at the outset the concept of inherence as unnecessary and admit that the relation between the universal and the particular is directly one of *svarūpa*? This would, after all, be in accordance with the law of parsimony (*lāghava*), which is a necessary and logical pre-requisite of the way of our solving a problem.

But the Naiyāyikas would at once reply that it is rather the position of the Bhāṭṭas than that of their own which contradicts the principle of parsimony. If there could be *svarūpa-sambandha* directly between a jar and its colour, the jar itself would be regarded as the relation, which would in effect, entail that an infinite number of *svarūpa-sambandhas* must be assumed to account for the relation between the countless number of substances, their qualities, actions and universals. But this would clearly be a violation of the law of parsimony.⁴ Again, the Naiyāyikas cannot favour the relation of *svarūpa* in place of *samavāya*, since that would undermine their doctrine of *asaikāryavāda* - a theory of causation which holds that the effect is a new beginning and is different from and inheres in its material cause. Hence the relation of *svarūpa* fares no better as a substitute for the relation of inherence. So inherence must be admitted as a relation between the universal and particulars.

But the Bhāṭṭas again raise a fresh objection against the relation of *samavāya*. Inherence is said to be a relation of inseparability (*ayutasiddhi*), which means the absence of separability between two

4. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1916), pp. 85, 86.

entities, such as a whole and its parts, a particular and its genus, etc. But what is the exact connotation of the word "separability of entities" (*yutasiddhi*)? It means either the capacity for separate or independent movement (*prthaggatimattva*) or subsistence in different substrates (*prthagāśrayāśrayitva*).⁵ In either case, there would be no relation of inseparability between a composite whole and its component parts, since there can be a movement in the parts without a movement in the whole, and since, further, the whole and its parts inhere in different substrates — the whole in the parts and the parts in their component sub-parts. Likewise, the universal and the particular have different substrates, since the substratum of the universal is the particular and that of the latter the parts that compose it. So Fārthasārathi Miśra defines inherence as a relation between the container and the contained such that the latter produces a cognition of itself in the former.⁶ To say that the universal inheres in the particular means, according to this definition, that the universal (cowness) produces an apprehension of itself in the particular (cow). Since the universal is perceived in the particular, they are not absolutely different from each other — their relation is one of identity (*tālatmya*) in the sense explained before. Hence there is no need of postulating inherence as a separate ontological category to explain the relation between the universal and the particular.

The Naiyāyikas may argue that the above argument of the Bhāṭṭas is not a sound logic at all but a tactful verbal sophistry, a mere play of language over the supposed connotation of the word 'separability' (*yutasiddhi*). In actuality it means a very simple thing. It means that of the two entities related by inherence one, at least, cannot stay apart from the other,⁷ and nothing else is meant by it. Therefore, the pair of alternative meanings which the Bhāṭṭas impose on the word "separability" is far from being true.

5. *Prasastapādabhaṣya* (Benares, 1895), p. 152.

6. Yena sambandhenādheyamādhāre svānurūpaṁ buddhiṁ janayati, svākāreṇa bodhayati ityarthah sa sambandhaḥ samavāyah. *Śāstradīpikā*, p. 217.

7. Aprthagbhāvo' svātantryaṁ samavāyah bhinnayoḥ parasparopaśleṣasya sambandhakṛtatvopalambhāt. — Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandali* (Benares, 1895), p. 325.

The Naiyāyikas may finally argue that if there were no such relation as inherence and if the relation between the universal and the particular were one of identity, the nature of both these entities would also be the same. But the universal is eternal and common to many particulars, while the particular is non-eternal and specific. Were the universal identical with the particular, the universal would be non-eternal and different like the particulars, and the particulars would be eternal and common to many. But this is obviously absurd. Hence the relation between the universal and the particular cannot be one of identity. They are ontologically distinct entities and are related by the relation of *samavāya*.

Considering the soundness of the above arguments of the Naiyāyikas, Prabhākara, a critical follower of Kumarila and founder of a new school of Mīmāṃsā, admits the reality of inherence as a relation between the universal and the corresponding particulars, but, unlike the Naiyāyikas, he denies its eternity. Inherence, according to Prabhākara, is not an eternal entity, but one which is produced or not produced according as the thing in which it exists is non-eternal or eternal; and it is not regarded as *one*, as Nyāya holds, but as *many*, according as there is the infinite number of things in which it exists. When a new particular member of a class (say, of the cow-class) comes into being, a new relation of inherence is generated by which the individual is brought into relation with the class-character existing in other individuals. Again, when any individual of a class is destroyed, its class-character does not go elsewhere, nor is it destroyed, but it is only the inherence of class-character with that individual that ceases to exist. With the destruction of an individual or its production, it is a new relation of inherence that is destroyed or produced.

But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers do not agree with the Prābhākaras in this respect. They advocate the unity and eternity of the relation of *samavāya* for which they have their sound logic. We have already stated these arguments while discussing the nature of *samavāya*. So we need not repeat them here.

Another very important point of controversy of the Prābhākaras with the Naiyāyikas in respect of the problem of universal is that while the Naiyāyikas acknowledge *sattā* (being, existence) as the highest genus in respect of denotation, the Prābhākaras do not admit the reality of such a highest universal. So let us discuss at first the

concept of existence-universal (*sattā-jāti*) as advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers.

Existence (*sattā*), according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, is the highest universal (*parasāmānya*). By 'highest' as an adjective of the universal they only mean its denotative supremacy: the highest universal is the common point of identity among the maximum number of particulars. Though substances (*dravyas*), qualities (*guṇas*) and actions (*karmas*) are ontologically independent categories, these are felt as identical in so far as all of them are viewed as *existent* entities (*sadbuddhiviṣaya*). Hence *existence* (*sattā*) is a synthetic principle which assimilates *dravyas*, *guṇas* and *karmas*, despite their ontological independence, under an identical mode of being⁸. The only difference of this highest universal from the other types of lower universals (*apara-sāmānya*) lies in the fact that while the other lower universals are the cause of both assimilation (*anuvṛtti*) and discrimination (*vyāvṛtti*) in our knowledge of a thing, *sattā* is the cause of assimilative knowledge only, not of discriminative ones.

The strict monistic standpoint adopted by the Advaita Vedāntins does not allow them to admit the reality of any sort of universals whatsoever. According to them, Brahman which is unqualified pure consciousness is the only reality and the world with all its categories is a superimposition on it due to the function of *māyā* (ignorance). But some post-Samkara later Vedāntins are of opinion that Brahman as the principle of pure existence is the highest or grand universal while all other lower universals (*apara-sāmānya*) and the particulars as their possessors are merely the appearances of this highest universal due to its association with different *upādhis* which are the creation of *māyā*.⁹ Ui in his *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy* (page 35) informs us that the same standpoint was adopted by the Buddhist philosopher Dharmapāla in his *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra* in which it is stated that *existence* is the only universal and all other universals are merely figments of our imagination (*kalpanā*).

8. (a) Bhāvo'nuvṛttereḥ hetutvāt sāmānyameva—*Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, 1. 2. 4.

(b) Saditi yato dravyaguṇakarmasu sā sattā—*Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, 1. 2. 7.

9. *A Primer of Indian Logic* by Kuppaswami Śāstrī (2nd Ed.), pp. 32-33.

But a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher may argue that this sort of preservation of the highest universal *sattā* at the cost of other universals and particulars is not logically admissible. Something is a universal only in so far as it is the common point of identity among different particulars. But if the particulars themselves be illusions—products of ignorance (*māyā*), as they say—there is no point in saying that the universal is the common characteristic shared by many particulars. The reality of the universal presupposes the reality of different particulars. If the particulars are unreal the universal, by definition, becomes unreal. Hence it cannot be said that *sattā* is the only universal, there being no other universals and no particulars in which *sattā* may inhere. The reality of particulars and other lower universals has to be admitted along with the reality of the highest universal *sattā*.

But, as we have already seen, *sattā* inheres only in *dravyas*, *guṇas* and *karmas*. For some formidable logical difficulties the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers do not recognise the inherence of *sattā* in *sāmānyas* (universals), *samavāya* (inherence) and *viśeṣas* (ultimate uniques). Hence entities under these categories cannot be said to exist: that alone can be said to exist to which the universal *sattā* (existence) stands related. At the same time, however, we cannot deny that even these entities are felt and judged as existing facts (*sadbuddhiviṣaya*). The question naturally arises—how can their factual unrelatedness to existence be compatible with our conscious reference to them as existing facts? What exactly is their ontological status? Śrīdhara in his *Nyāyakandalī* points out that though *sāmānyas*, *samavāya* and *viśeṣas* have no existence-universal, each of them has a *svarūpasattā* (self-individuality) which somehow produces the illusion of their existence within us. This concept of *svarūpasattā* corresponds roughly to the concept of subsistence in modern European realism. But the discovery of a new terminology is not the real solution of a problem. Moreover, even granting that the awareness of existence of these categories is to be explained by *svarūpasattā*, it cannot account for their unity in respect of existence, since *svarūpasattā* is numerically different in each different single case. For these reasons the concept of *svarūpasattā* was partially given up by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, and the problem in question was sought to be solved by introducing the notions of *ekārtha-samavāya* and *ekārtha-vṛtti*. Existence-universal directly inheres in *dravyas*, *guṇas* and *karmas*,

Sāmānyas and *viśeṣas* also inhere in the same *dravyas*, *guṇas* and *karmas*. In this way, being co-inherent (*ekārtha-samaveta*) with the existence-universal in common substrata, *sāmānyas* and *viśeṣas* are indirectly qualified by *existence*. As regards *samavāya*, it cannot be related to *sattā* by another *samavāya*, since that would lead to a logical fallacy technically known as *asambandha*. But though *samavāya* cannot co-inhere with *existence*, it co-exists (*ekārtha-vṛtti*) with it in a common locus and is qualified by it.

But the Prābhākaras, though they admit the reality of other lower forms of universal, do not acknowledge the denotative supremacy of the universal *sattā*. They are of opinion that all things are said to be existent (*sat*) not because all of them possess a common character known as *sattā*, but because each of them has its own specific existence or *svarūpasattā* which is numerically different from individual to individual. Therefore, *sattā* is more or less a word or a name without the corresponding apprehension of a common quality ; it is an *upādhi*, not a *jāti*. In this way, by reviving the old Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of *svarūpasattā*, the Prabhakaras do away with the concept of *sattā* as the highest universal shared by all individual objects'. They hold that it is only *the capability of being accepted by proof* (*pramāṇa-grahāṇa-yogyatā*) which is to be termed as "existence". We call a thing existent which is and can be proved by perception or other kinds of *pramāṇa* ; and what cannot be so proved appears to us as non-existent. Absolutely non-existent entities like a square circle, the horn of a hare, etc., can never be substantiated by any kind of proof. Hence existence is nothing over and above this *capability of being accepted by proof*. It is not an objective property of a thing.

It should be noted here that Kant also, like the Prābhākaras, pointed out that existence cannot be an attribute of a thing. For, when we ascribe a property to a thing, we implicitly assert that it exists : so that if existence were itself an attribute, it would follow that all positive existential propositions are tautologies and all negative existential propositions are self-contradictory ; and this is not the case.

Anyway, leaving aside Kant for the present purpose, let us see now how the Naiyāyikas ruthlessly expose the absurdity of the nominalistic standpoint advocated by the Prābhākaras with regard to the

universal existence (*sattu*) and establish its reality as the highest universal in respect of scope, extent or denotation.

If the capacity of being accepted by proof (*pramāṇagrahaṇayogyatā*) is to be termed as existence, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinker argues, it will lead us to a hopeless paradox, viz., that even non-existence (*abhāva*) will have existence, because it is an independent ontological entity for which sufficient proof can be given, the proof being perception for the Naiyāyikas and inference for the Vaiśeṣikas.

This polemic of the Naiyāyikas naturally leads one to the most controversial question of the ontological status of non-existence, and the Prābhākaras, in their own defence, deny altogether the reality of non-existence as a separate unit of reality. According to them, every case of negation is a case of disguised affirmation, affirmation of the locus in which a thing is said to be non-existent. There is nothing called a negative or non-existent fact of the world. Every non-existential judgement can be translated into the existential judgement of the locus. Non-existence is not a distinct entity over and above the existence of the locus (*adhikaraṇa*) which is a positive fact of the world. The non-existence of a pot on the ground means the existence of the ground *per se* and the knowledge of the non-existence of the jar on the ground is nothing but the perception of the bare ground as such. Hence the argument of the Naiyāyikas that the definition of existence as given by the Prābhākaras obliterates the essential distinction between existence (*bhāva*) and non-existence (*abhāva*) falls to the ground, since there is no distinction between them at all. Non-existence is not an irreducible object of knowledge. The concept of 'non-existence of a thing' can be reduced to the positive conception of its locus.

The Naiyāyikas, the Bhāṭṭas and the Advaita Vedāntins would at once oppose the Prābhākaras in this respect. They are of opinion that the feeling of existence and that of non-existence are so conspicuously opposed to and exclusive of each other that neither of them can be reduced to the other. Though the Naiyāyikas differ from the Bhāṭṭas and the Advaita Vedāntins as to how the non-existence of a thing is known by us, all of them agree in holding, as against the Prābhākaras, that this non-existence cannot be identified with the locus as such; it is something real over and above the bare locus. The non-existence of the jar on the ground is as real and objective as the existence of the jar on the ground; only it has no being.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, non-existence is an objective character of the locus (*viśeṣaṇa*). It is adjectival to or a determination of the locus. Let us see now how the Naiyāyikas establish the reality of non-existence as an independent category by refuting the Prābhākara view stated above :—

(1) If the non-existence of a jar on the ground were but another name for the bare ground *per se*, we should perceive the non-existence of the jar even while it is there on the ground, because it cannot be said that the ground as such is not perceived while the jar is on it. But actually we do not perceive the non-existence of a jar when it is present on the ground.

(ii) Again, if the non-existence of a jar on a table were identical with the existence of the empty table, we should not perceive its non-existence, if the table were covered with a piece of cloth. But even when it is so covered we continue to perceive the non-existence of the jar on that empty covered table. This proves successfully that non-existence is not identical with its locus, but something over and above the bare locus.

(iii) To the argument of the Prābhākaras that they identify the cases of non-existence with their respective substrata for the sake of simplicity or parsimony of hypothesis (*kalpanālaghavaḥ*), Viśvanātha in his *Siddhāntamuktāvali* answers that it is certainly more simple to regard them as belonging to a separate category altogether than to assume their identity with an infinite number of substrata.

(iv) Moreover, Viśvanātha argues that the notion of non-existence as a separate entity apart from its locus successfully answers to the notion of container and content as is expressed in the non-existential statement like "There is no jar on the ground". Here the ground is the container and the non-existence of the jar is the content, and this kind of relation between them cannot be successfully accounted for if we assume an identity between the two. By these and many other arguments the Naiyāyikas prove the irreducible objectivity of the category of non-existence.

The objection of the Naiyāyikas that the definition of existence as given by the Prābhākaras would obliterate the distinction between existence and non-existence was answered by the Prābhākaras by a plain denial of non-existence as a fact of the world. But the above considerations prove conclusively the independent ontological reality

of non-existence over and above existence. Hence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika critique of the Prabhākara conception of existence still retains its force.

Śrīdhara points out against these Prābhākaras that if the capability of being accepted by proof is to be identified with existence, a thing should be taken as non-existent before the emergence of these proofs and a non-existent entity like a hare's horn can never be accepted by any kind of proof whatsoever. As a result it would lead us to the inevitable logical fallacy known as *anyonyāśraya* (fallacy of mutual dependence) in that, a thing capable of being accepted by proof is to be termed existent and an existent thing is to be taken as that which is capable of being accepted by proof. Hence the Prābhākara definition of existence does not stand the test of criticism. Existence must be admitted as the highest universal shared by all particular entities.¹⁰

10. Raghunātha Śiromani, the famous neo-Naiyāyika of Bengal, does not recognise *existence* as the highest universal. (*Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam* pp. 49-54). He replaced the notion of *sattā-sāmānya* by the notion of *bhāvatva* (positivity). He is of opinion that the objective correlative of our awareness of existence is not a separate universal called 'existence' (*sattā*), but positivity (*bhāvatva*) which is shared by all positive entities. *Sattā-sāmānya* cannot inhere in another *sāmānya*—for that would lead to infinite regress; but still it is felt to be existent due to this *bhāvatva* which it has. But Dinakara Bhatta establishes the reality of *sattā-sāmānya* by refuting Śiromani's concept of positivity.

CHAPTER—IV

ON BUDDHIST NOMINALISM

I

We have seen in the foregoing chapter that though the *Mīmāṃsākas* and the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* thinkers fought the thickest of their battles on the nature of the relationship between the universal and the corresponding particulars, yet both these contending parties agreed in holding that the universal exists in the objective world as a separate ontological category (*padārtha*) over and above the individual objects with which it is related. According to all of them, the universal is a synthetic principle which assimilates the individual objects subsumed under it into an identical mode of being. But the Buddhists are vehemently opposed to this view. According to them, the external world consists of discrete and detached bits of reality called "unique particulars" (*svalakṣaṇa*) ; their synthesis exists only in our thought and hence it has no objective reality of its own. The so-called universals, maintain the Buddhists, are nothing but mental images or conceptual constructions of our Productive Imagination (*kalpanā*). In contrast with the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* thinkers and the *Mīmāṃsakas* who are uncompromising realists so far as the ontological status of universals is concerned, the Buddhists have been generally designated as nominalists ; but theirs is a kind of nominalism which cannot be distinguished from conceptualism, since a name and a concept, according to them, cover the same ground. Conceptual thought has been defined by them as naming thought capable of coalescing with a name. "Names originate in concepts," says Dignāga, and vice versa, "concepts can originate in names."¹ Hence to determine the import of names is the same as to determine the fundamental character of concepts. For the Buddhists conceptualism is the same as nominalism, there being no difference between them whatsoever.

Reality, according to the Buddhists, consists of a plurality of unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇas*). Every vestige of generality is absent in it. Generality, similarity, relation or universal is always something imagi-

1. *Vikalpa-yonayaḥ śabdāḥ, vikalpāḥ śabda-yonayaḥ.*

Quoted in *Nyāyavārtikāṭīkā* by Vācaspati Miśra,
(Calcutta Santkrit Series, 1936, 1944), p. 681.

ned or constructed by the spontaneous creativity of our understanding which in the Buddhists' terminology is known as Productive Imagination (*kalpanā*). Positively the real is the efficient (*artha-kriyākāri*), negatively the real is the non-ideal (*nirvikalpa*), by which is meant 'not ideationally constructed'. This non constructed dynamic particular which is said to be grasped immediately by our first moment of sensation in the cognition of an empirical object is claimed to be the only 'pure' reality by the Buddhists. This reality is 'pure' in the sense that it is not mixed up with the slightest bit of imaginative construction (*kalpanā*) of our mind. Directly opposed to this pure reality, there is pure ideality, pure imagination of our understanding. God, Soul, the Sāṃkhya concept of primordial Matter etc. are examples of this pure imagination (*visuddha kalpanā*).² These are, to use a phrase used by Kant, "transcendental illusions" having no objective validity whatsoever. But between these pure realities of efficient particulars and pure idealities of the so-called metaphysical entities, there is a half-imagined world, a world which though consisting of constructed images is yet established on a firm foundation of efficient particulars. It is the phenomenal world of our everyday experience. The images arise in functional dependence on the moments of unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) reflected in sensation and by an act of imputation they are objectivised and identified with those bare particulars. The result is the phenomenal world. Hence we find that there are two kinds of imagination, one pure and the other mixed with reality ; and two kinds of reality, one direct and pure, and the other indirect and mixed with imagination.³ The pure reality consists of unique particulars which are directly reflected in pure sensation. These particulars are shorn of all sensible qualities ; they have no duration in time, nor have they any extension in space. Each of them is differentiated and distinguished from everything else in the world (*sarvato-vyāvṛtta*). Hence they are discrete, disconnected and absolutely isolated. The Sanskrit word for the unique particular, *svalakṣaṇa*, means 'of its own kind' which has no parallel to it in the whole universe. It exists only for one moment, because no sooner

2. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, (Mouton and Co., S-Gravenhage, 1958. Vol. 1), p. 70.

3. *Ibid.*

it is born than it is destroyed and replaced by another unique particular which, although similar to it, is quite different from it. Lasting only for a 'moment', it is called momentary (*kṣānika*). But as a matter of fact, there being no separate reality called time which is the temporal receptacle of objects as understood in the realistic systems, the unique particular itself is called the 'moment' (*kṣāṇa*). As it is shorn of either duration in time or extension in space, the best English term for the Buddhist particular would be 'point-instant', a term used by Stcherbatsky. This *svalakṣaṇa*, *kṣāṇa*, or 'point-instant' alone is the pure reality, according to the Buddhists, because it is not yet mixed up with the imaginative construction (*kalpanā*) of our mind. But over and above this pure reality, there is another reality which is impure so to speak, because it consists of objectivised images on the basis of these unique particulars. This reality has been endowed by us with a position in time, a position in space and with all variety of sensible and abstract qualities. This is the phenomenal world of our everyday experience.

From the above discussion it is clear, that a man, a cow, a jar etc., will not be real particular, according to the Buddhists; the real particulars here will be the transcendental point-instants which underlie these phenomenal individual objects. Any general image constructed by thought with reference to and on the basis of these point-instants is a universal. In this sense every predicable concept, every relation and quality will be a universal. From the Buddhist point of view, whatever can be expressed in speech by a name is a universal. The particular point-instant is inexpressible, since it is a thing shorn of all relations and is the ultimate subject of all possible predication. Hence the particular and the universal "may be mutually defined as the negation of one another, they are correlated as the real and the unreal (*vastu*, *avastu*), as the efficient and the non-efficient (*samartha*, *asamartha*), as the non-constructed and the constructed (*nirvikalpaka*, *kalpita*), the non-artificial and the artificial (*akṛtrima*, *kṛtrima*), the non-imagined and the imagined (*anāropita*, *āropita*), the uncognizable and the cognizable (*jñānena aprāpya*, *prāpya*), the unutterable and the utterable (*anabhilāpya*, *abhilāpya*), the own essence and the general essence (*svalakṣaṇa*, *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), the thing shorn of all its extension and the thing containing albeit quite rudimentary extension (*sarvato vyāvṛtta*, *avyāvṛtta*), the unique and the non-unique (*trailokya-vyāvṛtta*, *avyāvṛtta*),

the non-repeated and repeated in space-time, (*deśa-kāla-anugata*, *ananugata*), the simple and the composite (*anavayavin*, *avayavin*), the indivisible and the divisible (*abhinna*, *bhinna*), the transcendental thing and the empirical thing (*paramārtha-sat*, *saṃvṛti-sat*), the essence unshared by others and the essence shared by others (*asādhāraṇa*, *sādhāraṇa-lakṣaṇa*), the external and the internal (*bāhya*, *abāhya*), the true and the spurious (*anālīkam*, *ālīkam*), the non-dialectical and the dialectical (*viruddha-dharma-adhyastam*, *anadhyastam*), the significant and the insignificant (*atuccha*, *tuccha*), the unformed and the formed (*nirākāra*, *sākāra*), the Thing-in-Itself and the phenomenon (*svalakṣaṇa*=*paramārtha-sat*, *saṃvṛti-sat*=*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*)."⁴

A question can be raised here : how can the utterly heterogenous point-instants having nothing in common produce an illusory image of identity in our mind ? The mental origin of the idea of universal which is the same as the idea of identity (*anurṛtti pratyaya*) is perfectly conceivable when, corresponding to it there is an identical universal existing in external objective world. But the Buddhists deny the objective existence of universals altogether while retaining the notion of identity. The genesis of this notion, therefore, remains an unaccounted mystery. To say that the idea of identity is simply an illusion (*ālīka*) without giving any rational explanation of the illusion in question is simply to evade the intricacy of the problem. To this the Buddhists answer that the postulation of an objective universal to justify the origin of the idea of identity is necessitated by an erroneous view of causation, a view which holds that the effect must be similar to its cause. But our experience teaches us, argues a Buddhist, that the things or objects which are utterly dissimilar can yet produce a similar effect and they can do so by virtue of their inherent power.⁵ For example, the plant known as '*guḍūci*' is used in medicine for the purpose of curing fever. But there are other

4. *Ibid*, pp. 184-185.

5. *Evamatyantabhede 'pi kecinniyataśaktitah*,

Tulyapratyavamarśādehertutvaṃ yānti nāpare.

Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṃgraha (Gaekwad's Oriental Series. Baroda, 1926, Vol-1), p. 239.

plants which are also used in medicine for the same purpose. But these different plants all of which produce the same febrifuge effect have not the slightest similarity with one another, either in shape, or in substance, or in stuff or in any other. Their similarity lies not in having an identical property in common, but in producing a similar or a nearly similar effect. In the same way, the utterly dissimilar particulars of a certain class, though not having in common an objective identical property called universal, can yet stimulate our Productive Imagination (*kalpanā*) by virtue of their inherent power (*śakti*) in such a way as to produce a general image, the notion of an identical universal in our mind.⁶

II

The problem of universal, though mainly an ontological problem, has a well-marked epistemological hinterland which shapes and determines the nature of the former. In the present section, therefore, an attempt will be made to study this problem in its epistemological background without which the true significance of it cannot be fully appreciated.

The controversy between realism and nominalism in India is closely associated with two different theories of sense-perception. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists assume an imageless (*nirākāra*) consciousness and a direct perception by the senses of both the particular and of the universal residing in it. The Buddhist-nominalists transfer these universals out of the external world into the internal world and assume an external world of mere particulars directly reflected in sensation, faced by an internal world of mere images, that is to say, of mere universals. Sensation becomes related to images as particular to universals.

6. Yathā guḍūcyādīnāmeva jvarādīśamane śaktirnānyeṣām, indriyaṣayālokaṃskārādīnām ca viśiṣṭajñānotpādane, tathā-ikapratyavamarśo 'pi keśādicideva śaktiniyama iti.

Kamalaśīla, *Tattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā* (Gaekwad, 1926), p. 497.

Perception, according to the Buddhists, is nothing but the passive receptivity of senses, the pure sensation of an efficient point-instant (*svalakṣaṇa*) of external reality and is absolutely devoid of the forms of the understanding (*kalpanāpoḍam*).⁷ It is, therefore, the bare moment of pure sensation or sense-intuition and is thus unutterable in itself. The Buddhists agree with the Mimāṃsakas in holding that in all perception there must be an element of novelty, i. e., a felt addition to our experience. Cognition in the true sense, must be a new cognition, cognition of the object not yet cognised (*anadhigata-artha-adhigantṛ*). If this be the case, argues a Buddhist, then such feeling of novelty belongs only to the first moment of sensation in the knowledge of an object. In the following moments, when the attention of the perceiver is aroused, it is no more that pure sensation which it was in the first moment ; it becomes the repeated cognition of the first flash of awareness. True perception, therefore, according to the Buddhists, is always momentary sensation, enduring perception is not perception at all ; it is not cognition proper, it is *re-cognition*. The cognitive element of our mind is limited to that moment only when we get first awareness of the object's presence. It is followed by the synthetical operation of the intellect which constructs a general form or image of the object. But the function of sense-perception consists only in signalling the presence of the object in the ken, its mere presence and nothing else. To construct an image of the object whose presence has thus been reported by sense-perception is the function of Productive Imagination (*kalpanā*). Therefore, the salient feature of sense-perception lies in the fact that though it is followed by the construction of a general image, in itself it is non-constructive in nature. What passes as perception ordinarily and is regarded as such by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers and other realists under what they call *saṃkalpaka-pratyakṣa* or judgmental perception is not perception at all. It is the original sensational core followed by the construction of a general image of the object and by an act of identification of the image so constructed with the given in sensation. In the judgemental perception, 'this is a cow', the 'this' is the sensational core and is unspeakable in itself and the element 'cow' is a general concept constructed by the understanding and expressed in a mnemonic

7. Dharmakīrti, *Nyāyabindu*, Chapter-I.

image (a connotative name) and identified with the given sensation by an act of imputation.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, on the other hand, consider both the pure sensation (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) and the judgmental perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) to be sense-perception and caused by sense-object contact (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*). The difference between these two kinds of perception is, for them, one of quantity to be explained as follows. All the elements of judgmental perception are directly presented to our pre-judgmental level of perception as self-contained units not qualifying one another and as realities outside. In the *savikalpaka* perception also, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there is immediate presentation (which may also be called immediate discovery) of reals outside, and as such there is no difference in quality between these two kinds of perception. The only difference in the latter case is that the items of the *nirvikalpaka* perception are presented (immediately discovered) as standing in a qualifier-qualified relation; and according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, this qualifier-qualified relation is as much an independent reality outside as the items themselves.

According to the other Indian realists also like the Sāṃkhya and the Mīmāṃsā thinkers, the difference between *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka* perception is never one of quality but one of degree of distinctness and clarity. The *nirvikalpaka* perception, they hold, is vague, indistinct and inexpressible in words. On the judgmental plane, all the items of the *nirvikalpaka* perception become clear and distinct by qualifying one another.⁸

Hence the difference between these two cases of perception, according to the Indian realists, is not one of kind as the Buddhists maintain, but either one of quantity or of degree. The difference consists in a qualified and non-qualified cognition of the objects perceived, not in the passive receptivity of senses and the spontaneous construction of understanding.

Substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), universal⁹ (*sāmānya*) etc., according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, are not thought-constructs as the Buddhists say, but ultimate irreducible forms of reality as the

8. Satkari Mukherjee, *The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism* (Calcutta, 1944), pp. 258-60

objective material of both kinds of perception—determinate or judgmental and indeterminate or pre-judgmental. We have direct apprehension of these ultimate entities through different forms of sense-object-contact. In the case of perception of a universal qualifying an object, the corresponding contact is either *saṃyukta-samavāya* or *saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*.⁹ In the case of a universal like 'jariness' (*ghatatva*) corresponding to the substance 'jar' (*ghata*), the *sannikarṣa* or contact is *saṃyukta-samavāya* through which the universal in question is perceived. The individual jar (*ghata*) being a substance (*dravya*) is *saṃyukta* or in direct conjunction with the senses and the jariness (*ghatatva*) is related to the individual jar by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) and thus through *saṃyukta-samavāya* or the relation of inherence in that which is in conjunction with the sense, in perceiving the jar we also perceive the 'jariness' inherent in the jar. In the case of the perception of universals corresponding to qualities and movements (*guṇa* and *karma*), the particular contact involved is *saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*. Blue colour e. g., is a quality and blueness inheres in the blue colour as its universal and blue colour again inheres in the blue substance. We perceive the substance through the relation of conjunction (*saṃyoga*) with our sense of sight, the colour blue of the blue substance through the relation of *saṃyukta-samavāya* or inherence in that which is in conjunction with the eyes and the blueness of the colour blue through the relation of *saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*, i. e., through inhering in an inherent quality of the substance which is in conjunction with the sense. The same type of sense-contact operates in the perception of universals corresponding to motion. Again, soundness (*śabdatva*) as the universal of different kinds of sound is perceived by the auditory sense through another kind of sense-contact known as *samaveta-samavāya*.¹⁰ The universal 'soundness' is in contact with the ear through its inherence (*samavāya*) in sound which inheres as a quality (*samaveta*) in the auditory sense.

The Buddhists, however, deny the perceptibility of universals on the ground that they are not forms of reality at all and the aforesaid varieties of sense-contact are not possible. The universals, according

9. S. C. Chatterjee, *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, (Calcutta University, 1939). pp. 182-83.

10. *Ibid*, pp-183-84.

to them, are the intelligible concepts, the workmanship of our understanding which the senses cannot know. The function of the senses consists merely in presenting the efficient particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) which is the affirmative element in perception. It is the understanding that elaborates the presented element into a known empirical object by means of a concept or a universal of its own creation. A judgmental perception thus involves both the receptivity of sense and the spontaneity of the understanding, and therefore is not pure perception. Pure perception is, as we have indicated already, nothing but presentation as such without any imaginative or conceptual elaboration. It is the bare datum in its immediacy and is unutterable in itself. Perceptual judgment is a further elaboration, the interpretation of the datum through any one of the five kinds of thought-construction (*pañcavidha-kalpanā*), namely, the image of substance (*dravya-kalpanā*), a quality (*guṇa-kalpanā*), an action (*karma-kalpanā*), a universal (*sāmānya-kalpanā*), and a name (*nāma-kalpanā*)¹¹. It should be noted here that though the name 'universal' (*sāmānya*) is given to one of the five kinds of categories of the understanding, yet all of them should be treated as universals from the Buddhist point of view, since all of them represent the general construction of our understanding as opposed to the particular point-instants of external reality.¹² This is how a perceptual judgment transforms the non-significant datum of sense into a significant knowable object. Perception or more properly sensation, according to the Buddhists, does not know though it apprehends, while judgment knows but only by distorting what it apprehends. The subject of the judgment is the datum in its immediacy and as such unutterable. The predicate is an intelligible concept or universal. Judgment is the act of predication, i. e., the interpretation or mediation of the unutterable immediacy by an intelligible universal and is so far a deviation or distortion of the given in its immediacy.

Both the Mīmāṃsakas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, however, reject the Buddhist view that the *savikalpaka* perception is a construction of the understanding and therefore void of truth. The *savikalpaka*, according to the non-Buddhist Indian realists, answers

11. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic* (Vol-I), p. 217.

12. "..... all categories are universals."

Ibid, p. 218.

to the real relational character of objects and is not a superimposition of thought-constructs *ab-extra* on an intrinsically non-relational manifold. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, the relational as well as the non-relational represent different stages of knowing rather than of being so that though in the order of being there may not be relations without relata or vice versa, in the order of knowing relations and the relata are first apprehended in themselves before they are apprehended as qualifying one another. It is clear from the above that if reality is essentially non-relational—a non-relational dynamic manifold as the Buddhists say or a non-relational undifferentiated essence of pure presentative consciousness (*Brahman*) as the Advaitins say, —then the relational consciousness of the non-relational reality will be more or less a construction of the understanding and will so far be a distorted representation of its intrinsic nature. Thus the movement of experience from the *nirvikalpaka* or non-relational plane to that of the *savikalpaka* or relational will be a falling away from truth and reality, according to the Buddhists and the Advaitins. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers and the Mīmāṃsakas, however, (and also for the Sāṃkhya-philosophers for whom relational forms are real evolutes of *prakṛti* as the original non-relational matrix of objective reality) *nirvikalpaka* i. e., non-relational, and *savikalpaka* or relational experience are not negatively related as according to the Buddhists and the Advaitins. On the contrary, the relational forms being not the impoverishment but rather the fuller and more developed forms of the non-relational experience, the latter is only a less adequate and less articulate apprehension of what is apprehended more clearly and distinctly and more in accordance with its developed intrinsic nature in relational experience. Thus the advance from the *nirvikalpaka* to the *savikalpaka* is not a falling away from truth as the Buddhists and Advaitins say but a marked gain in content, clearness and distinctness of apprehension.

The above discussion is sufficient to show how the ontological problem of universal can be linked up and is practically based upon the logical problem of perception. The validity or invalidity of the *savikalpaka* perception determines the reality or unreality of the universals. But the problem of universal can be viewed from a more general epistemological point of view. It rests upon the question—are sensibility and understanding, sensation and conception, two different

and distinct sources of human knowledge or, do they represent two different stages of the same process of knowing? The Buddhists maintain a sharp, radical and transcendental distinction between these two separate faculties of human knowledge, while the Mīmāṃsakas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers deny this distinction altogether. According to the Buddhists, the sensibility is passive and receptive and is the source of direct knowledge, while the understanding is creative and spontaneous and is the source of indirect knowledge. The sensibility directly apprehends only the non-relational dynamic particulars, while the understanding creates the general images of the particulars and knows them.

The sense-perception of an entity, according to the Buddhists, is possible only if it is causally efficient (*artha-kriyā-kāri*), that is, if it possesses the faculty of affecting our sensibility. But mere efficiency is not enough for the sense-perception of an object, because there is always a plurality of causes. Therefore, over and above its causal efficiency, that cause alone is the object of sensation which invariably calls forth in our cognition its own general image.¹³ But a universal neither can effect our sensibility, nor can it call forth an image of the object, since it is *ex-hypothesi* devoid of any kind of causal efficiency.¹⁴ We cannot, therefore, according to the Buddhists have any sense-perception of the universals. Nor can we have any sense-perception of the so-called empirical individual objects, because they are nothing but the meeting point of several universals on the basis of some efficient particulars. These transcendental particulars, therefore, which underlie the so-called empirical individual objects and which are causally efficient are the proper objects of our sense-perception.¹⁵ That a particular of this kind should also be cognised

13. Arthasāmarthyasamuttharḥ hi pratyakṣagocararḥ. Sa eva cārthaḥ pratyakṣagocarō yo jñānapratibhāsamātmano'nvayavyātirekāvānukārayati.

Vācaspati Miśra, *Nyāyavārtikāṭīkā* (Chowkhamba, 1925), p. 17.

14. Na ca sāmānyam nirastasamastārthakriyāsāmarthyamevaṁ bhavitumarhati. *Ibid.*

15. Tasmāt svalakṣaṇaviśayaṁ pratyakṣam.

Ibid., p. 17.

by the conceiving, synthetic faculty of our mind or by inference is impossible.¹⁶ The sphere of absolute particulars is not the sphere of inference or intellection. Inference or intellection cognises relation¹⁷ but in an absolute particular no relation can be found. Relation is possible only between two universals not between two *svalakṣaṇa* particulars.¹⁸ Therefore it is only the universals that can be inferred not the absolute particulars. The distinction between sensibility and understanding, or, between perception and intellection, is therefore, *viśayagata*, i. e., arises from a difference of their respective objects. In the case of perception, the object is *svalakṣaṇa* real. In intellection (indirect knowing), however, what we know is not the real in itself but certain universals constructed by thought on the basis of our perception of unique reals.

Here the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers join issue with the Buddhists and so do the Mīmāṃsakas. They point out that the Buddhists' view of perception as *svalakṣaṇaviśaya* does not square with the facts of experience, since the universals like the particulars, also admit of perception. In fact, most perceptions of particulars are also perception of universals inhering in particulars. The different kinds of sense-contact which are operative in the perception of universals have been discussed already. Nor is the Buddhist view of intellection as *sāmānyalakṣaṇaviśaya* necessarily true in every case, since the particulars also can very well be inferred like the universals. The existence of a particular fire, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists, can either be perceived directly by the visual and tactile sense, or it

16. Na ca svalakṣaṇamanumānasyāpi gocaraḥ.

Ibid., p. 18.

17. Sambandhagrahaṇāpekṣamanumānaḥ.

Nyāyamañjarī (Vol-1, edited and translated into Bengali by Pañcānan Tarkavāgīś, Calcutta University), p. 229.

18. Pratibandhaḥ sāmānyadharmāvāśrayate.

Vācaspati Miśra, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

The relation holding between a universal and its corresponding particular is not real relation, according to the Buddhists, but an imputed one imposed by the understanding. The nature of this relation will be discussed later on.

may be inferred indirectly from the presence of smoke.¹⁹ To a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realist, therefore, the distinction between perceiving and mediate knowing is not *viśayagata* strictly speaking; it arises from a difference of their respective *karaṇas* or instrumental causes and is thus *karaṇagata* and not *viśayagata*. Thus, perception is *jñānakaraṇka jñāna*, i. e., knowledge that does not result from another knowledge as its *karaṇa* while *parokṣa* or mediate knowing or intellection is knowledge mediated by another knowledge as its instrumental cause. In the case of perception, the instrumental cause or *karaṇa* in the sense of *phalāyoga-vyavacchinna karaṇa* (the last cause in the causal series immediately after which the effect arises) or in the sense of *vyāpāravat-asādhārana karaṇa* (operative uncommon cause) is either the sense-object contact or the sense itself. But neither the sense-object contact nor the sense is itself knowledge though it causes knowledge which we call perceptual cognition. In inference and other forms of indirect knowledge, however, the resulting knowledge is mediated by some other knowledge. Thus, in inference the knowledge of the conclusion is mediated by the knowledge of a universal proposition (*vyāpti-jñāna*) and *pakṣadharma-jñāna*, i. e., the knowledge of the mark as a *dharma* or property of the *pakṣa* or the subject of inference.

As we have already shown that for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, sensibility and understanding, sensation and intellection, are not two radically distinct and separate source of knowledge, because both the particulars and the universals can be apprehended either directly by different sense-faculties or indirectly by understanding, there cannot

19. Particulars are empirically conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists, but these are transcendently understood by the Buddhists. The Buddhists' particular is the point-instant, the thing-in-itself (*svlakṣaṇa*), and radically different from all constructions of the conceptive faculty of our mind. But the realists' particular is the concrete physical individual objects of our everyday experience. The concrete individual object, being a meeting point of several universals, is nevertheless treated as a particular by the realists, but for the Buddhists it is a construction of our mind on the basis of transcendental particulars and therefore treated as a universal cognised by inference.

be, therefore, no strict *viṣayagata* limit for each source of knowledge ; one can very well interfere into the realm of the other. This view of the realists is known as *pramāṇa saṃplava*, a view which admits that the very same thing, be it a universal or a particular, can be cognised in two different ways—either directly by sense-organs or indirectly by the understanding.²⁰

As against the above theory of the realists, the Buddhists put forward the theory known as *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*, according to which there is a sharp and radical distinction between two sources of knowledge corresponding to two kinds of object. The objects are either particulars or universals and accordingly the sources of knowledge are either sensation or conception. Each source has a marked jurisdiction of its own to which the other has no access. The particulars are apprehended by the senses but the universals are conceived by the understanding. The senses cannot know the universals nor can the particulars be known by the understanding. The reason for this conclusion has been discussed already.²¹

Dharmakīrti, the famous Buddhist philosopher, proposes an experiment by way of introspection to demonstrate the rigid dichotomy between sensibility and understanding. The experiment consists in pointing to the simple psychological phenomenon of absent-mindedness. He says that when we are absent-minded, i. e., when our attention is otherwise engaged (*anyatra-gatacitta*), we cannot recognise an

20. Ekasmin viṣaye'nekapramāṇapravṛttiḥ saṃplavaḥ,
Nyāyamañjarī (Vol-I, ed P. Tarkavāgīś, 1939), p. 227.

21. It should be noted here that from the empirical point of view it is just the Buddhist theory which would deserve to be called '*saṃplava*' theory, since the two sources of knowledge, sensation and conception, are not found in our everyday experience in their pure and unmixed condition. The empirical world is a world created 'by our understanding by a synthesis (*saṃplava*)' of its concepts with the pure sensation. In order to separate them and to show their mutual exclusiveness, we must go beyond actual experience, beyond all observable conscious and sub-conscious operation of the intellect, and assume a transcendental difference, a difference which, although unobserved by us directly, is urged upon us necessarily by uncontradicted ultimate reality.

object presented to our senses even if the senses are operative fully. In this case, the observer will not 'understand' anything except the bare presence of the object.²² The attention of the observer must be directed to the object ; the disposition of the past experience must be remembered, the name and its connotation must be recalled ; only then will the observer begin to 'understand' and recognition will follow.²³ The experiment of Dharmakīrti signifies the fact that the understanding is a separate faculty different from the senses. The understanding is the mind's spontaneous activity subsequent to the function of the sensuous passive apparatus. There is a minimum limit to every empirical cognition, the limit being the pure unutterable sensation absolutely free from the construction of the understanding and on the basis of which the understanding constructs its universals.

The experiment of Dharmakīrti offers a remarkable coincidence with one proposed by Bergson. "I am going," says the French philosopher, "to close my eyes, stop my ears, extinguish one by one the sensations all my perceptions vanish, the material world sinks into silence I can even, it may be, blot out and forget my recollections upto my immediate past ; but at least I keep the consciousness of my present, reduced to its extremest poverty, that is to say, of the actual state of my body"²⁴ This consciousness "reduced to extremest poverty" is evidently nothing but Dharmakīrti's moment of pure sensation, the present moment. Bergson adduces it as a proof that the idea of nought is a pseudo-idea. The Buddhists refer to it exactly for the same purpose. But it is at the same time a proof that sensation and understanding are two quite heterogeneous sources of knowledge, the sensation being the basic foundation upon which the understanding builds up its entire superstructure. The universal is an illusion, it is a mere name or concept of the understanding without any objective correlative corresponding to it. Thus we

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22. Anyatra gatacittasya vastumātropalambhanam,
Sarvopādhivivekena tata eva pravarttate.
Śāntarakṣita, *Tattvasaṃgraha* (Gaekwad, 1926, Vol-I.) p. 241.
 23. Saṃketa manaskārāt sadādipratyaयāime,
Jāyamānstu lakṣyante nākṣavyāpṛtya anantaram.
Ibid, p. 240.
 24. *Creative Evolution*, p. 293 (Macmillan, London, 1911).

find that the Buddhists' rejection of the reality of universals is founded upon the epistemological doctrine that the senses and the understanding are two utterly heterogeneous mental faculties, although united by a special causal relation, inasmuch as the images of universals always arise in functional dependence on sensation.

III

The Buddhists offer various arguments to disprove the ontological reality of universals. Kamalaśīla, a well-known Buddhist philosopher, argues that had the universal been a separate objective reality apart from the particulars, we could have apprehended it separately as a fruit in a basket. But to have an abstract idea of a universal apart from the ideas of the particulars is a psychological impossibility. The universal cowness (*gotva*) is supposed to be bereft of the characteristics, colour or shape, which an actual individual cow possesses. But try as we may, we can not imagine, or have an idea of this universal 'cowness' devoid of those peculiar features of an actual cow. Hence the ontological unreality of the universals.²⁵

It should be noted here that Berkeley, an English nominalist, adopts almost the same line of argument in his celebrated "introduction" to his "Principles of Human Knowledge" and also in the main body of the Principles, to dispose of Locke's conceptualistic theory of universal.²⁶ As against Locke, Berkeley denies the mental existence of the universals in the form of general ideas by pointing out the psychological impossibility of imagining the general as opposed to the particular, the abstract as opposed to the concrete. Our capacity of forming ideas, argues Berkeley, is always limited to the particulars.

25. Etaduktaṁ bhavati—anugāmipratyaśānaṁ piṇḍādivyatiriktaṁ nimittamālmvānabhūtaṁ bhavadbhiḥ sisādhayīṣitaṁ, taccāyuktam, tasyāpratibhāsanāt; tadvilakṣaṇavarṇākṛtyādiratibhāsanācca. Tathāhi—bhavadbhivarṇākṛtyakṣarākāraśūnyameva varṇyate gotvādisāmānyam, vijñānaṁ ca varṇādiratibhāśānugatamanubhūyate, tat kathamasya varṇādisūnyamālmvānaṁ bhavet, na hi anyākārasya vijñānasyānyadālmvānaṁ yuktamatiprasaṅgāt.

Kamalaśīla, *Tattvasaṁgraha-pañjikā* (Gaekwad, 1926, Vol-I) p. 243.

26. Section 9 of the "introduction".

Section 99 of the *Principles*.

The so-called ideas of universals, therefore, are mere names or words without any corresponding mental concepts or objective correlative.

But though the type of argument advanced by both Berkeley and a Buddhist is almost the same, the enormous difference between these two philosophers should not be overlooked. So far as Berkeley repudiates the objective existence of the universals by pointing out the psychological incapacity of our mind of having general or abstract ideas as opposed to the ideas of the particulars, a Buddhist would readily agree with him. But he would point out to Berkeley that what he calls the idea of particular is also general, general in respect of the particulars coming under it. The non-general is only that thing which is strictly 'in itself' (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), i. e., a thing whose being or knowledge is not determined by anything other than itself. If, on the other hand, the being or knowledge of a thing is determined by, relative to, or dependent on things other than itself, then it is no longer 'in itself' (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), it is 'in the other' (*sāmānya lakṣaṇa*), it is no longer a particular, it becomes general. In this sense, only the very first moment of unutterable sensation represents particulars. Moments which follow this first moment of pure sensation or the determinate images or concepts which subsequently arise in functional dependence on this first moment, are all universal or general, since, according to the Buddhists, their being and knowledge are determined by a negation of their opposites, and hence dependent on them. The idea of a particular blue colour as opposed to the idea of blueness in general is a particular idea, according to Berkeley. But a Buddhist would say that if it is blue in colour, this means that it is already not non-blue and then it is general, no more 'in itself' (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) but 'in the other' (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), relative, dependent, constructed and dialectical. The absolute particular blue is the unutterable point-instant of the first moment of sensation which is subsequently understood by the understanding by a general image of blue. The reality and meaning of this image of blue consist in the negation of things which are not blue in colour. In this way, the idea of the blue which is proposed by Berkeley to be a particular idea is also general or universal, according to the Buddhists. The particulars are empirically conceived by Berkeley, transcendently understood by the Buddhists. The negative way of determining the content of a concept (*apoha-vāda*), as has been suggested here, is fundamental to the Buddhist theory of universal which will be discussed in detail in the sequel.

We have seen how the psychological impossibility to have an abstract general idea over and above the ideas of particulars is made the ground for rejecting the ontological reality of the universals. But there are many other arguments advanced by the Buddhists which tend to disclose the absurdity of a realistic theory of universal. Most of these arguments try to show that even granting a separate ontological existence to the universals apart from the particulars, the realists fail to explain with success the relationship between them.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, the particular and its corresponding universal are related to each other as the 'support' and the thing 'supported' (*āhārādheya-sambandha*). But a support, the Buddhist argues, is always a cause which modifies its content. An unsupported apple which naturally would fall down to the ground is transformed into non-falling-down object when it is supported by a basket. But the universal is supposed by the realist to be an eternal never changing entity which cannot be efficiently acted upon so as to be modified by a cause and hence it cannot be supported by a substratum.²⁷

Again, one particular object is said to 'support' several universals at the same time, which according to the Buddhists, is an unintelligible jargon. Thus the fact of 'being a tree' (*vrkṣatva*) and that of 'being a śimśapā tree' (*śimśapātva*) are two separate universals which are supported by the self-same particular tree named *śimśapā*. They are regarded as two separate universals, because each of them has its own separate name. They, therefore, cannot be possessed in common by the same supporting particular, just as cowness (*gotva*) and horseness (*aśvatva*) do not represent two characteristics possessed by one common substratum.²⁸

27. *Api cāstu sāmānyam vastusaṭ tathā'pi nityatvādanupakāryatayā svalakṣaṇādhāratvānupapattiḥ. Ādhāratvamapi hi karaṇatvameva. Patanadharmāno hi vadarādayaḥ kuṇḍādivirpatanadharmanāḥ kriyanta. Na ca nityam kriyata iti nādheyam.*

Vācaspati Miśra, *Nyāyavārtikāṭīkā* (Chowkhamba, 1925), p. 484.

28. *Tathā vrkṣatvaśimśapātve svatanetre eva sāmānye svaśabdābhyāmavagamito na gouraśva itivaśmānādhikaraṇyam bhajetām,*

Ibid,

But even supposing for the sake of argument, urges a Buddhist, that a self-same particular can 'support' two or more universals at the same time, it will lead us to the absurd position to think that there can not be any existential and connotative difference between those different universals which are ontologically distinct from one another. If one of them be suggested by a name or by a conception, then all the remaining ones, since their existence depends on the same supporting cause, will be *eo ipso* suggested and their names will practically become synonyms. Thus the names of the universals like existence, substantiality, solidity, arboreity and *śimśapāness*, all of which are supposed to inhere in the self-same *śimśapā* tree, will have the same meaning, which is evidently absurd. Again, if different universals be supported by the same particular, then, in perceiving one of these universals, we should be able to perceive the rest of them. But that this is not the case is proved by the fact that from a considerable distance in a dim moonlit night, a *śimśapā* tree is perceived merely as something existent and nothing else. Had the hypothesis in question been true, i. e., if the self-same particular tree supported the different kinds of aforesaid universals, then in perceiving the universal 'existence' within it, we could have perceived the rest of them at the same time. But this is not the case.²⁹ These considerations, the Buddhists claim, conclusively dispose of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contention that a single individual object is the support of several universals at the same time.

Again, when a universal is said to be present in a particular instance of it, the Buddhist asks the Naiyāyikas—is it present in it in its entirety, or, is only a part of it present in that particular instance? If it is present in its entirety, then, in accordance with the law of contradiction, nothing of it will be left to be present in its other particular instances, so that if there be one individual cow by virtue of its possession of the universal 'cowness' (*gotva*), there will be no other individual cows in the world. And if it is present in its various particular instances part by part, then, the universal in question, instead of of being a simple unanalysable entity as claimed by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, will be a complex one composed of parts; and

29. Ekopakārake grāhye nopakārāstato'pare,
Dṛṣṭe tasminnadṛṣṭā ye tadgrāhe sakalagrāha.

Ibid.

as no complex entity is eternal, the universal would cease to be eternal (*nitya*). But this conclusion directly goes against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of universal. Moreover, if only a part of the universal 'cowness' be present in a particular cow, then we are landed in the absurdity that an individual cow is only partly a cow and partly some other animal such as a horse.

Next, the Buddhists ask the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers—are the so-called universals present everywhere (*sarva-sarva-gata*), or, are they confined only to their respective particular instances (*vyakti-sarva-gata*)? If it is present everywhere, then all things will be confused together and form a chaos, because a cow would be then characterised non only by cowness (*gotva*) by also by horseness (*aśvatva*), dogness etc., which are everywhere by supposition.³⁰ If the universal is, on the other hand, confined only to its respective particulars, e. g., if the universal 'cowness' be present only in all individual cows and not in any other animals, then it would be difficult to account for its sudden appearance in a newly born particular object which springs into existence at a spot where the universal in question was not found previously and whereto it could not have moved from another individual in which it was, being by hypothesis, incapable of movement. Only the substances are capable of movement, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, and if the universal in question moves from another individual, it would cease to be a universal and turn out to be a substance. Moreover, how can we explain the perception of the individual from which its corresponding universal is transmitted to the other newly born individual? It cannot be said that the universal in question is born anew along with the newly born individual, because the universals are eternal entities which do not admit of any temporal origination. As the sudden appearance of a universal in a newly born individual object cannot be explained with success, so also we cannot explain its sudden disappearance from an individual when it is broken or destroyed. The universal in question cannot be destroyed along with the destruction of the individual, since it is an eternal entity incapable of destruction. Nor can it be said that it moves forward in search of an another individual as its abode, because it is *ex hypothesi* devoid of any motion. Even if for the sake of argument we admit that it can move forward to another individual for its

30. See *Nyāyamañjarī*, (Chowkhamba, 1936), pp. 272-73.

locus, the individual to which it moves cannot accommodate it, because it is already possessed of its own universal and the new-comer universal would prove superfluous to it. Again, suppose the species we call cow becomes extinct in the course of evolution so that not a single individual cow is anywhere left on the earth, where will the eternal 'cowness' (*gotva*) go ? Will it wander about like a floating adjective in empty space and empty time ? Even if it does so, its subsistence in space and time (which, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers are substances) would make them understood as cow, as the presence of a cow-universal (*gotva-jāti*) in an individual cow makes the latter understood as a cow. But this is obviously absurd. All these Buddhist objections in connection with the relation of a universal to its corresponding particular objects have been summed up in the following verse :

Na yāti na ca tatrāśīn na cotpannañ na cāmśavat,
Jahāti pūrvam nādhāram aho vyasana-saṁtatiḥ.

Pramāṇavārtika, 1/153.

The main point of the realists' answer to the objections summed up in the verse³¹ is that all of them are based on a false spatial view of universal, that the universals are spatial entities spatially located in particulars. But the particular is not the spatial seat of the universal, it is only a means of revealing it (*vyañjaka*). The universal 'cowness' is present not only in the particular cows but also in other animals such as horses, dogs etc. But it is not manifested in other animals except in the individual cows. That is why, the universal 'cowness', though present in a horse, cannot be perceived in it. It can be perceived only in a cow which alone possesses the capacity to manifest it. Hence, despite its omnipresence, a universal cannot be perceived anywhere and everywhere in the world, it can be perceived only through the perception of the individual which is capable of revealing it.³² Hence it is both correct to say that the universal is

31. In the next chapter we shall see how can all other objections adduced by the Buddhists against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of universal be answered successfully from the standpoint of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Realism.

32. Sarvasarvagatā jātiriti tāvadupeyate,
Sarvatrāgrahaṇam tasyā vyañjakavyaktyaśānnidheḥ,
Nyāyamañjarī (Choukhamba), p. 285.

omnipresent (*sarvasarva-gata*) and also that it is present in its respective particulars (*vyakti-sarva-gata*).³³ When a new particular is born, it comes to be related to its corresponding universal and is manifested through it. Though the universal is eternal and omnipresent, its relation to a particular individual and hence its manifestation come into existence only at the moment when the individual in question comes into being.

But the Buddhists might retort to the above argument of the realists that potential or unmanifested existence is equivalent to non-existence. Efficiency, activity or actuality (*arthakriyākāritva*) is the mark of the real. If an entity is devoid of this efficiency, if it is unable to affect our sensibility so that it fails to produce any kind of sensation within us, it should be pronounced as unreal or non-existent. The Buddhists could readily concede to Berkeley's dictum—*Esse est percipi*—to be is to be perceived—if perception is taken in the sense of pure sensation devoid of any kind of imaginative construction. Hence to say that the universal 'cowness', though present in a horse, is not perceived in it, because it is not manifested there, is a clear contradiction in terms. Moreover, it is said by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers that only some particulars possess the capacity of revealing a specific universal. But it cannot explain—why the universal in question should be perceived in those particulars. The flame of a torch reveals the objects in a dark chamber, but it cannot be said that those objects are felt or perceived *within* the flame.

IV

It should be noted from the previous section that most of the Buddhists' arguments to disprove the ontological reality of universals are chiefly based on showing the incomprehensibility of the relation between the universal and its corresponding particulars. It, thus, becomes incumbent upon the Buddhists themselves to explain this relation satisfactorily, to offer a solution of the problem where the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers and the other realists are supposed to have

33. Tatra yat tāvat pṛṣṭam sāmānyam sarvagatam vyaktigatam veti tatra pakṣadvayamapi vayam kakṣikurmaḥ.
Mānameyodaya, p. 231.

failed. But this is not an easy task to be done and it offers to them a more serious and more complicated problem to be solved than it was for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, because they (the Buddhists) have created an irreconcilable dichotomy between the particulars and universals by postulating an unbridgeable gulf between their corresponding sources of apprehension—sensibility and understanding. But the gulf between these two heterogeneous sources of apprehension must somehow be bridged over, the non-intellectual pure sensation of dynamic particulars and the intellectual construction of non-dynamic universals must somehow be united together, if knowledge³⁴ is to be attained at all. They hold that the truth of knowledge consists in its practical value. A cognition must prompt successful action, i. e., it must lead to the achievement of "some desired end."³⁵ But neither the unutterable pure sensation alone nor the empty concepts (universals) alone can lead us to any kind of activity whatsoever—successful or unsuccessful. Only a combination of these two factors can do so. Hence the phenomenal or empirical knowledge whose test of truth lies in successful activity is, according to the Buddhists, the joint product of two absolutely heterogeneous sources of knowledge—sensibility and understanding. That these two apparently contradictory sources can co-operate in producing a piece of phenomenal knowledge is evident in the perceptual judgment of the form—"This is a cow". In this judgment the 'this' represents the unutterable pure sensation and the 'cow' the general image of it constructed by the understanding. Thus the judgment, according to

34. Knowledge, here, evidently means empirical knowledge as distinguished from transcendental knowledge. Transcendental knowledge consists in the pure sensation of the dynamic particulars, the things-in-themselves (*svalakṣaṇas*) which are absolutely free from the construction of the understanding. But empirical knowledge is a knowledge which contains the pure sensation of the non-conceptual particulars and the conceptual construction of the understanding together. It is the knowledge through a concept of the understanding as referred to a sensation.

35. *Nyāya-vindu* (Chowkhamba), Chaptea I :—

"Tataḥ arthakriyāsamarthavastupradarśakam samyagjñānam" and *Ibid* :
 "Yataśca arthasiddhistat samyagjñānam".

the Buddhists, is a mental act of uniting sensation with conception with a view to attaining (phenomenal) knowledge. It is synthetic in so far as it brings together two elements of knowledge which are quite different. But if they are quite different, if sensibility and understanding are radically opposed and mutually exclusive, if the definition of the one consists, in a way, of the negation of the other, it appears to be a perplexing enigma as to how they could be united together in a single act of perceptual judgment.

The Buddhists offer two kinds of explanation towards the solution of this mystery—one psychological and the other logical. The logical solution is contained in their theory of *apoha* or the negative meaning of names which will be discussed a little later. At present let us turn to their psychological solution of the problem.

The psychological solution is nothing else than the theory of attention or 'mental sensation' (*mānasa pratyakṣa*) as it is called by the Buddhists. Pure sensation of absolute particulars is momentary. It vanishes as soon as it comes into being. But it possesses the capacity of stimulating the understanding to construct an illusive image of universal. But before the understanding is fully worked up, the moment of pure sensation or sense-intuition is immediately followed by a moment of mental sensation or intelligible intuition. It is, therefore, something intermediate between the moment of pure sensation and the conceptual working of our understanding. In one and the same stream of cognition, there are then two consecutive moments of sensation—the one sensuous and the other mental. They are homogeneous in so far as they belong to the same stream of cognition (*eka-santāna-patita*). But they are not quite identical in so far as they represent two different moments whose functions are quite different. The function of pure sensation, as has been indicated already, is to signalise the presence of the object in ken, its mere presence and nothing else. But the function of mental sensation consists in stimulating the understanding to construct an image of the object.

In the mental sensation of a given object, the second moment of the *object* is present in the ken, because, in accordance with the law of momentariness (*kṣaṇabhāṅga-vāda*) which has been universally accepted by all the schools of Buddhism in general, the first moment of the *object* vanishes as soon as it gives rise to the first moment of pure sensation. The first moment of the *object* (*prathama kṣaṇa*) is

the substrata cause (*urādāna*) of the next following moments of the object (*uttara-kṣaṇa*). This second moment of the object is contemporaneous with the first moment of sensation, so that mental sensation is the joint product of co-operation (*pratītya-samutpanna*) of the first moment of sensation with the second moment of the object. In the next third moment of cognition, the mnemonic elements become aroused, the sensations fade away and the intellect constructs an abstract image according to its own law.

From the point of view of empirical psychology, the mental sensation is simply the moment of attention or of attending to the preceding moment of pure sensation. The mind which in early Buddhism was a special sixth organ of cognition³⁶ is identified in the logical school of Buddhism (*nyāya-vādino-Bauddha*) with 'the moment of attention, which is called mental sensation or sensation by inner sense, in distinction from 'pure sensation' or sensation by the outer sense organ. This second moment of sensation, although from the empirical point of view, is nothing but a moment of attention, it is, from the epistemological point of view, a moment which, although characterised as a moment of intelligible intuition, nevertheless lacks the most characteristic feature of being intelligible, it is as unintelligible and unutterable as the first; it is, therefore, half-intelligible, something intermediate between pure sensation and its corresponding intelligible image.³⁷

Jñānagarbha, a famous Buddhist scholar, is of opinion that the theory of mental sensation was devised in order to re-establish the unity of knowledge which the Buddhists themselves have destroyed by assuming a radical distinction between two sources of cognition—sensation and conception.³⁸ How could it otherwise happen that a pure sensation should be comprehended under a conception with which it has no point of connection, with which it is absolutely

36. Man-āyatana, āyatana no. 6. See Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 8.

37. An exhaustive account of the genesis and nature of mental sensation can be found in Stcherbatsky's *Buddhist Logic* (Vol-II), pp. 311-339, in which he translates relevant tracts from various Hindu and Buddhist sources.

38. *Ibid*, p. 23, footnote no. 3.

dissimilar? There must be some third thing, homogeneous, on the one side, with pure sensation, and, on the other, with the intelligible conception, in order to render the application of the latter to the former possible. Such is the intelligible intuition or mental sensation. It is pure intuition in the sense that it is not yet touched upon by the concepts of the understanding and this feature makes it homogeneous with pure sensation. It is an intelligible intuition, on the other hand, in the sense that it is attended with a halo of attention which precedes the full working up of the intellect, and this feature makes it homogeneous with the intelligible concepts. The transition from sensation to conception is, thus, explained through the mediation of mental sensation.

It should be noted here in passing that the theory of mental sensation plays the same role in the logical school of Buddhism as the theory of schematism did play in the philosophy of Kant. Kant also, like the Buddhists, maintained a sharp and radical distinction between the passive receptivity of sensibility and the spontaneous creativity of understanding and in order to fill up the gap between them, he was also in the need of a third intermediate entity, homogeneous, on the one side, with the categories of the understanding, and, on the other, with the sensible phenomenon. This intermediate link must be sensuous, on the one side, and intelligible, on the other. He found this intermediate link in the time-series while the Buddhists found it in their theory of mental sensation.

Dharmottara, the commentator on Dignāga's *Nyāya-vindu*, rejects the interpretation of the theory of mental sensation as given by Jñānagarbha.³⁹ He points out that the contention of Jñānagarbha that mental sensation provides an intermediate link between two heterogeneous sources of knowledge rests upon an unfounded assumption of homogeneous causation, that the effect must be similar to its cause. Since sensation is said to be the cause of conception, and since sensation and conception are radically opposed and mutually exclusive, the former cannot produce the latter, unless they are first made similar through some intermediate agency and this intermediate agency is said to be the mental sensation. But Dharmottara argues that causation as functional interdependence (*prāṭītya-samutpāda*) can

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 314-15.

exist between two absolutely heterogeneous facts.⁴⁰ Sensation can call forth an image directly without the help of any intermediate operation. The intellect begins to operate when the operation of senses comes to an end. If that were not the case, i. e., if the pure sensation could not produce the concepts of the understanding directly without the help of any intermediate agency like the mental sensation, there could be no sharp line of distinction between sensation and conception, a distinction which is the basic assumption on which the entire edifice of the logical school of Buddhism has been erected; there would be then a difference of degree only, sensation would be confused conception, in other words, there would be no pure sensation at all. The Buddhist law of causation as functional interdependence, thus, does not militate against the dissimilarity between cause and effect. Given a point-instant of reality and a receptive consciousness, a sensation arises. The corresponding concept, likewise, arises in functional dependence on a moment of pure sensation and a moment of objective reality. No mediating third entity like the mental sensation is required to explain the origin of concepts.⁴¹

The objection against the theory of mental sensation came from the side of the Hindu realists also who denied the sharp distinction between sensibility and understanding. Vācaspati Miśra ridicules it by saying that if two absolutely dissimilar things like sensation and conception could be made similar by the mediation of mental sensation, then "a fly could be made similar to an elephant through the medium of a donkey."⁴² For this and many other reasons advanced by the realists, to all of which we need not refer here, and also due to the difference of opinion among the Buddhists themselves as to its true nature and function, the theory of mental sensation (*mānasa*

40. *Supra*, pp. 47-48.

41. But, though Dharmottara rejects the interpretation of the theory of mental sensation as given by Jñānagarbha, he does not reject the theory as such. He retains it on the ground that its admission into the system of Buddhism does not involve any contradiction. See Stcherbatsky's *Buddhist Logic* (Vol-II), p. 29, foot-note 3.

42. "Hasti-maśakāv api rāsphaḥ sārūpayet."

Op. cit., p. 341.

pratyakṣa) cannot be accepted as offering a true and satisfactory solution of the problem of relationship between sensibility and understanding, a solution which would at once solve for the Buddhists the problem of relationship between the universals and particulars also. Where psychology fails, logic comes to its aid and the Buddhists offer their most original and at the same time highly controversial logical theory of *apoha* (doctrine of the negative meaning of names) as a solution of the problem in question.

The Buddhist theory of *apoha* is mainly concerned with determining the meaning of class-concepts like cow, horse etc. which can be applied to a group of individual objects belonging to the same class. How is it possible, asks a Buddhist, that a single name 'cow' can be applied to each and every member of the class of cow at the same time? To this, the realists have an easy answer. They are of opinion that the individual cows, in spite of their numerical and qualitative variance, share an identical character called 'cowness' (*gotva*) and the class-name cow refers to this common identical character. This identical character shared by the individual members of a class is known as universal. But the Buddhists deny the objectivity of universals altogether. According to them, the so-called universals are nothing but mental concepts created by our Productive Imagination (*kalpanā*). The external reality consists of discrete particulars which have nothing common in them. If it be so, how can we refer a single class-concept to a number of individual objects belonging to the same class? The question of referential meaning of the class-concepts, therefore, poses a very serious problem to the Buddhists and they try to answer it by their theory of *apoha*. A Buddhist points out that the notion of commonness (*anuvṛtti pratyaya*) designated by a class-concept, which is supposed by the realists to be caused by a positive common universal residing in all particular objects belonging to the same class, is really negative in character. For example, all the cows of the world are different from one another and have nothing in common. Yet all of them are called by the same class-concept cow simply because all of them have a negative commonness in that they are all different from the non-cows, viz., horses, dogs etc. The universal cowness, according to the Buddhists, is not an ontologically existing entity, but only a negation in the form of the exclusion of non-cows. It is called *ataḍ-vyāvṛtti* which means the exclusion of what a thing is not. The

technical term used for it is *apoha* which is the Buddhist counterpart of the universal of the realist school.

Sāntarakṣita defines *apoha* by saying that "it is the (externally) reflected image (*artha-pratibimbaka*) which appears in our determinate perception."⁴³ This definition requires a little elucidation. According to the Buddhists, the so-called universals, being essentially different in every respect with the point-instants of external reality, cannot have any real relation with the latter. Yet in the perceptual judgment of the form "this is a cow" in which the 'this' represents an external point-instant of reality and the 'cow' an internal thought-construct, we feel as though these two elements have been united and identified with each other. This feeling of identification, according to the Buddhists, is an illusion. The explanation of illusion as given by the Buddhist logicians is similar to that of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, according to which, a so-called case of illusion is caused by non-comprehension of difference (*bhedāgraha*) between what is directly perceived and what is recollected in thought. To account for the phenomenon of illusion, the stock example of which is the erroneous perception of silver in a glittering piece of nacre, the Prābhākaras put forward the view that what really happens in the case of nacre-silver illusion is that a generically given glittering surface of a nacre or a glittering 'this' calls forth the memory-image of a piece of glittering silver and we fail to distinguish between the presented 'this' and the represented 'silver' (*bhedāgraha*). Having thus failed to realise their difference and numerical duality (*bhedāgrahāt*), we feel as though we are identifying the one with the other and form the false judgment "this is silver". For the Prābhākaras, therefore, the phenomenon of illusion is no positive experience, but a negative non-distinguishing (*bhedāgraha*) of a presented datum in the form of 'this' and a represented memory-image which the datum calls forth. The same principle of non-comprehension of difference (*bhedāgraha*) has been resorted to by the Buddhist logicians to explain the relation between the non-constructed unique particulars and the universals which are said to be the conceptual constructions of our Productive Imagination (*kalpanā*). The universals and the particulars, according to the Buddhists, are radically opposed and mutually

43. Yaj-jñāne bhāty artha-pratibimbakam.
Tattvasaṃgraha. Verse, 1006.

exclusive entities, which, therefore, should not have any real connection between them. Yet in our perceptual judgment, these two elements seem to be identified with each other, simply because the distinction between the internal thought-image and the external point-instant is not grasped by us (*bhedāgraha*). Their identification is not real, it is illusory ; and the illusion in question is caused not by any (positive) comprehension of identity (*abheda-graha*), but by the non-comprehension of difference (*bhedā-graha*) between what is internal and what is external.⁴⁴ That is why the internal thought-image is perceived in the determinate perception of an object as though it were something external. In this way, the internal thought-image becomes illusorily externalised and this is what is known as *apoha*. This illusory external image is similar in the case of all determinate perception of an object of the same class, say, cow. "One determinate perception of a cow projects externally an image which is similar to those projected by determinate perception of other cows ; and these determinate perceptions which grasp only their own form are incapable of grasping the difference between different images projected by them, because comprehension of difference depends on the (simultaneous) grasping of two things. Thus, on account of non-comprehension of the difference, identity is imposed on the images projected by the thought, and therefore, the object of all the determinate perceptions is held to be one and the same. It is this identity of images which is regarded by the (Hindu) realist to be a universal. Inasmuch as it is in the form of a negation, i. e., non-comprehension of difference in the externally projected forms of the determinate perceptions, it is held to be of a negative nature (*abhāva-rūpa*)."⁴⁵

44. Darśanānantarya-vipralabdhas tu dṛśyam eva gṛhītaṁ manyate tad-abhimānena ca pravartate idaṁ tad-ekikaraṇam āhuḥ dṛśya-vikalpayor bhedo yan na gṛhyate, na punar bhinnayor abhedādhyavasāya ekikaraṇam iṣyate.

Jayanta Bhatta, *Nyāyamañjarī* (Benares, 1936), Part-I, p. 281.

45. Yādṛśameko govikalpo bāhyātmatayā svapratibhāsamāropayati govikalpāntaramapi tādṛśamevāropayati vikalpāśca pratyekaṁ svākāramātragrāhiṇo na parasparāropitānāmākārāṇāṁ bhedagrahaṇāya paryāpnuvanti, tasyobhayagrahaṇādadhīnatvāt tadagrahaṇācca vikalpāropitānāmākārāṇāmekatvamāropya vikalpānāmeko viṣaya ityucyate,

On the negative nature of *apoha*, Śāntarakṣita and his commentator Kamalaśīla have given an illuminating discourse, the substance of which is reproduced below.

Apoha (negation) is of two kinds: (i) it is either *paryudāsa*, a special kind of negation, or (ii) *prasajya-pratiṣedha* which means a negation of something positive. The special kind of negation (*paryudāsa*) is of two kinds, viz., *buddhyātman* and *arthātman*. The *buddhyātman* which is the principal *apoha* is in the form of thought which is the same as the "externally reflected image appearing in our determinate perception."⁴⁶ The other kind, *arthātman*, is the unique particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) which is real (*artha*), and is called *apoha* only in a secondary sense. There are several reasons, all of which we need not mention here, why *buddhyātman* or *artha-pratibimbaka* is regarded as *apoha*. The chief reason is that a thought-image appears in a form distinct from all other thought-images. The literal meaning of *apoha* is the negation of others, i. e., differentiation from others by negation. This, therefore, is the principal reason why a thought-image which distinguishes itself from other thought-images by negation is called *apoha*. It is then pointed out that the name *apoha* is applied in a secondary sense to *sva-lakṣaṇa* also, because the latter, being of the nature of unique particular shorn of all possible relations, is also distinguished from everything else of the world (*sarvato-vyāvṛtta*). The real *apoha*, however, is the first one, the thought-image (*buddhya-ātman*), to which the second kind of negation, viz., *prasajya-pratiṣedha* (the negation of a positive form) is also applicable. It means that a cow is simply a negation of non-cows, i. e., it is distinguished from all other things not belonging to its class (*atad-vyāvṛtti* or *ago-vyāvṛtti*).

Śāntarakṣita points out that the first meaning of the special negation (*paryudāsa*), viz., thought-form (*buddhya-ātman*) or the externally reflected image of our thought (*artha-pratibimbaka*), is the principal meaning of a word (the class-name). When a word is

tadeva ca sāmānyam vahirāropitebhyo vikalpākārebhyo'tyantabhedābhāvenābhāvarūpam.

Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī* (Benares, 1895), p. 318.

46. Yaj-jñāne bhāty artha-pratibimbakam.

Tattvasamgraha. Verse, 1006.

spoken, it is the thought-image of an object which is directly evoked in our mind, and therefore, that is the principal meaning of a word. But the second kind of negation, viz, *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, is also implied in it. The essence of a thought-image, i. e., of a cow, consists in this that "its essence is not the essence of another image, say, a horse."⁴⁷ It is significant to note that according to the analysis of Śāntarakṣita, the principal meaning of a class-name, e. g., cow, is the thought-image of the cow. The exclusion of non-cows (*ago-vyāvṛtti*) is only a subordinate meaning.⁴⁸ Kamalaśīla refers to an objection raised by an opponent that in the knowledge caused by a word, it is not merely a negation that is comprehended. This objection is out of place, because, according to the theory expounded above, the thought-image is the direct meaning of a word, and negation in the form of exclusion of non-cows is only an implied and secondary meaning.⁴⁹ But we should not forget that, according to the Buddhists, even the thought-image is not positive, but is only a kind of special negation (*paryudāsa*).⁵⁰

It has been stated that an illusory external object designated as *apoha* is the object of determinate perception as well as the direct meaning of a word, the class-name. Analysis of the unreal external image (*alīka-bāhyākāra* or *apoha*) which is not different from the object of determinate perception, shows, as already noted, that the external image is not positive, although it has a positive-like appearance. Essentially it is negative, being in the form of exclusion of others (*anya-vyāvṛtti-rūpa*). Buddhist writers have advanced strong arguments to establish the negative nature of *apoha*, i. e., of the so-called external object like a cow which is for them an illusory

47. Na tad-ātma parātmēti,

Tattvasamgraha. Verse, 1014.

48. Of course, the subordinate meaning is also implied in the principal meaning.

49. Niṣedha-mātraṁ naiveha śabde jñāne 'vabhāsatē.

Tattvasamgraha-pañjikā. Verse, 1012.

50. Only a brief substance of the discourse in the *Tattvasamgraha* and the *Pañjikā* has been given here. Stcherbatsky has translated into English portions of this discourse in his *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. pp. 471 ff.

object. Vācaspati Miśra has summed up the Buddhist arguments in a lucid manner. He says : "The *apoha* (the external illusory object) is in the nature of the exclusion of others (*anya-vyāvṛtti-rūpa*) for three reasons : (i) it is commonly applied to both existence and non-existence, (ii) it brings about similarity between the extremely dissimilar, and (iii) it is experienced as such (i. e., having the nature of exclusion of others)."⁵¹ Vācaspati Miśra explains each of these three reasons : "Whatever is common to both, existence and non-existence, can only be in the nature of the exclusion of others, for example, incorporeality (*amūrtatva*) which is found in knowledge (which is existent), and also in the hare's horn (which is non-existent). The objects of determinate perception, like a jar or cloth, are similar (common to both existence and non-existence). This is the logical reason called *svabhāvahetu*.⁵² With regard to the objects of determinate perception, we make assertions 'a cow exists' and 'a cow does not exist,' which refer to both its existence as well as non-existence. If the object 'cow' were of positive nature like the unique particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) which is always of an affirmative nature, i. e., existent only, it could not be related to non-existence, because of contradiction. An object which is existent cannot be non-existent. Nor can a cow be related to *existence* because it will be a mere repetition (the word 'cow' being affirmative means a cow which is existent, and therefore to say that 'a cow exists' is a mere repetition)."⁵³ The essence of 'cow' cannot, therefore, of positive

51. Tacedam *anya-vyāvṛtti-rūpam bhāvābhāva-sādhāraṇyācca*, *atyantavilakṣaṇānām śalakṣaṇyāpādanācca tadrūpyānubhavācca*.

Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā (Chowkhamba, 1925), p. 486.

52. This is one of the two kinds of logical reason accepted by the Buddhists : one is called *svabhāvahetu* or *tādātmya* based on an analysis of the nature of things, and the other is *tad-utpatti*, based on causal relationship.

53. *Yad bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇam tad anyavyāvṛttirūpameva yathā mūrttatvaṁ, tat khalu vijñāne ca śaśaviṣāne ca sādhāraṇam. Tathā ca vivādadhyāsītā vikalpaviṣayāḥ ghatapatādaya iti svabhāvahetuh. Gourasti gournāstīti hi bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇo gavādivikalpaviṣayo vidhirūpasvalakṣaṇavat bhāvāsādhāranye nāstītyanena na saṁvadyate virodhāt, astītyanenāpi na saṁvadyate pounaruktyāt.*

Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā (Chowkhamba, 1925), p. 486.

nature. It consists in the negation of its contradictory counterpart (*anya-vyāvṛtti-rupa*).

Vācaspati Miśra then explains the second reason: "Besides, similarity between absolutely dissimilar objects can only be due to the exclusion of others. There may be said to be similarity even between a cow, horse, a buffalo, and an elephant on account of their common differentiation from a lion. (All these animals are absolutely different from one another, yet they may be said to be similar in that they are all different from a lion). Likewise, there is similarity of an external unique particular which is of an affirmative nature and is an ultimate reality, with the unreal (object of determinate perception, like a cow) which is extremely dissimilar to it. This is the logical reason called *svabhāvahetu*⁵⁴. The external reality (*sva-laksana*), although of affirmative nature, is differentiated from non-cows ; similarly, if the object of determinate perception (i. e., the empirical object cow) is also differentiated from non-cows, then, on the basis of the differentiation alone, similarity can be established (between different objects of determinate perception, i. e., cows) and not otherwise."⁵⁵

He then explains the third reason: "Moreover, the object of determinate perception (the empirical cow) is actually experienced in the form of differentiation or exclusion (from others). If exclusion from other objects be not experienced (at the time of the determinate perception of a cow), a person who has been asked to fasten a cow to a post may fasten a horse instead, because the cow is not comprehended as distinguished from a horse. And, if it has been comprehended as distinguished from a horse, why not the fact of its being in the nature of exclusion from non cows be accepted ?

54. *Supra*, see note 52.

55. *Api cātyantavilakṣaṇānām sālakṣaṇyam anyavyāvṛttikṛtameva. Yathā gavāśvamahiṣamātaṅgānāmatyantavilakṣaṇānāmapi sūdhavyāvṛtṭyā sālakṣaṇyam. Tathā ca vāhyasya svalakṣaṇasya vidhirūpasya paramārthasato'paramārthasatā'tyantavilakṣaṇena sālakṣaṇyamiti svabhāvahetuḥ. Vāhyam hi vidhirūpamapi agovyāvṛttam, vikalpaviśayo'pi cedagovyāvṛttastataḥ sālakṣaṇyam, nānyathā.*

Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā (Chowkhamba, 1925), p. 486.

Therefore, a class-name and a determinate perception (associated with it) are of the nature of exclusion of other things."⁵⁶

Jinendrabuddhi in his commentary on the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* of Dignāga gives an illuminating discourse on the negative meaning of *apoha*⁵⁷. The realist raises a question : if a tree were nothing over and above the negation of non-trees, we could not explain the first cognition of the tree, because at that time we did not know what a non-tree was. If we were to say that a non-tree meant 'other than a tree', and then if a question were raised as to what a tree was, and we were to answer that it was other than a non-tree, it would mean arguing in a circle. This the Buddhists answer by asking a counter-question : even if you fix the name *tree* based upon a positive universal tree, do you, then, exclude non-trees from it or not ? You cannot exclude it without previously knowing what a tree is. But in the case of your first cognition of a tree, you cannot exclude non-trees from it, and, hence, without knowing non-trees you will not know a tree. And if a person cognises a tree without excluding non-trees, his cognition of the tree will be of no avail, because if he wants to avoid non-trees, he will not be able to do so, not knowing what a non-tree is. In fact, it is the same idea, explained here at some length, which is included in Vācaspati Miśra's exposition of the Buddhist argument, viz, if exclusion of other objects is not expressed by a word, a person asked to fasten a cow to a post may fasten a horse instead. The Buddhist points out that the difficulty for himself as well as for the realist will be the same at the time of the first cognition of a universal. The Buddhist, thus, turns the world of phenomenal experience into a series of negations, and the negation being mutual, the empirical world becomes merely relative (or dialectical according to the Mādhyamika system).

The Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* falls in line, to a large extent, with the Hegelian view of concepts. The universality of a concept,

56. *Api cānubhūyata eva vikalpaviṣayo vyāvṛttirūpaḥ. Tathā hi tadapratibhāsane gām vadhāneti deśito'svaṁ vadhniyād goraśvād bhedenāpratibhāsanāt. Pratibhāse vā katham nāgovyāvṛtti-pratibhāsaḥ. Tasmādanyāpohagocarou śabdavikalpāvitī.*

Ibid., p. 487.

57. The discourse has been translated into English by Stcherbat-sky in his *Buddhist Logic*, Vol-I. p. 461.

says Hegel, is posited through its negativity : the concept is identical with itself only inasmuch as it is a *negation of its own negation*. This sounds nearly like the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha*. But Hegel goes a step further than the Buddhist and pronounces the ultimate identity between position and negation, being and non-being. The thesis and the anti-thesis, according to Hegel, are merely two phases in the self-development of concepts. All oppositions in thought or concept pre-suppose a higher synthesis in which all contradictions are resolved. So Hegel has left in the world nothing but logic, in his system logic and metaphysics merge together. In the Buddhist view however, there is besides logic a genuine reality, i. e., the *svakṣaṇa* particular, which is neither negative nor dialectical. It is only the logic, concept or thought that is dialectical. It is true that from another point of view, from a translogical point of view, the Buddhist Dignāga, as a monist, will admit the ultimate identity and confluence of all opposition between logic and reality in a transcendental all-absorbing undifferentiated consciousness (*viññaptimātratā*) which is the unique substance of the universe. But this metaphysical or translogical point of view is carefully distinguished from the empirical and the logical. From the empirical point of view, logic and reality are kept distinct and separate. It is only the dialectical nature of the concepts (*anya-vyāvṛtti rūpa*) that serves an indirect connecting link between them. Another important point of difference between Hegel and the Buddhists lies in the fact that while Hegel views logic or dialectic as a means for the self-development of concepts, for the Buddhists there is no question of self-development of these logical concepts. Every kind of development, movement or motion belong to the reality, not to logic.

CHAPTER V

A DEFENCE OF REALISM

In the foregoing chapter, we engaged our attention in finding out the various grounds offered by the Buddhist nominalists on the basis of which they seek to deny the ontological reality of the universals. In our present discussion, our main programme will be to expose the weakness of this nominalistic theory by showing that the so-called grounds put forward by the Buddhists in support of their theory cannot stand the test of criticisms offered by the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā realists. Consequently, our discussion will have the effect of *reductio ad absurdum*: it will indirectly substantiate the logical soundness of the realistic theory of universal, in accordance with which the universal is a separate ontological entity (*padārtha*) apart from the particulars, by reducing its opponent's position to illogical absurdity.

The first thing we are to examine here is the theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* upon which the entire edifice of the Buddhist nominalism seems to rest. It is a theory which maintains that sensation and inference, the only sources of human knowledge, are radically opposed and mutually exclusive in the sense that each of them has a marked jurisdiction of its own to which the other has no access. Pure sensation apprehends only the non-constructive particulars whereas the universals, which are nothing but the constructions (*kalpanās*) of our understanding, are the special field of inference. Sensation cannot apprehend the universals, nor can the particulars be apprehended by inference. This theory is in flat contradiction with the Nyāya theory of *pramāṇa-saṃplava*, according to which the self-same object can be cognised either directly by sense-perception or indirectly by inference. There is no hard and fast opposition between sensation and inference and each of them can change its function with the other with regard to the same object.

We have seen in our previous chapter how the case of the Buddhist nominalists stands or falls with their theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* and hence, if this theory is proved to be false and the cause of the Nyāya theory of *pramāṇa-saṃplava* be championed, the entire superstructure of the Buddhist nominalism will collapse and crumble to the ground.

The Naiyāyikas point out that if the theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* on which the Buddhists have relied so much be accepted, it

would rather go against their claim of inference as a valid source of knowledge. Universals, which according to the Budhists, are nothing but the constructions of our understanding, are the exclusive objects of inference. But inference always depends upon a prior knowledge of the thing to be inferred (*sādhya*) as invariably related with some of its mark (*linga, sādhanā*). This invariable concomitance between the *sādhya* and *sādhanā* has been technically called the relation of *vyāpti*. But the knowledge of any kind of relation (*sambandha*) presupposes a previous knowledge of its different relata (*sambandhi*) as independent units. The *sādhya* constitutes a relatum in the relation of *vyāpti*. Hence without a knowledge of the *sādhya* apart from the relational context, the relation of *vyāpti* which is regarded as the ground of inference cannot be ascertained. The *sādhya*, in the case of inference as interpreted by the Buddhists, is always a universal, i. e., a construction of the understanding, the knowledge of which must, therefore, be derived from inference. Hence we find that inference here depends upon the knowledge of relation (*vyāpti*) and the knowledge of relation, in its turn, depends upon inference (of the *sādhya*). This is clearly a case of *petitio principii*, a defective way of ratiocination technically known in Indian philosophy as *anyo'nyāśrayadoṣa*.¹

Moreover, if the knowledge of the *sādhya*, as one of the relata in the relation of *vyāpti* be itself the result of inference, then, for this inference of *sādhya* an another relation of *vyāpti* should be assumed, in which case the required knowledge of the *sādhya* would again be the result of another inference, for which another relation of *vyāpti* should again be assumed and the knowledge of the *sādhya* required; and this process would be multiplied indefinitely. The fallacy of indefinite regress (*anavasthā*), thus, becomes inevitable.²

1. Na hyavijñātasambandhaḥ liṅgaṁ gamakamiṣyate,
Sambandhadhīśca sambandhidvayāvagatipūrvikā.
Sāmānyātmakasambandhigrahaṇaṁcānumānataḥ,
Tasmādeva yaśiṣyeta vaktamanyo'nyāsaṁśrayam.

Jayanta Bhatta, *Nyāyamañjarī*, Vol-I (Bengali translation by Pañcānan Tarkavāgīś, Calcutta University, 1939) p. 254.

2. Anumānāntarādhīna sambandhigrahapūrvikā,
Sambandhādhigatirna syānmanvantarāśatairapi.
Ibid, p. 254.

Hence we find that the Buddhist theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* which emphasises the inferential character of the universals as opposed to their perceptual character, annuls the very claim of inference as a valid source of knowledge, since the relation of *vyāpti* which is considered to be the ground of inference cannot be ascertained on this theory.

But the Buddhists, in support of their theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*, put forward an objection against the theory of *pramāṇa-saṃplava* as sponsored by the Naiyāyikas. *Pramāṇa* means the source of cognition and cognition, according to the Buddhists, must be the cognition of something new, cognition of something not yet cognised (*agr̥hītagrāhi*). There must be an element of novelty in our cognition, argues a Buddhist, a felt addition to our experience not received before. But if the Nyāya theory of *pramāṇa-saṃplava* be true, i. e., if the self-same object be cognised both by perception and inference consecutively, then the source which comes latter must be dismissed as a source of cognition, since it gives us then not the cognition of something new, but re-cognition of something which has already been cognised. Instead of being *agr̥hītagrāhi*, it would be a case of *gr̥hītagrāhi*, and hence should not be regarded as a *pramāṇa*.

But the Naiyāyikas answer the above objection of the Buddhists by saying that the character of being *agr̥hītagrāhi* is not always a universal and necessary mark of *pramāṇa*, since a *gr̥hītagrāhi* source may equally give rise to a piece of valid knowledge (*pramā*). To this, the Buddhist might again object that the *gr̥hītagrāhi* source engages itself in re-producing a piece of valid knowledge which has already been produced by the *agr̥hītagrāhi* source, but since a thing which has been produced once cannot be re-produced again, the attempt of the *gr̥hītagrāhi* source in doing so would be a fruitless endeavour. But the Naiyāyikas answer that the knowledge produced by the *gr̥hītagrāhi* source here is numerically different from that produced by the *agr̥hītagrāhi* source, and hence the charge of re-producing an already produced entity does not hold good. Moreover, if the knowledge produced by the *gr̥hītagrāhi* source was ever found to be cancelled, it could have been regarded as a case of *apramāṇa*, but it is never found to be so and hence the claim of the *gr̥hītagrāhi* as a source of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) cannot be dismissed.³

3. Yadapi pramāṇa-viśeṣaṇa nanadhiga'ārthagrāhitvamabhidhīyate

It may be urged by the Buddhists that if the *grhītagrāhi* source of knowledge be regarded as a case of *pramāṇa*, then, *smṛti* or recollection also being *grhītagrāhi*, should be treated as a genuine source of knowledge. But recollection is never recognised by the Naiyāyikas as a source of knowledge. As against this Jayanta Bhatta answers that recollection is not regarded as a source of knowledge, not because that it is a *grhītagrāhi* source but because that it is not caused by the object to be recollected.⁴ The recollection of an entity even after its destruction is a clear evidence that *smṛti* is not caused by the object in question (*arthajanva*).

The Buddhists have raised another fresh objection against the Nyāya theory of *pramāṇa-samplava*. It is urged by them that if sense perception and inference were cognisant of the same objective reality as is maintained by the Naiyāyikas, then the difference in contents of the two cases of cognition in question cannot be accounted for. In perceptual cognition an object is cognised with all its vividness and distinctive individuality. But in inferential cognition the supposedly identical object is felt as less vivid and less distinct. It is a blurred picture of reality which cannot be specifically identified with this or that individual that is cognised with its distinctive identity in perception. We know from the testimony of perception that one individual cow is different from another individual cow. But the evidence of inference gives us knowledge not of this or that individual cow, but of the cow in general, a knowledge in which the mutual difference between the individual cows has faded out. Certainly this difference in contents of the different kinds of

paraistadapi na sāmpratam. Pramāṇasya grhītataditaraviṣayappravṛttasya prāmāṇye viśeṣābhāvāt. Nanu grhītaṇiṣaye pravṛttam pramāṇam kiṃ kuryāt? Pramāṇamiti cet grhyetāpi tāmeva vidhātum. Kṛtāyāḥ karaṇāyogāditi cenna pramāntarakaraṇāt.....Pramāṇasya tu na kiñcit vādhyam paśyāmo yena tadapramāṇamiti vyavasthāpayāmaḥ.

Ibid, p. 172.

4. Na smṛter pramāṇatvaṃ grhītagrāhitākṛtam
 Api tvanarthajanyatvaṃ tadaprāmāṇyakāraṇam.
Ibid, p. 175.

cognition in question cannot be successfully explained, if they are supposed to be cognisant of the self-same objective reality.⁵

But the Naiyāyikas refuse to be convinced by this argument of the Buddhists. They are of opinion that the Buddhists' contention that the difference in contents is incompatible with the sameness of object is not true as a matter of fact. The same object which is clear and distinct when perceived from close vicinity is pale and blurred when viewed from a considerable distance.⁶ In fact the difference between the contents of perceptual cognition and inferential cognition consists, holds a Naiyāyika, not in the difference of their respective objects, but in the difference of the ways (*upāya*) in which the same object is cognised. Their difference is not *viśayagata* strictly speaking but *upāyagata*.⁷

Apart from this, another line of explanation has been adopted by some Nyāya thinkers to account for the difference in contents between perceptual cognition and inferential cognition. Their difference, according to them, is not qualitative but quantitative. The contents of a perceptual cognition are only in excess of those of an inferential cognition. The excess is due to the different qualities of the thing that are cognised in perception alone. But in so far as the identity of the object, irrespective of the excess or diminution of qualities, is taken into account, there is absolutely no difference between perceptual and inferential cognitions. Thus, for instance, the perception of a cow and the inference of a cow have a common content, which is due to the common substance, viz., an individual possessed of the cow-universal (*gotva*). Hence there is no qualitative difference in the content of consciousness relating to the substance. But a substance is cognised with a greater number of qualities in perception and so felt to be more vivid and distinct. In inferential

5. *Yadi ca pratyakṣaviśaye śabdānumānāyorapi vṛttiriṣyate, tarhi pratyakṣasādṛṣṭvitsadṛṣṭīmeva te api buddhiḥ vidadhyaṭāṁ na caivamasti.*

Ibid., p. 230.

6. *Dūrāvidūradeśavyavasthitapadārtha pratītivat.*

Ibid., p. 266.

7. *Viśayasāmye'pi-upāyabhedāt pratītibhedo bhavati.*

Ibid., p. 266.

cognition, on the other hand, the number of qualities cognised is much less, as sensible qualities are not cognised in it, and hence the content of inferential cognition is felt to be more pale and hazy. The so-called qualitative variation in the contents of perceptual and inferential cognitions has, therefore, reference to the numerical ratio of the adjectival qualities that are perceived or unperceived along with the substance and has nothing to do with the substantive core of reality.⁸

From the discussion above, it is evident that the Buddhists' attempt to dismiss the Nyāya theory of *pramāṇa-saṃplava* is an utter failure and their own theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* upon which they try to base their nominalistic theory of universals has not legs to stand upon. It, therefore, should be rejected as offering no solution of the problem of universal.

Having thus failed in this direction, the Buddhists take another line of approach in defence of their nominalistic theory. They say that the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā realists had to postulate the ontological reality of the universals apart from the particulars to account for the uncontradicted notion of identity (*anuvṛttipratyaya*) which we have with regard to all individual objects belonging to a certain class. When we experience an individual object, we experience it not merely as an individual unit but as a member belonging to a certain class. This classification of an individual object at the time of its experience is possible only, argues a Hindu realist, if we have experienced in it a common character which runs identical through all other members of the class in question. The genesis of the notion of identity (*anuvṛttipratyaya*) with regard to an individual object of experience as explained above cannot be accounted for unless an ontological identical principle residing in the individual in question is held to be its cause or ground. This ontological identical character shared by the individual members of a given class has been termed as universal (*sāmānya*) by the realists.

But the Buddhists object against the above contention of the realists that it is not necessary that the notion of identity should

8. Bahutarālpata radharmavaddharmibhedaviṣayatvam eva sfutās-futapratibhāsatvam, nādhikam.

Raghunath Śiromani, *Ātmatattvavivekdīdhiti* (Bibl. Indica), p. 336.

always be grounded upon or caused by one identical ontological universal. Several individual objects having nothing in common may yet give rise to an identical notion. It is a matter of common observation, argues a Buddhist, that a particular entity without having the slightest bit of similarity with other objects may yet produce a similar result along with the others. The plant *guḍūci*, for example, which is said to have a febrifuge effect in medicine has nothing in common, neither in shape, nor in stuff, nor in colour with other plants which are said to have the same febrifuge effect. In the same way the *svalakṣaṇa* particulars, though they do not share a common identical character called universal, may yet be the cause of the notion of identity (*anuvṛttipratyaya*) in our mind. It should be noted here that the Buddhists do not deny the notion of identity itself; what they are at pains to deny is that there is a corresponding ontological universal which causes this notion of identity. They are of opinion that the discrete particulars are endowed with such a capability (*śakti*, *sāmarthya*) as to produce directly the notion of identity without being grounded on one ontological universal.⁹ That the notion of identity can be sometimes explained without the help of a corresponding ontological universal has been admitted even by the Naiyāyikas themselves. It has been said by them (*Naiyāyikas*) that the different universals, e. g., a horse-universal (*aśvatva*), a cow-universal (*gotva*) etc. are so many self-contained units without sharing a common identical universal. The Naiyāyikas do not admit a universal inhering in other universals to avoid the fallacy of indefinite regress (*anavasthā*). But nevertheless these universal-units are all referred to by a common concept and a name, viz., universal. So if in some cases the notion of identity can be explained without an identical ontological principle called universal, the Buddhists demand that we may with equal propriety and cogency explain the notion of identity with regard to experience of an individual cow without taking recourse to a corresponding universal called cowness (*gotva*).

But the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya realists do not admit the validity of the above argument of the Buddhists. They argue that even admitting for the sake of argument that discrete individuals having

9. Vide *Chapter IV*, foot-note no. 6.

nothing in common in the shape of an identical universal are yet endowed with a capability (*śakti*) of producing the notion of identity in our mind, one has the right to ask : (i) is this capability cognisable or non-cognisable and (ii) is it different in each individual or one and the same for all ? If it be *one* and *cognisable*, then it amounts to the admission of an ontological universal, only expressed in a somewhat different phraseology.¹⁰ If, however, the capability (*śakti*, *sāmarthyā*) itself be held to be non-cognisable, how can it lead to the *cognition* of something else, that is, an identical universal ? If the capability itself is not cognised, how can that which is said to be produced by this capability be cognised ? In that case, it will lead us to the rejection of the notion of identity itself, because no object is accepted by mere existence unless it is, in some form or other, actually cognised.¹¹ But to reject the notion of identity itself will be going against the actual deliverance of experience. Even the Buddhists do not deny it, though they deny its corresponding ontological universal.

Again, if the capability (*śakti*, *sāmarthyā*) be different in each individual and something wholly different from the individual itself, how could it lead to any *single* notion of identity by means of the individuals that are many and diverse ? Even granting that it can do so, it can not explain our feeling that this notion of identity or the idea of the universal embraces all the individuals coming under it, since it is an entity which is wholly different from the individuals.¹² Moreover, if the capability of each individual be identical with it, we could have no other entities save those of the individuals ; and these

10. Gṛhyate yadi saikā ca jātirevānyaśabdikā.

Kumarila, *Ślokavārtika* (*Ākṛtivāda*), śloka no. 13.

11. Bhavennirviṣayā buddhiryadi śaktirṇa gṛhyate,

Na hi sadbhāvamātreṇa viṣayaḥ kaścidiṣyate

Ibid, śloka no. 14.

12. Sāmarthyam yadi.....prativyakti bhinnam, na tarhi tasyānugatavikalpotpādāniyāmakatvam, mitho vyābhicārād.

Raghunath *Ātmatattvavivekādīhiti* (Bibl. Indica), p. 389.

individuals being many and diverse, they could not form the basis of any *single* notion of identity.¹³

Again, as regards the Buddhist argument that the several cases of universal which are referred to by the same name and concept, viz., universal, without recognising any higher universal presiding over them, that also does not afford any advantage to the Buddhists. The fact that the universals do not possess any higher universal in common does not prove that lower universals are ontologically unreal or the ideas of them logically unsound. Kumarila makes the situation clear by means of an analogy. The forest is nothing apart from the trees within it. Hence though the ideas of forest apart from the trees is clearly a mistaken one, yet the ideas of the trees themselves cannot be so. Similarly, in the present case, though the idea of the universal corresponding to different universals may be mistaken, that of the universals themselves like cowness (*gotva*), horseness (*aśvatva*) etc. cannot be so.¹⁴

Moreover, the Naiyāyikas point out that though the universals do not admittedly possess a higher universal, their identity of reference is not ungrounded in a common objective character. The common character in question may be defined as the character of existing in all the individuals of a class without existing in the individuals of other classes.¹⁵ This common character is not a universal but that does not argue that it is not objective. In fact it has been admitted by the Naiyāyikas that there are two types of common character (*sāmānya*), viz., (i) universal (*jāti*) and (ii) non-universal (*upādhi*) and it is on the latter that the identity of reference of the various universals is grounded.

13. Bhinnatve vā 'pi śaktīnāmekabuddhirna labhyate,
Viśeṣaśaktyabhede ca tābanmātramatirbhavet.

Kumārila, *op.cit* śloka no. 16.

14. Banopanyāsatulyo 'yamupanyāsaḥ kṛtastvayā,
Bhṛāntitvana hi naitasyā bhrāntirgotvādidhīrapi.

Ibid, śloka no. 20.

15. Vastutaḥ sāmānyeṣva api taditarāvṛttitve sati sakalatadvṛttitvam upādhisāmānyam ekam asti

Ātmatattvaviveka, commentary by Śaṅkar Miśra (Bibl. Indica), p 390.

Thus we find that the Buddhists' attempt to explain the genesis of the awareness of identity (*anuvṛttipratyaya*) by means of the individuals alone without admitting any ontological identical universal proves, on closer examination, to be a failure. But the Buddhists advance many other arguments to disprove the ontological reality of the universals. Let us examine these arguments one by one.

One of the most important and serious charges that the Buddhists put forward against the Naiyāyikas is that, even granting the ontological reality of the universals for the sake of argument, it cannot be decided with certainty whether these universals exist everywhere (*sarva-sarvagata*) or whether they exist only in their corresponding individual objects (*vyakti-sarvagata*). Both these alternatives are fraught with insuperable difficulties which we have already discussed in our previous chapter and so we need not repeat them here. But these difficulties, the Buddhists hold, would not arise at all if the universals be regarded as the imaginary construction of our understanding (*kalpanā*).

Now this question—whether the universals are omnipresent or present only in their corresponding individuals—has given rise to a difference of opinion between the Naiyāyikas, on the one hand, and the Vaiśeṣikas, on the other. The Vaiśeṣika philosophers in general contribute to the *vyaktisarvagata* theory of the universal and deny its omnipresence. They argue that in accordance with the omnipresence theory, the universal cowness (*gotva*) would be present not only in the individual cows but also in dogs, horses etc. Therefore, when someone would be asked to tether a cow, he might rush to a horse leaving a cow, since 'cowness' is present in a horse as well. This would cause great chaos and confusion in our practical behaviour. The Buddhists also repeat the same argument against the omnipresence theory of universals.

But the Naiyāyikas like Vācaspati Miśra, Jayanta Bhatta, Udayana and others who endorse the *sarva-sarvagata* of universal do not admit validity of the above argument of the Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists. They are of opinion that the supposed difficulty in our practical behaviour will not arise at all, since, though the universal cowness (*gotva*) is present in dogs, horses, snakes etc., these animals cannot manifest the universal in question and hence it cannot be perceived in them. A universal is said to be manifested only by the

ākṛti or the form of its corresponding individual so that the perception of this *ākṛti* is an essential pre-requisite of the apprehension of the universal in question. What is *ākṛti* then? It is the specific arrangement and relation subsisting among the different parts of an individual whole (*vilakṣaṇa-avayava-saṃyoga*). An individual cow is a whole (*avayavi*) composed of parts (*avayavas*). But there is such a peculiarity in the arrangement and relation among its different parts as is not found in the relation and arrangement among the various parts of a horse or a dog etc. That is why an individual cow, having this specific *ākṛti* of its own, can manifest its corresponding universal cowness whereas an individual horse cannot do it, because a horse lacks that specific arrangement and relation among its parts (*ākṛti*) which is found in a cow. Similarly the *ākṛti* of an individual horse is capable of manifesting the universal horseness (*aśvatva*) only, not the universal cowness, though the latter co-exists with but does not inhere (*samaveta*) in the former.

The whole (*avayavi*) inheres in its parts (*avayavas*) by the relation of *samavāya* and the universal inheres in the whole by virtue of the same relation. Though the universal is related with each and every part of the whole, yet these parts separately cannot manifest the universal. All the parts should be arranged and related into a definite form or *ākṛti* in order to manifest its corresponding universal. That is why if any particular part of the whole, e. g., the tail, ear, or eye of an individual cow is lost or destroyed, that defective whole still continues to manifest its respective universal, because the manifestation of the universal does not depend on any particular part of the whole but upon the specific arrangement of its different parts taken together (*ākṛti*) and the loss of any particular part of the whole does not mean the loss of the internal *ākṛti* of the whole in question.

Though as a general rule the *ākṛti* of an individual is the revealer (*vyañjaka*) of its corresponding universal, it should be noted here that all universals are not thus revealed through *ākṛti*. For example there is no specific *ākṛti* of the individual qualities (*guṇas*) and actions (*karmas*). Hence the universals corresponding to these entities, viz., *guṇatva* and *karmatva*, cannot be revealed through *ākṛti*. In such cases the manifestation of these universals will entirely depend upon their inherence (*samavāya*) in their corresponding individual loci. The universal *guṇatva*, inspite of its presence in the different indivi-

dual *karmas*, can inhere only in the individual *guṇas* and nowhere else. That is why '*guṇatva*' becomes manifested only by the individual *guṇas* and we perceive '*guṇatva*' in the *guṇas* only, not in the *karmas*. Similarly, the universal *karmatva*, though it is present in the different *guṇas*, can inhere only in its corresponding individual *karmas* and be manifested by them. That is why *karmatva* can be perceived only in the different *karmas*, not in the *guṇas*.

Now, if this distinction between the existence of the universals and their manifestation only through certain individuals is kept in mind, there will be no difficulty in upholding the omnipresence theory of the universals (*sarva-sarvagatavāda*). Though a universal is omnipresent, it is not perceived everywhere simply because it is not manifested everywhere. It can only be perceived in its corresponding individual object which alone possesses the capacity of manifesting it.

The realists are of opinion that the universals are eternal entities (*nitya paa arthas*) free from origination and decay. If the universal cowness (*gotva*) were a non-eternal entity like the individual objects, argues a Naiyāyika, it would be destroyed along with the death of an individual cow and thereafter all other cows of the world would cease to be cows. To avoid this absurdity, the eternity of the universals must be admitted.

Here the Buddhists might raise an objection that if the universal in question were eternal, it would have been perceived eternally. But the 'cowness' is not perceived in a place in the interval between the death of an individual cow and the birth of another. This proves conclusively, argues a Buddhist, that the universals are born or destroyed along with the birth and death of the individuals.

The answer of the Naiyāyikas to the above objection is the same as before : Non-perception is not the only mark of a thing's non-existence. The universal cowness (*gotva*) is eternally present in the interval between the death of an individual cow and the birth of another, but it is not perceived there simply because an individual cow having a definite form (*ākṛti*) which alone possesses the capacity of manifesting the universal in question is absent at that time.

Kamalaśīla, a famous Buddhist philosopher, argues that if the universal were a separate ontological category as contained in its corresponding particulars, we could have reflected it distinctly just like a fruit in a basket (*kunḍavadaravat*). But as it is psychologically impossible to have an abstract idea of generality apart from the idea of particulars, the existence of the universals as a separate ontological category (*padārtha*) should be dismissed as a figment of our imagination. Incidentally it is interesting to note that Berkeley, a famous British empiricist of the eighteenth century, offered almost the same ground as given by Kamalaśīla to disprove the ontological reality of the universals. Berkeley argued that because the formation of abstract general ideas apart from the ideas of the particulars is a psychological impossibility, the objective existence of the universals corresponding to the former kind of ideas is simply an illusive notion of our mind.

The Naiyāyikas answer that the above objection of the Buddhists—why should not a universal be perceived distinctly like a fruit in a basket if it were really an existent entity in an individual—is ambiguous. If by distinct perception it is intended that it should be perceived outside an individual, the answer is that the universal has no medium of manifestation outside the same. Hence it is always perceived as contained in the individual, not outside it. But the case is entirely different with a fruit as contained in a basket. The fruit is a whole (*avayavī*) which inheres in its parts (*avayavas*) outside the basket. Had the universal also been a composite entity composed of parts just like the fruit, it could have subsisted in its parts outside its particular locus. But the universal is an unanalysable simple entity devoid of parts. It can inhere only in its corresponding individual objects. Hence it is never perceived outside its individual locus.¹⁶

The question where the universal should inhere can be decided by the evidence of experience alone. That the cow-universal inheres in the individual called 'cow' and not in the horse is proved by the very fact that it is felt there and not elsewhere. The ultimate nature

16. Vyaktivṛttitvājñāteḥ prthagdeśatayā 'nupalambhaḥ,
Tadagraho vā na punastadatiriktāyā abhāvādeveti.
Nyāyamañjarī (Chowkhamba, 1936), p. 284.

of things is to be accepted on the evidence of experience exactly in the way in which it manifests itself (*svabhāva eva pratīti-sākṣikāḥ*). It will be over-stepping the limit of our jurisdiction to expect things to behave according to our preference. Therefore, the question why does the universal inhere in its relevant individuals only and not in anything else is not legitimate, because it is the very nature (*svabhāva*) of certain individuals to allow their corresponding universals to be related with them by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*).

But the opponent might observe that the Naiyāyikas' appeal to the ultimate nature of things (*svabhāva*) is only a trick for concealing the failure of rational explanation. If the unquestionable nature of things can be accepted as an explanation of a philosophical problem, the Buddhists also can make the same appeal. The Buddhists deny the existence of universals and assert that it is the individuals themselves which, inspite of their lack of a common identical nature, do possess a natural capacity (*svābhāvika sāmānyā*) for generating identical concepts. And this attempt to take shelter under the ultimate nature of the individuals does not stand in a position of disadvantage as compared with the similar appeal made by the Naiyāyikas.

But a Naiyāyika points out that the two cases mentioned above are not similar. The appeal to the ultimate nature of things is the last resource which is necessitated by the failure of other possible explanations. The postulation of a universal distinct from the individuals is dictated by logical necessity as well as experiential evidence and the consequential problem of its relation with the individuals demands an explanation. And when an explanation is not available except one based upon the nature of things, we have to accept it as a metaphysical necessity. The Buddhist hypothesis could be accepted if the universal were found to be an impossible fiction.

We started our discussion of this point by way of refuting Kamalaśīla's objection that if the universal were an ontological reality, it could have been perceived distinctly as a fruit in a basket (*kunḍavadaravat*) and we marked an ambiguity in the expression "perceiving distinctly as a fruit in a basket." If this expression means that the universal is not perceived outside its corresponding individual, then, as we have shown, it would be a malicious distortion of the position of the Naiyāyikas. But if it means that the universal

and its corresponding individual are not perceived as logically distinct entities inspite of their ontological inseparability, the Naiyāyikas emphatically assert that they are perceived as distinct entities and never felt to be identical with each other. The numerical difference of the universal from the individuals is attested by the fact that it is felt as different from the individuals in which it was previously perceived when it is perceived in a new individual. And even when it is perceived in a new individual, it is felt as distinct from the individual and as related to it. If the cow-universal were identical with any one of its corresponding individual, it could not have been shared then by the other individual cows of the world and consequently there would be no other individual cows save that one with which the universal cowness is identical. But that the cow-universal is shared by innumerable cows is a matter of direct experience. This proves conclusively that the individual cow and its corresponding universal are logically distinct entities and are never felt to be identical with each other.¹⁷

The Buddhists advance many other arguments against the ontological reality of the universals and most of these arguments are based on showing that the relation between the universal and its corresponding individuals is an unexplained mystery. Dharmakīrti, a famous Buddhist logician, points out¹⁸ that the cow-universal can become related with a newly born individual cow in three different ways :— (i) it can move forward to the newly born calf from another individual cow ; or (ii) it can pre-exist there even before the birth of the calf or (iii) it can be born along with the birth of the calf. But none of these explanations are logically tenable. The universal cannot move forward from one individual to another, since in that case the universal would cease to be a universal and would turn out to be a substance (*dravya*) which alone possesses locomotion. Nor can it be supposed that the universal pre-exists there even before the

17. Bhedena tūpalabhyte eva, piṇḍāntarāsamsargiṇi piṇḍe 'nubhūyamāne tat samsargitayānubhavāt.

Udayaṇa, *Ātmatattvavivēka* (Bibl. Indica), p. 402,

18. *Pramāṇavārtika*, 1/153.

birth of the cow, because it is not perceived and cannot be acted upon at that time. Nor can it be said that the universal is born along with the birth of the individual, since it is an eternal entity free from origination and decay.

But the Naiyāyikas point out that the above-mentioned difficulties alleged by Dharmakīrti are nothing but the figment of his imagination. A Naiyāyika never holds that the universal moves forward from one individual to another, nor that it is born with the individual. Since a universal is an eternal entity, it is existent all the while and even before the birth of the individual and after its destruction. The non-perception of the cow-universal during the interval of time between the death of a cow and the birth of another is not the proof of its non-existence; it is simply not manifested at that time due to the absence of an individual cow which is said to be its revealer (*vyāñjaka*). In fact, the universal is a self-existent principle independent of the existence and non-existence of its corresponding individuals. It may be objected by the Buddhists that the existence of the cow-universal in empty space and time before the birth of the individual cow or after its death should make space and time understood as a cow just as the existence of a cow-universal in an individual makes the latter understood as a cow. The Nyāya answer to this objection is that it is not merely the existence of the universal rather its inherence (*samavāya*) that makes the individual understood as a cow. The cow-universal, though it exists, does not inhere in space and time and so the question of the latter appearing as a cow does not arise.¹⁹ This also disposes of the further objection of the Buddhists that the co-existence of all universals in the same locus will result in confusion. In accordance with the omnipresence theory of the universal (*sarva-sarvagatavāda*), it is a fact that the cow-universal co-exists with the horse-universal in a same individual locus. But that does not make a cow to be understood as a horse or vice versa. It is inherence (*samavāya*) and not mere existence that determines the cognition of an individual in terms of class-

19. Yady api aparicchinnadeśāni sāmānyāni bhavanti tathāpy upalakṣaṇāniyamāt kāraṇa-sāmagrī-niyamācca sva-viśaya-sarva-gatāni antarāle ca saṃyoga-samavāya-vṛtty-abhāvād avyapadeśyāni,

Prāśastapādabhāṣya (Benares, 1895), p. 314

character. The horse-universal inheres in the individual horse and not in the cow. If the different universals were admitted to co-inhere in the same individual, the difficulty alleged by the Buddhists would be irrefutable. But the Naiyāyikas never admit the possibility of co-inherence of two such different lower universals (i. e., *apara sāmānyas*) in the same individual locus. Nor can there be any inherent impossibility in the co-existence of different universals in the same locus since they are not objects of limited dimension. It is only seen in the case of limited entities that one excludes the other from its locus. The horse and the cow cannot co-exist in the same substratum. But the entities like space and time which are not subject to limitations of dimension are in a different position. In these cases the existence of one does not cancel the existence of the other in the same locus since the opposition imposed by dimension is absent. Universals also share this character and so their co-existence in the same individual locus does not involve any difficulty.

The distinction between its existence in and by itself (*svatūpa-sāmānya*) and its inherence (*samaveta-sāmānya*) and consequential manifestation in a individual is essential to the understanding of a universal and its relation with the individuals. The difficulties raised by the Buddhists mainly spring from their deliberate refusal to subscribe to this distinction. The universals are self-existent principles. The individual only serves to manifest its being and the existence and the non-existence of the individual does not affect the being of a universal. The proposition "the cow-universal is in the cow" would be illegitimate if it were understood to connote the actual existence of the cow-universal in the individual. The position would be legitimate if the copula 'is' meant 'is manifested'.²⁰ Our ordinary assertions such as there is no cow here or its explanatory form "it does not possess cowness (*gotva*)" are only loose modes of expression. The denial of the universal cowness in such

20. Antargaḍum nirūpakamātram na tu gotvasyādhāramityarthah. Tathā ca piṇḍe gotvamiti vyavahāro na mukhyaḥ kintu lākṣaṇika ityarthah.

Ātamatattvariveka, commentary by Śaṅkari Miśra (Bibl. Indica), p. 407.

propositions is to be understood as nothing more than the denial of manifestation due to the non-existence of an individual. It does not mean that the universal in question was not existent at the time when the individual was non-existent. The universal is self-contained so far its existence is concerned. The individual is required only to make the universal related to it.

It may be urged by the Buddhists that the relation of inherence (*samavāya*), being eternal like the universal, cannot also be non-existent like the latter. So the universal and the inherence being present all the time the former should always appear 'as related. But it does not appear to be related so long as the individual is not present. The Naiyāyikas answer that this objection of the Buddhists is based on the forgetfulness of the fact that the apprehension of relation presupposes not only the actual existence of relation (*sambandha*) but also the terms or the entities to be related (*sambandhis*). It is true that the cow-universal and the relation of *samavāya*, being eternal, are always present. But the individual cow which is a perishable entity may not be always present on the scene. Yet it is one of the terms of the relation of inherence. Hence so long as the individual cow does not present itself, the relation of the cow-universal with it is not apprehended. The situation can be made clear by a concrete example. Suppose a man stands in a place and somebody puts a stick in his hand. The man may then be legitimately stated to be one who bears a stick. Suppose then that somebody else takes away the stick from him and this makes a difference in the quality of the man and this can be expressed in the form that the man does no longer possess a stick. The case is similar with the universal and its relation with the individual. The universal cowness is all the while there, but when an individual cow appears on the scene, we say—"here is a cow here" and when the same individual departs from the place, we say "there is no cow here." The universal which is always present may be compared with the man of our example and the individual which is present occasionally with the stick. The presence and absence of the individual do not mean the corresponding change of attributes so far as the universal is concerned.²¹

21. Deśakāle sāmānyasvarūpam asti, piṇḍopagamāpagamādinā goura asti gouranāstītivyavahārah, yathā avicalati Caitre daṇḍopaga-

As regards the Buddhist charge that the universal cannot exist either in its entirety or in its partial extension in the individuals, the Naiyāyikas answer that the universal does not admit of degree of dimension. So the question of extension is irrelevant here. It exists in its own nature which is non-dimensional. In this respect it is rather on a par with spiritual entities to which the question of dimension is entirely repugnant.

The Naiyāyikas are of opinion that the relation between the individual and its corresponding universal is one of support and the supported (*ādha-adheya sambandha*). But a support, says a Buddhist, is always a cause which modifies the nature of the thing supported, just as an apple which naturally would fall down to the ground is transformed into a non-falling-down object when supported by a basket. Similarly, if the individual supports the universal, the latter would also get modified by the former. But this would be in flat contradiction with the Nyāya standpoint which holds that the universals are eternal entities (*nitya padārthas*) incapable of any kind of modification.²²

As an answer to this objection, the Naiyāyikas would point out that the appeal to the fruit-basket relation cannot successfully refute the case of relation between the individual and its corresponding universal, because the two cases are not similar. The relation which holds between an apple and a basket is a mechanical separable relation (*saṁyoga*) while that which holds between a universal and its corresponding particular is necessary and inseparable (*samavāya*). To impute the analogy of one to the case of another which are by no means similar may be a tactful verbal sophistry but not a logically sound position. Moreover, the relation of *samavāya* which holds between a universal and its corresponding individuals cannot modify

māpagamābhyām daṇḍī Caitro nāyaṁ daṇḍīti vyavahāraḥ iti pragha-
ttārthaḥ.

Āmatattvaviveka commentary by Saṁkara Miśra (Bibl. Indica),
p. 410.

22. *Nyāyavārtikātātparyāyikā* (Chowkhamba), pp. 135, 484.

the terms related by it. Such an explanation would be inadmissible in view of the pluralistic metaphysics advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers.

The Buddhists replace the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā theory of ontological universals by their logical theory of *apoha* or the negative meaning of names. It is not common inclusion, says the Buddhist but common exclusion that constitutes the universality of a concept, and hence the unitive concepts need not be grounded on any ontological identical principle called universal. The concept cow, argues a Buddhist, does not refer to any cow-universal that runs identical through all the individual cows of the world; it simply means the negation of all entities that are not cows (*agovyāvṛtti*). Every name or concept names not what an object is but only expresses the denial of what it is not (*anyavyāvṛttirūpa*). The Buddhists try to substantiate this theory of *apoha* by some logical arguments. They argue that, that the names or the objects designated by the names are not realities in themselves but only *anyavyāvṛttirūpa* can be proved (i) by the fact that they are subject to both affirmation and negation (*bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇyat*), (ii) by the fact that they create a kind of sameness between things absolutely dissimilar (*atyantavilakṣaṇānām śalakṣaṇyāpādanāt*) and (iii) by some immediate feeling (*anubhavāt*).²³ These arguments have been discussed in detail in the foregoing chapter and hence need not be repeated here. Let us now examine these arguments one by one and see how far they can survive the severe test of criticisms offered by the Naiyāyikas.

First of all, let us take up the Buddhists' argument of the common possibility of positive and negative determinations with regard to the same phenomenal object. The very fact that a cow is capable of being said to exist and not to exist proves, argues the Buddhist, that it is a mental construction having no ontological reality in the external world. It is only the negative mental fiction (*kalpanā*), not the unutterable positive particulars (*śvalakṣaṇas*) which constitute reality, that is amenable to both positive and negative determinations. If the universal be a positive entity as the Naiyāyikas maintain, argues the Buddhist, the affirmation of it would be an unmeaning tautology and the negation of existence of such a positive fact would be a case of self-contradiction.

23. *Ibid*, p. 486.

But a Naiyāyika would atonce rejoin that the Buddhist conception of negative universal also does not fare better in this respect and involves the same consequences. If the universal be a negative fiction as the Buddhists maintain, affirmation of its existence would be a case of self-contradiction and negation of existence would be a superfluous tautology. Again, in connection with the Buddhist argument that anything to which both existence and non-existence can be attributed is of negative nature (*apoha-rūpa*), the Naiyāyikas find in the contention of the Buddhists a confusion of thought. If existence (*sattā*) of an entity means its *being* which is inseparable from its reality, the Buddhist contention would be unassailable. But the predication of existence in the proposition 'The cow exists', argues a Naiyāyika, does not refer to the being of the cow, but to its connection with a temporal determination, viz., presentness (*varṭamānatva*). The word 'cow' means to a Nyāya realist an individual possessed of the cow-universal. But individuals being scattered over diverse places and times would not be of any service, unless they are determined by reference to specific attributes, time, place and so on. Thus, the word 'existence' in any existential proposition connotes the connection of the individual with a particular spatio-temporal setting. Thus the meaning of the proposition "The cow exists" is that an individual possessed of the cow-universal is connected with the present time, or a particular area of space, which may be specified again according to the needs of a person, as the cow-shed or the like. The cow-universal as a meaning of the word or concept 'cow' is a positive entity, no doubt. But the predication of *existence* of the cow does not involve any tautology inasmuch as existence (*sattā*) is not a part of the connotation of a 'positive' (*bhāvatva*). A 'positive' is, by itself, bereft of time-determination, though the latter is not repugnant to the former. Thus the positive is not only present but may be past and future also. But the predicate 'existence' connotes 'presentness' (*varṭamānatva*) which is not a necessary concomitant of a real.²⁴ The predication of non-

24. This argument is based upon a distinction between 'positivity' (*bhāvatva*) and 'existence' (*sattā*) which is typical of the neo-Naiyāyikas of Bengal. Raghunātha Śiromani discards the classical notion of existence-universal (*sattā-sāmānya*) and replaces it by

existence also does not lead to the alleged case of self-contradiction, as it means only that the universal has lost its substratum owing to the destruction of the individual. The predication of existence and non-existence is, thus, neither unnecessary nor logically absurd. Therefore, argues a Naiyāyika, that a thing cannot be pronounced to be a negative fiction (*apoha-rūpa*) simply because that it is capable of being said to exist and not to exist alternately.

The Buddhist, however, seeks to prove his contention by pursuing a different line of attack. He points out that the above argument of the Naiyāyikas is based upon a distinction between the essential and un-essential characters (*dharma*) of a thing. The attribution of existence and non-existence to an entity, says a Naiyāyika, does not involve the kind of logical difficulties which have been pointed out by the Buddhists, since they are only contingent as opposed to necessary characters of the entity concerned. But the Buddhist insists that the contemplated differentiation of characters (*dharma*s) as essential and unessential, necessary and contingent as made by the Naiyāyikas is not justifiable. If the predicate does not stand for a character which belongs to the subject as a part of its nature, the former would not belong to the latter. Moreover, the relation of substance and attribute, urges a Buddhist, cannot be one of absolute difference. The attribute must be identical with the being of the substance. So a word or a concept which does not signify an attribute of a thing, cannot signify the identity of the same. To take an example, the word 'cow' does not signify an attribute of a horse and consequently the substance horse. If the word 'cow' did not signify an attribute of the cow, it could not signify the cow as a real either.

But the Naiyāyikas observe that the above argument of the Buddhists is based on the supposition of identity between substance and attribute, which is an unwarranted assumption. The difference of attributes from substance is a felt fact and there is no logical necessity for repudiating it. So the knowledge of the substance

the notion of positivity. He is of opinion that all the entities of the world including the different universals are felt to be existent not because they participate in one existence-universal (*satta-sāmānya*) but because they are all positive entities (*bhāva-padārthas*).

does not carry the necessity of the knowledge of the attribute. The subject-predicate relation in a proposition is based upon this truth.²⁵ The Buddhist contention that the knowledge of the subject necessarily involves the knowledge of the predicate could be accepted, if it were true that the subject, or the cognition of the subject, or the conditions of the cognition of the subject involve necessarily the cognition of all possible attributes that could be predicated of it. But the fact is quite otherwise. The conditions of the cognition of the subject differ from the conditions of the cognition of the predicate and they are neither coincident nor simultaneous. The cognition of attribute is rather conditional upon that of the subject and the Buddhist puts the cart before the horse by making the former the condition of the latter.²⁶

As to the second argument of the Buddhists in favour of their theory of *apoha*, according to which the negative nature of concepts serves as a synthetic principle to include divergent particulars into one class concept which is nothing but the construction of our understanding (*atyantavilakṣaṇānām śalakṣaṇyam*), the Naiyāyikas answer that an ontological universal running through the different individual objects can perform this synthetic function equally well. Moreover, the existence of such an ontological identity corresponding to our identical concepts is delivered from uncontradicted experience. The Buddhists seem to be obsessed by the efficiency of pure logic and they attempt to determine the nature and meaning of physical existence designated by concepts by means of it. But if it can be determined by uncontradicted experience, the logical method should be abandoned as fruitless. Pure logic is frequently seem to be worsted when it comes in conflict with uncontradicted experience. Thus, the inference of coldness in fire on the ground of its materiality is dismissed in spite of its apparent cogency, as it is contradicted by direct experience which finds fire to be hot. The attempt of the Buddhists, therefore, to construe a concept, e. g., a cow-concept as negation of buffalo, horse and the like, that is to say, of the opposite of cow, on

25. In connection with the Buddhist argument in question and its refutation, we are not drawing any distinction between 'attribute' (*guṇa*) and 'character' (*dharma*).

26. Raghunātha Śiromani, *Ātmatattvavivekadhiti* (Bibl. Indica), p. 326.

the ground that these negations serve to include a number of divergent individuals into the concept in question, is stultified by the direct experience of its positive entitative character. The argument of the Buddhists is based on a partial finding that a negation serves as a synthesising principle. But they fail to consider whether a positive principle delivered by uncontradicted experience can also function as a synthetic principle with equal efficiency.

We have seen in our previous chapter that the present argument of the Buddhists tacitly presupposes the doctrine of "neglected difference (*bheda-agraha*). In the perceptual judgement "This is a cow", argues a Buddhist, the element 'this' represents a sensible point-instant (*svalakṣaṇa*) of *external reality* whereas the 'cow' represents an *internal image* or concept which arises on the back of our sensation. But because the difference between the internal conception and the external point-instant is not sufficiently discriminated (*bheda-agraha*) these heterogeneous elements are synthesised into a single perceptual judgment in the form "This is a cow" and the internal conception is felt to be external. Hence the externality of the concepts or universals as claimed by the Naiyāyikas, argues the Buddhists, is illusive (*alīka-bāhya*); these are felt *as though* external in spite of their internality, because their difference with the external point-instants is not apprehended.

But a Naiyāyika answers that the above argument of the Buddhists is a desperate one and is hopelessly absurd. A thing cannot be felt in the character of another simply because its distinction from the latter is not perceived. A pen as a fact is distinct from the whole world of reals which are comprised under the category of not-pen. It is not necessary that the pen should be *felt* as distinct from all these things. But this failure of realisation of its distinction from the horse or the like does not make it appear as a horse or the like. So the non-apprehension of distinction of an internal and negative concept from a positive external point-instant of reality cannot account for the felt externality and positivity of a concept.

Let us now come to the third and the final argument of the Buddhists given in favour of their theory of *apoha*. This argument maintains that the meaning of a concept as the negation of its opposites is endorsed by direct experience (*anubhava*). When a man is asked to tether a cow, he excludes the horses and the like and moves towards the cow only, simply because he directly feels that

the meaning of the term 'cow' consists in the negation of not-cows (*agovyāvṛtti*). But the Naiyāyikas refuse to be convinced by this argument of the Buddhists. They maintain that the avoidance of 'not-cow' is not due to the comprehension of the negation of not-cow as the meaning of the term 'cow'. The man who is asked to tether a cow does not move towards a horse, simply because the term 'cow' stands for and signifies a positive fact, viz., cow and not horse and the like. The idea of the horse and the like does not arise at all, as there is no occasion for it. And even when by accident a horse is perceived on the way, the man avoids it, simply because he is persuaded that the horse is not the positive cow which he is directed to tether. Hence the negation of not-cow is only a logical concomitant of the positive cow-concept and is never psychologically felt. The meaning of positive terms and propositions are always understood as positive facts and neither as fictions (*kalpanās*) nor as negation of the opposites (*apoha-rūpam*). The proposition, for instance, "This hill is on fire" is not understood as asserting that negation of fire does not exist, but that fire, a positive fact exists.

Again, if the meaning of a concept were entirely negative in character, argues a Naiyāyika, there would be no activity possible with regard to such negations. A blank negation, an airy nothing cannot stir us into activity. Suppose, for instance, that a man were called upon to fetch a pitcher. The idea, that would move him to activity, cannot be supposed to be of the form that a not-pitcher does not exist, but it must be of the form that there is a pitcher. It should, therefore, be admitted that the idea of the pitcher is that of a positive real. This idea is not absolutely identical with one individual pitcher in question, as it is appropriately capable of being affiliated to all such individuals. Hence it can be nothing other than the idea of a positive universal.

Again, the Naiyāyikas point out as against the Buddhists that if the meaning of the concept 'pitcher' consisted in the negation of 'not-pitchers', the latter concept should include not only such positive things as pen and the like, but also the negative entity like the absence of pitcher (*ghatābhāva*). Such being the case, the negation of the absence of pitcher would be nothing but the assertion of positive pitcher, i. e., of an individual pitcher possessed of

pitcher-universal, for negation of a negation is nothing but affirmation.²⁷

Moreover, if the comprehension of the negation of the opposite be made a condition of the comprehension of the meaning of a term, i. e., of a determinate concept, the result would be the following absurdity. Is the negation of the opposite, e. g., not-not-cow which the Buddhists contend to be the meaning of the concept 'cow', a determinate concept or not? If determinate, is it felt to be so by virtue of the comprehension of its opposite? If it be so, the negation of the opposite, viz., of not-not-cow, would be felt as a determinate fact only by the felt negation of its opposite, viz., of not-not-not-cow. But the second negation would again require another negation of the opposite in order to be made determinate. In other words, there would be an infinite regression and this would make a dead-lock inevitable.²⁸ If it be maintained that negation of the opposite is a determinate concept felt by itself, without involving reference to any other negation, the contingency of infinite regress would be avoided, no doubt. But then there would be no logical or psychological justification for making the comprehension of the negation of the opposite a condition of the comprehension of a determinate concept. The cow-concept being equally determinate, should be admitted to be felt by itself without reference to the negation of its opposites.

Again, the Naiyāyikas point out that if the contention of the Buddhists were true, i. e., if the meaning of the concept consists in the negation of its opposite, it may be legitimately asked—what are the not-cows the negation of which determines the meaning of the concept 'cow'? If the not-cows are those animals which are not cows, then what are the cows, which are not not-cows? The determination of the nature of not-cows would depend upon the determination of the nature of cows, and the determination of the nature of cows would depend upon the determination of the nature of not-cows. In this way the fallacy of mutual relativity

27. Nīṣedhapratikṣepasaiva vidhitvāt.

Ātmatattvaviveka (Bibl. Indica), p. 283.

28. Nivṛtṭyantarāccedanavasthā.

Ibid.

(*anyo'nyāśraya doṣa*) would be inevitable, since the knowledge of negation always depends upon the knowledge of its negatum (*pratīyogī*).²⁹ These considerations led Bhagīratha Thakkura and Raghunatha Śīromani to opine that the negation of the opposite is not a felt element in the meaning of a concept. It is only a deduction from the positive concept and is understood at a subsequent stage.³⁰

Even if it is allowed that negation of the opposite is a factor of the meaning of a word, this negation cannot be understood without reference to a positive universal. This will be obvious from an analysis of the concept 'not-not-cow'. 'Not-cow', unless it be nonsense, must mean all that is different from cow. But one individual cow is different from another individual cow and if this difference of individuality be made the connotation, the word 'not-cow' would denote not only horses, buffaloes and so on, but also other individual cows. In order to avoid this contingency it must be admitted that 'not-cow' denotes all things that are different from each and every cow. But the number of cows being unlimited it is not humanly possible to know that a horse or a buffalo differs from an unknown cow. So the negation of cow must be admitted to refer to the cow-universal and not infinite number of cows as individuals. Even an ordinary assertion of negation is possible only because the negated object is never felt as an individual, but as a fact possessed of the universal that constitutes its essence. When we say—"there is no cow here", we mean not the absence of this or that individual cow, but of cows as such. To be explicit, we mean that all cows are absent from this place. How is this knowledge of all individual cows, past, present, future, near or remote made possible? Certainly a man would have to live for countless ages if he were to acquire this knowledge from direct acquaintance with all individuals. But such a miracle is neither possible nor necessary. It is a simple intuition and is made possible because the knowledge of one cow gives insight into the fundamental essence that makes a cow what it is and this essence is called the cow-universal (*gotva-jāti*). The

29. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī* (Vizian), p. 320.

Also *Ślokavārtika*, chapter on *Apoha*, śloka no. 83, 84.

30. Paścāttanītaravyāvṛttibuddhiḥ

Raghunatha, *Āmatattvavivekādīdhi* (Bibl. Indica), p. 292.

knowledge of the universal (*sāmānya-jñāna*) is here the medium of sense-object contact, by which we have a perception of all cows when one is perceived (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*). So when the Buddhists seek to identify this universal with the negation of the opposite they attempt an impossible task, as the 'opposite' can be understood only in terms of a universal which is sought to be denied by their theory.³¹

31. Yatkiñcit gavetaratvaṁ tu gavāntarasādhāraṇaṁ, gomātre-
taratvena bhāne ca gotvam bhāvikamanugatamupetavyam.

Raghunatha, *Ātmatattvavivekādīdhi* (Bibl. Indica), p. 295,

CHAPTER VI

PSEUDO UNIVERSALS

In the foregoing chapter, we tried to offer the various grounds on the basis of which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers establish the ontological reality of the universals as against the Buddhist nominalists. One of the chief reasons which prompted the Nyāya realists to admit the ontological reality of the universal is that it is such a common character shared by the individual members of a given class as successfully accounts for the notion of identity (*anuvṛttipratyaya*) in our mind. In order to demarcate the universal from its corresponding individuals, a suffix in the form of 'tva' in Sanskrit and 'ness' or 'hood' in English is generally attached to the names of the universals, such as *ghatatva* (pitcherness), *gotva* (cowhood) etc. But it was realised afterwards that anything which causes the notion of identity and is expressed in a word to which the said suffixes are attached need not be a case of genuine universal. For example, the different universals, e. g., cow-universal (*gotva*), horse-universal (*aśvatva*) etc. can give rise in our mind to a notion of identity so far as all of them are recognised by us as universals. Hence we tend to think that corresponding to these different universals which are genuine (*jāti*), there is still another genuine universal called 'universalness' (*jāitva*) which is shared by the different first-order universal-units. But for the reason which will be discussed presently, a genuine universal called *jāitva* corresponding to the different universal-units cannot be admitted. These considerations led the later Nyāya thinkers to formulate certain conditions on account of which a character, although causing the notion of identity and expressed in a word containing a suffix 'tva', could not be held to be a genuine universal. Such a character has been called by them an *upādhi* or pseudo-universal in contradistinction from a *jāti* or real universal. The later Nyāya thinkers have enumerated six such counteracting conditions (*vādhakas*) of real universals. In the present chapter, we shall try to elaborate these conditions one by one.

The first one of these *vādhakas* is called the unity or identity of an individual object (*vyakter-abheda*). If there is any characteristic of a thing which resides only in the one object of the world, there cannot be a universal corresponding to the characteristic in question. For example, "the character of being *ākāśa*" (*ākāśatva*) cannot be a genuine universal, since *ākāśa* being one, *ākāśatva* as its character

cannot reside in more than one instance of *ākāśa*. The very defining characteristic of the universal consists in the fact that it is the common point of identity among different individual objects consisting a certain class. The different individuals are said to be the substrates (*āśraya*) in which a self-identical universal resides by means of the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Hence an entity, in order to be designated as a genuine universal, must satisfy one essential condition, the condition being that it must have the numerical difference of its corresponding substrates (*āśraya-bheda*) so that it might inhere in all of them identically (*anekasamaveta*). But if this numerical difference of its corresponding substrates is lacking due to the fact that there is only one object available in which the so-called universal could reside, there is no point in saying that the universal is the common characteristic shared by many individuals (*anekasamaveta*). The reality of the universal pre-supposes the reality of difference of its corresponding substrates (*āśraya-bheda*). If this difference is non-existent, the universal, by definition, becomes unreal. Hence the unreality of the universal *ākāśatva* corresponding to the unique substance *ākāśa*. *Ākāśatva* is simply a pseudo-universal (*upādhi*) without having any ontological reality of its own. For the same reason, there cannot be any universal of space (*dik*), time (*kāla*) and other unique substances of the world.

The second counteracting condition (*vādhaka*) of the universal is said to be *tulyatva* which is explained as follows. If we analyse the nature of two genuine universals which happen to co-exist in the same locus (*samānādhikaraṇa*), we find that the total number of the corresponding substrates of one of these universals is either more or less (*nyūnātirikta*) than that of the other. Existence (*sattā*) and substantiality (*dravyatva*) are typical examples of two such *samānādhikaraṇa* universals. Both these universals inhere in the same locus, say, a pot. A pot is both an existent (*sat*) entity as well as a substance (*dravya*). But the total number of loci (*adhikaraṇa*) in which the universal *sattā* resides is more in number than that in which the universal *dravyatva* inheres, since *sattā* relates itself not only to substances only like a pot, but also to qualities (*guṇas*) and actions (*karmas*) as well. But the universal substantiality (*dravyatva*) cannot reside either in *guṇas* or in *karmas*. This is true of all other cases of genuine universals which co-inhere in the same locus. Hence we find that the "fact of there being two co-inherent universals" (*samānādhikaraṇa sāmānyas*) and

"the fact of having unequal numerical difference between their corresponding substrates" (*nyūnātiriktavṛttika*) are related to each other by way of pervaded-pervader relation (*vyāpya-vyāpaka sambandha*), a relation which, in effect, implies that if the latter is absent, the former would be absent also. It follows, therefore, that if there are two such co-existent characteristics of a thing whose corresponding substrates do not differ in number but are numerically the same (*anyūnānatirikta-vṛttika*), there cannot be two separate universals corresponding to the two characteristics in question. In that case, they are only two synonymous names for one and the same universal. For this reason, *ghatatva* and *kalasatva* (two synonymous Sanskrit words for the universal potness) can not be regarded as two cases of genuine universal corresponding to the substance *ghata* (pot). Since both these names—*ghata* and *kalasa*—designate the same entity, viz., a pot, their co-existence in the same pot must be admitted. But in spite of the fact that they designate the same entity, both of them cannot be regarded as two genuine universals on the ground that their corresponding substrates do not differ unequally in number but perfectly coincide with one another. There is not a single *ghata* which is not a *kalasa* and vice versa, there is not a single *kalasa* which cannot be said to be a *ghata*. *Ghatatva* and *kalasatva*, therefore, are merely two different names of the single universal 'potness'. Hence *tulyatva* as a counteracting condition (*vādhaka*) of the universal means that where the corresponding substrates of the two so-called co-inherent universals do not differ unequally in number but are numerically the same (*anyūnānatirikta-vṛttika*), they cannot be said to be two cases of universal existing ontologically side by side. Rather they are two different names of a self-same universal.

The third counteracting condition of the universal is known as *sāmkarya* which is usually translated in English as cross-division. It means that if there are two generalising characters the sphere of one of which crosses that of the other, such characters will not constitute a universal. For instance, *bhūtatva* (character of being an element) and *mūrtatva* (non-all-pervading finite size) are two such generalising characters. *Bhūtatva* resides in the five elements, earth, water, fire, air and *ākāśa*; and *mūrtatva* resides in the first four elements and in the *manas* (mind). Both *bhūtatva* and *mūrtatva* are common to the first four elements. But inasmuch as they intersect the sphere of each other, the two characters, i. e., *bhūtatva* and *mūrtatva*, together

cannot be held to be universals subsisting in the four elements. The crossing of the sphere of one of the characters by another would mean that one of them shall be co-existent with the non-existence of the other, i e., one of them would exist where the other does not. For example, *bhūtatva* exists in *ākāśa* where *mūrtatva* does not exist, and on the other hand, *mūrtatva* exists in *manas* (mind) where *bhūtatva* does not exist. When two such characters are found in common in some objects, as *bhūtatva* and *mūrtatva* do in the first four elements, they will not constitute a universal.¹

The implication of the annulment of a universal due to cross-division (*sāṃkaryā*) is: universals are either quite different and their spheres of residence are mutually exclusive, or they stand in the relation of being larger and smaller, which means that the smaller is included in the larger. In such cases, the smaller must be wholly included in the larger, and not partially. In other words there can be no two universals which are common in some spheres but exclusive of each other in the rest. If two universals somehow already known to be contrary are yet found together in some individual locus, they cannot be called universals.

In Western logic we find the corresponding view that two sub-classes under the same determinable (genus) must be mutually exclusive, which means that if they are not mutually exclusive they cannot be called sub-classes. The only difference of the Western view from the Indian one is that while according to the Western view, the contrariety of the two sub-classes is known *apriori* by the very fact of their being under the same determinable (genus), the Indian view is that this contrariety may well be known empirically. That *bhūtatva* and *mūrtatva* are contrary to each other is known from the empirical fact that while *bhūtatva* remains in *ākāśa* where *mūrtatva* does not reside, *mūrtatva*, on the other hand, remains in the *manas* where *bhūtatva* does not exist.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers next proceed to put forward the fourth counteracting condition (*vādaaka*) of the universal known as

1. *Saṃkaraś ca parasparātyantābhāva-samānādhikaraṇayor (dharma-
mayor) ekaś samāveśaḥ.*

Dinakarī on *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, verse °,

anavasthā (infinite regress) in connection with the question of the possibility of admitting a separate universal inhering in other universals. The reality of different universals such as cowness (*gotva*), horseness (*aśvatva*) etc. is admitted by the Indian realists to account for the notion of commonness (*anuvṛttipratyaya*) among different groups of individual objects forming so many natural classes of the world. If this be so, then it might equally be urged that on the same logic we must admit another universal called universalness (*jātitva*) residing in the different cases of the universal, since all these universals are recognised by us as *universals*, and so far we have a notion of commonness with regard to them. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers simply deny this on the ground that the admission of a separate universal residing in other universals would lead us to the absurdity known as vicious infinite regress (*anavasthā*). If we admit a separate universal called universalness (*jātitva*) to account for the notion of commonness with regard to all other universals of the world, argues a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinker, then to account for the notion of commonness of this universalness, we have to postulate still another universal and so on indefinitely. But as against this Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contention the opponent might urge that the alleged fallacy of infinite regress (*anavasthā*) would not arise at all, since the universal of universals (*jātitva*) being identically one (because according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers every definite universal is always one) would not require *another* co-ordinate universalness to account for its notion of commonness. The problem of explaining the notion of commonness is intelligible only when there is a difference in number of the entities whose commonness we seek for. But where there is only one entity available, it makes no sense to postulate another universal corresponding to it to account for its notion of commonness. This, after all, has been admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers themselves as the first counteracting condition of the universal (*vyakter abheda*). But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers at once retort to the above argument of the opponent that the said fallacy of infinite regress cannot be avoided by simply pointing out to the fact the universal of different universals is unique or one. Even admitting the unity of the universal of universals (*jātitva*), we have to postulate still another universal between the so-called case of universalness (*jātitva*) and other genuine universals like potness, clothness etc. to account for the notion of commonness with regard to all of them and

in this way the process will go on indefinitely. So the fallacy of infinite regress cannot be avoided in any way.²

This contention of the Naiyāyikas, however, does not appear to us quite acceptable. For, after all, if one tries to find out what is common between this universalness (*jātitva*) as a universal and other universals like cowness, horseness etc., one cannot avoid feeling that the required common feature would be but universalness itself.

Vyāghata (self contradiction) is said to be the fifth counteracting condition (*va lha*) of the universal. If the admission of a universal corresponding to an entity leads to contradict the defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of the entity in question, then the so-called universal cannot be regarded as genuine. It is this consideration which led the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers to deny a universal called *viśeṣatva* which is supposed to be the common feature of many *viśeṣas* (particularities). The very defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of the category of *viśeṣa* is said to be that it is completely uncharacterised by any kind of universal whatsoever (*jātijātimadbhinnatve sati samavetatva*). If therefore, a universal corresponding to the category of *viśeṣa* be admitted it would directly contradict the *lakṣaṇa* of the category in question. But this sort of argument for not admitting a universal of *viśeṣa* seems to be defective in the following way.

The defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of an entity is always determined by its essential nature (*sva rūpa*), but it is absurd to determine the essential nature of a thing by means of a pre-conceived defining characteristic. So, if it had been really the case that the essential nature of *viśeṣa* consisted in its being characterised by a universal, its *lakṣaṇa* could have been formulated in an altogether different manner which would easily provide a scope for admitting a universal of *viśeṣa* within it. For example, the category of *viśeṣa* can be defined as that entity which inheres in the unique substances like space, time, material atoms etc. and is itself different from substances (*dravyas*), qualities (*guṇas*), actions (*karmas*) and other categories (*padārthas*) of the world (*guṇakriyādbhinnatve sati ekavyaktimātrasamavetatva*). If

2. Yadyapi sakalajātitvasyaikatvenaiva tattajjātyantarāsambhāvānānavasthā. Tathāpi ghatatvādikamantarbhāvvyāpi tatra jātyantarāsambhava ityanavasthokteti kecit.

Rucidatta, *Dravyaprakāśavivṛti* (Asiatic Society), p. 122.

this definition of *viśeṣa* be accepted, there would be no contradictions involved in it even if a universal corresponding to the category of *viśeṣa* is admitted.³ Hence *vyāghāta* as a counteracting condition (*vādhaka*) of the universal should not be taken in the sense of *lakṣaṇavyāghāta* (contradicting the defining characteristic of an entity) ; it should be taken, on the contrary, to mean *svarūpavyāghāta* or *svarūpahāni* which means contradicting the essential nature (*svarūpa*) of a thing. A universal corresponding to the category of *viśeṣa* cannot be admitted, because it contradicts its essential nature which, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, consists in its self-differentiating character (*svatovyāvṛtta-dharma*). In order to substantiate this point, the following digression seems to be necessary.

Viśeṣa as a category (*padārtha*) has been postulated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers to account for the numerical distinction between such eternal substances as two atoms of water or two individual souls etc. which would otherwise seem to be indistinguishable. Their distinction cannot be due to the different arrangements of their component parts, because they being eternal, can have no parts at all. They are, on the other hand, similar in other respects. Hence we have to admit, argues a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher, some peculiarity or unique character whereby they are distinguished from one another. The category of *viśeṣa* stands for this peculiar character of the eternal substances.

Now, as the eternal substances like the material atoms and the individual souls covered by the category of *viśeṣa* are innumerable, the *viśeṣas* themselves are also said to be countless in number. If this be so, how is it possible that one case of *viśeṣa* is distinguished from that of another? To say that it is possible by means of another *viśeṣa* is to indulge in a vicious indefinite regress (*anavasthā*). To avoid this fallacy it is said that while the eternal substances like the material atoms are distinguished from one another by virtue of their inherent *viśeṣas*, the latter are distinguished by themselves, i. e., they are self-distinguishing in nature (*svatovyāvṛta*). This self-distinguishing

3. Nanu vastavnurodhena lakṣaṇaṁ na tu savakṛtalakṣaṇānurodhena vastuvyavasthitiḥ. Tathāca guṇādibhinnatvesatyekamātrasamavetatvamityādyanekalakṣaṇasambhavāt kuto lakṣaṇavyāghāta iti.

Ibid.

uishing character of the category of *viśeṣa* should not be taken only in the sense that it distinguishes one instance of *viśeṣa* from that of another. It is also an explanation as to how the category of *viśeṣa* itself is distinguished from every other ontological categories (*padārthas*) admitted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

Let us now come back to our main point of discussion as to how the admission of a universal corresponding to the category of *viśeṣa* contradicts the essential nature (*svatūya*) of *viśeṣa*. It has already been said long before in Chapter I that both the functions of assimilation (*anuvṛtti*) and discrimination (*vyāvṛtti*) can be attributed to a universal, except, of course, the universal of existence (*sattā-jāti*) whose only function consists in assimilation and which is not discriminative in any way. Any universal, say substantiality (*dravyatva*), is said to assimilate in the sense that it brings all individual substances, e. g., pots, clothes etc. under an identical mode of being. But its discriminative function consists in the fact that it (*dravyatva*), distinguishes substances from other things which are not substances, e. g., *guṇas*, *karmas* etc. Now, if a universal corresponding to the category of *viśeṣa* be granted, then it must be admitted that the category in question is distinguished from every other categories of the world by virtue of that universal. But it will then directly contradict the essential nature of *viśeṣa* which is said to consist in its self-differentiating function. In this way, *rūpahāni*, i. e., contradicting the essential nature of an entity, is shown to be a counteracting condition (*vādhaka*) of the universal.

To sum up the observations on *rūpahāni* : By some this *rūpahāni* was understood as contradiction with the very definition of *viśeṣa* (*lakṣaṇavyāghāta*). But this way of understanding *rūpahāni*, as we have shown, is not tenable. We have, therefore, accepted another meaning of *rūpahāni*, namely, that it is a contradiction with the very essential nature of *viśeṣa* which consists in its self-differentiating character (*svatovyāvṛttadharma*).

The sixth and the last counteracting condition of the universal is known as *asambandha* which is explained below.

A universal resides in its corresponding locus by virtue of the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Now every relation presupposes two things—an entity whose relation it is (*pratīyogī*) and a locus to which the entity in question is related (*anuyogī*). If, therefore, there is any entity which cannot stand either as a *pratīyogī* or as an *anuyogī*

of the relation of *samavāya*, there cannot be a universal corresponding to the entity in question. This is what is known as *asambandha*. Judged by this criterion, a universal corresponding to either the category of *abhāva* (non-existence) or that of *samavāya* (inherence) cannot be admitted. The non-existence of an entity is never related to its locus by means of the relation of *samavāya*. The relation which holds between *abhāva* and its corresponding locus (*anuyogī*) is a different type of relation known as *svatūpa*, a relation where the one or the other of the relata itself functions as a relation and the relation in question is not something over and above the things related. Thus *abhāva* cannot stand as a *pratiyogī* of the relation of *samavāya*. Nor can it be the *anuyogī* of this relation, since nothing can reside in it by means of *samavāya*. *Samavāya* as a relation exclusively holds between two positive entities and never between a positive and a negative. Hence, even admitting a universal corresponding to the category of *abhāva*, the relation of *samavāya* which is the only conceivable relation between a universal and its locus cannot hold between them. Hence *abhāvatva* as a universal of the category of *abhāva* cannot be admitted as genuine. For the same reason, a genuine universal corresponding to the category of *samavāya* is denied. If there were a universal called *samavāyatva*, then it must be related to its corresponding locus (*anuyogī*) *samavāya* by means of another *samavāya* which, again to be related to its corresponding universal, would require another *samavāya* and so on indefinitely. It would, therefore, never explain finally as to how the so-called universal *samavāyatva* is related to its corresponding locus (*anuyogī*) *samavāya*. Hence *samavāyatva* as a case of genuine universal can never be admitted.

CHAPTER VII.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE SIMILARITY THEORY OF UNIVERSAL

In the chapters IV and V, we tried to delineate the main points of controversy between the Nyāya realism and the Buddhist nominalism on the problem of universal, and in doing so our decision, the reasons for which were mentioned therein, went in favour of the Nyāya realism. So far no attempt has been made to study this problem in the perspective of Western philosophy, except of course, by way of passing references to it. But the controversy between realism and nominalism is not a monopoly of Indian thought; it characterises, in some way or other, the entire course of Western philosophy. In fact, the terms realism and nominalism are of Western origin. In the mediaeval Europe, this problem gained an utmost importance in the philosophy of Schoolmen, as a result of which an elaborate literature was produced on that subject. To give any indication of this mediaeval controversy between the realists and the nominalists falls outside the scope of this dissertation. In the present chapter an attempt will be made to depict this age-old controversy in the light of modern European philosophy.

I

Since the time of Hume, the modern European nominalism has come forward with a novel weapon usually branded as Resemblance or Similarity theory to combat the realistic theory of universal. The realistic theory of universal may be designated as the Identity theory, because it maintains that the universals are identical qualities (or relations) which repeat themselves in different particular objects of nature. The Resemblance theory professes to be a specimen of common-sense philosophy and it proclaims that the mere fact of observed resemblance among different particular objects, which alone are existent entities, is sufficient to solve all the problems which were sought to be solved by the realists by their metaphysic of universal.

The realists admit the objective existence of universals in the shape of identities mainly for three reasons :—

First, they hold that the multifarious objects of the external world are classified into several Natural Kinds by virtue of their

possession of certain identical features in common. If all the objects of the world were unique in their own way having nothing in common, then no laws could be promulgated about them, no generalisation could be made and consequently the progress of science and knowledge in general which obviously depends on generalisation would come to a standstill. But the enormous progress made in the field of science points to the fact that generalisation about the objects of nature is possible or the promulgation of laws relating to the behaviour of natural objects is an attainable goal. But this could never have been done unless things of nature were classified into several kinds by virtue of their possession of certain identical features in common. "Science ..is the detection of identity, and classification is the placing together, either in thought or in actual proximity of space, those objects between which identity has been detected. Accordingly the value of classification is co-extensive with the value of science and general reasoning,"¹ From these observations, the realists conclude that the universals are genuine ontological identities which provide an objective foundation for the classification of and generalisation about the objects of nature.

Secondly, unless there are recurrent universals in the shape of identical qualities and relations, urges a realist, our conceptual cognition could never have started. The possibility of conceptual cognition is a basic assumption for both science and philosophy and the objective existence of identical universals makes such conceptual cognition possible. In a world of perpetual flux where no quality repeats itself or no relation recurs, no concepts could ever be acquired; or even if they could be obtained innately without needing to acquire them, they could never have been applied to anything. Acquisition and application of concepts pre-suppose recurrent identity, in some form or other, in the objective world. A perpetually changing world characterised by the non-recurrence of any identical qualities or relations cannot be conceptually thought about but only immediately experienced in a kind of incommunicable mystic intuition. Hence any philosopher like Bergson, Heraclitus or a Buddhist who advocates a kind of fluxional ontology is logically

1. Jevons, *Principles of Science*, pp. 673-74.

committed to a precarious epistemological position that all conceptual cognition is radically erroneous—a systematic distortion of Reality. Thus the answer to the “question whether the object of an idea really contains a universal, or whether, it is nothing but a set of particulars.....follows from the mere assumption that (conceptual) knowledge is possible, and this assumption we have made throughout. Unless there are universals there are no identities; and unless there are such identities a false report must be rendered by every perception, judgment and inference.”²

Thirdly, this epistemological consideration demonstrating the existence of objective universals can be further strengthened, argues a realist, by linguistic consideration; i. e., consideration about the structure and function of language. Any language is composed of words and the words in a given language can be conveniently divided into two classes, namely, proper names and general words, the general word being negatively defined as any word which is not a proper name “The classification of words into proper names and general words is exhaustive, so that all words which are not proper names are necessarily general words.”³ The distinction between the proper names and general words is easy enough to see. A proper name refers to a particular person, thing or place whose name it is. The only way of referring to a particular thing in its particularity or uniqueness is by using a proper name. But the general words refer not to one particular person or one particular place; their whole point and usefulness is that they can be applied to any one of a whole range of particular objects, things, events or situations. The word ‘town’ or ‘man’ refers not to any particular town or particular man, but applies indifferently to any town or any man one cares to take. The question naturally arises—wherefrom do these general words derive their generality? How is it possible that a single word can refer to a set of entities in general? The answer given by the realists is that they can do so by virtue of the fact that the individual members of a given class share an identical quality or relation in common and just as proper names refer to the discrete individuals in their unique individuality so the general names refer to these

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2. B. Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought*, I, pp. 580-81
 3. R. I. Aaron, *The Theory of Universals*, p. 138.

common identical qualities shared by the individuals. On this theory, there will be no distinction in principle between a proper name and a general word so far as their function in a given language is concerned. Both of them refer to one and only one thing, though the 'thing' referred to by the proper name will be ontologically different from that referred to by a general word. In the former case it would be an unique individual, in the latter case it would be an identical quality or relation shared by the individuals. Hence any successful use of general words, holds a realist, pre-supposes recurrent identities in the objective world.

From the above discussion it is clear that the realists advocate the existence of identical universals mainly for three reasons :— (i) The universal provides an objective basis for the classification of and generalisation about the objects of nature. (ii) It is the ontological foundation which makes conceptual cognition possible. (iii) It justifies the significant use of general words. But all these three things, argues a nominalist, can be successfully accounted for by his Resemblance theory without taking recourse to any identical universal. The existence of an objective universal repeated identically in many particular objects at the same time would raise many awkward questions, viz., how can a self-same property characterise different particular objects without violating the principle of contradiction etc. So the Resemblance theory does not allow a universal to be a feature reproduced in a number of particular objects numerically identical in each of them. According to this theory, the features or qualities of any given object are as particular and localised as the object itself. The quality of whiteness found in different white objects are numerically different from one another. No property can belong to two different individuals at the same time. But the fact that properties are as much particulars as individuals which they characterise is not incompatible with their being similar as a matter of fact. This similarity among a group of objects is an empirically given phenomenon which is ultimately responsible for their being grouped together into a class. The Resemblance theory does not abolish universals. It merely gives a new meaning to this concept. It asserts that what is meant by saying that there are universals is that objects can be classified into groups or classes according to their likeness or unlikeness. To say that there is a universal 'white' is to say that there are objects each of which is

white and they resemble each other in being white.⁴ There is nothing subjectivist in the theory of Resemblance, since it holds that resemblance is a relation which holds objectively among a group of objects. Things of nature would be grouped together into classes or kinds on the basis of resemblance even if there were no minds to perceive them.

Hence it is not true to say that the modern nominalism does not recognise any objective basis for the classification of objects. It does recognise that the classification of objects is objectively determined. But the objective foundation of natural classification is not a self-identical universal as is supposed by the proponents of the Identity theory; it is the relation of resemblance which holds objectively among a group of objects. It is on this basis of resemblance that generalisation is made. When a predicate is applied to two or more objects, we do not say the *same* thing but similar thing about them.

A nominalist points out that the realistic view of natural classification that the objects of nature are classified by virtue of their possession of some self-identical features in common or 'real essences' as Aristotle would call them, is exposed to the following fatal objections:—

First, even granting that the objects of nature share some real essences in common, the latter cannot be known by the human mind. Had we known these real essences of objects, argues a nominalist, we could have predicted *a priori* the nature and behaviour of each individual objects belonging to a certain class. But this we simply cannot do. We are to wait upon experience to know in what way a particular object behaves in different circumstances. We possess, of course, a great deal of probable knowledge inductively established which enables us to say what the behaviour of the object is likely to be. But the very fact that this knowledge is probable only is itself a proof that we do not know the real essence of objects. But a nominalist does not have to face this difficulty since he believes that the resemblance on the basis of which classification is made and generalisation is done is an empirically given phenomenon.

Secondly, the realistic theory of classification deludes us in making us think that the objects of nature can be parcelled off into neat and sharply divided compartments according as each object

4. Woozley, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 93.

possesses a certain characteristic or certain other characteristics in common. But the division between natural kinds is not as precise and exclusive as it is supposed to be and it seems to collapse in the face of some border-line cases which do not appear to belong to one species but which fall in somewhat between the two. In these cases, we arbitrarily force them into one species rather than another. From these observations, a nominalist concludes that the classification of natural objects does not depend on the discovery of an objective universal allegedly common to all members of a class. The classes, on the other hand, have their foundation in the similitude of things and this similitude subsisting among them enables us to generalise in their case.

To the question of the possibility of conceptual knowledge and applicability of general words, the Resemblance theory answers that an explanation of these phenomena does not necessarily require an identical feature to be repeated in the objects which a concept or general word applies to. To frame or apply the concept, that is, the meaning of the general word 'white', it is not necessary that a self-identical 'whiteness' be repeated in all the white objects. The white colours in different white objects are numerically different from each other; yet we do and can apply the same general term 'white' to each of them simply because all of them closely resemble certain standard white objects or class-exemplars as they are sometimes called. Every class, according to this view, has, as it were, a "nucleus, an inner ring of key-members, consisting of a small group of standard objects or examples."⁵ What particular members of a given class constitute the exemplars of that class entirely depends upon our arbitrary decision or choice. The exemplars for the class of white things might be a bunch of jasmine flowers, scraps of white clouds floating in the autumn sky, a bit of white chalk or a piece of white paper. All these objects resemble themselves closely in being white and their resemblance is immediately given to our experience. Now, once the exemplars of white class of objects have been decided by us, we ask ourselves whether the other members of the class resemble these class-exemplars as closely as they resemble one another. If they do, we apply the concept 'white' to each of them.

5. H. H. Price, *Thinking and Experience*, p. 20 ff.

But what degree of resemblance is sufficient for the purpose of framing a concept or applying a general word is sometimes difficult to decide. One may wonder whether a worn-out-dirty white handkerchief sufficiently resembles the above-mentioned class-exemplars to be called white at all. In such border-line cases we are to depend again on our choice or decision. But our choice here would not be wholly arbitrary, it would be pragmatically determined. It would depend on our needs and interests. This is "borne out by the fact that a dress designer or a painter would give two different names to the colours of two pieces of material, both of which I should call red."⁶

From the above discussion, it is evident that the objective basis for the use of general words is not immutable. Concepts, that is, the meaning of general words are not *necessarily* imposed by the given manifold of experience, though the fact of similarity which is an empirically given phenomenon plays an important role in the formation and application of concepts. The concepts are devices to be evaluated according to their utility, open to change and adjustment if they prove their unsuitability or break down under the strain of use to which they are put. It should be conceded, therefore, that for the nominalist language contains a conventional element as its essential characteristic that cannot be overlooked in any language, irrespective of what particular philosophic purpose this language is to serve.

This analysis of the structure of a class on the basis of observed resemblance towards a set of exemplars or standard objects at once disposes of one of the classical objections that has been usually levelled against the Resemblance theory. The objection is as follows:

It has been said⁷ that the concept of resemblance has no intelligible meaning at all unless we specify the *respect* in which things resemble one another. Things of nature resemble one another in *different respects*. White things resemble one another in one respect while red things resemble one another in a different respect. To ignore this and to say simply that the things called white just resemble one another without specifying the respect in which they resemble is to indulge in anomaly and chaos, because that would not distinguish the

6. Woozley, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 92.

7. Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, p. 73.

resembling white objects from the class of red objects which also have resemblance among themselves. Therefore resemblance always means resemblance *in respect of*. But in what respect does the class of white objects resemble one another? Obviously in respect of whiteness. In other words, white objects resemble one another in respect of being instances of or characterised by a self-identical universal called whiteness. In this way, an analysis of the concept of resemblance logically commits us to the concept of an objective universal which the Resemblance theory so carefully tries to get rid of.

As an answer to this objection, the proponents of the Resemblance theory put forward their theory of class-exemplars which we have discussed already. A class is formed, according to them, not because the members of a class are characterised by a self-identical universal, but because they closely resemble a small group of individual objects belonging to that class which are arbitrarily chosen by us as forming their nucleus or exemplars. Hence the objection arising out of the phrase 'resemblance in respect of' can be easily answered by substituting it by a different phrase 'resemblance towards'. The individual members of a given class resemble one another *not in respect of* a self-identical universal, but *towards* a group of individual objects which are chosen by us as forming their nucleus. Hence the formation of a class, urges a nominalist, does not require any self-identical universal as its basis; it can be explained in terms of the individual objects themselves without taking recourse to any corresponding universal.

This answer of the nominalist, points out an opponent, merely pushes the problem a step behind, but the objection still remains unanswered. The question "In what respect do the objects resemble one another?" can still be legitimately asked with regard to the exemplar-objects themselves, though it does not arise about the other members of the class. About the members other than the exemplar-objects of a given class, it is said that they resemble as closely as the exemplar-objects resemble one another and this is a perfectly intelligible statement. But it makes no sense to any that the exemplar-objects resemble one another as closely as they do resemble one another, since that would not be an informative statement at all, but a sheer tautology. Therefore we are compelled to conclude that the exemplars of the class of white objects resemble one another in respect of whiteness, i. e., all of them are instance of a self-identical universal called whiteness.

As an answer to this objection, the Resemblance theory points out that a given class may have alternative sets of exemplars ;⁸ and when the question is asked in what respect do the exemplar objects resemble one another, we do not attempt the absurd task of comparing those things with themselves and thereby commit ourselves to tautology, but we compare them with the other alternative sets of exemplars of the same given class. We have said already that the exemplars of the class of white objects consisted of a bunch of jasmine flowers, a scrap of autumn cloud and a piece of chalk. But they could equally be said to consist of a patch of freshly fallen snow, a white marble statue of Lord Buddha and a cinema screen. And when the question is asked in what respect do the first set of exemplar-objects of the class of white things resemble one another, it is answered that they resemble as closely as the second set of exemplar-objects resemble one another. In this way, the alleged absurdity of tautology can be avoided.

II

It should be noted here that the Identity theory of universal is in perfect agreement with the Resemblance theory in holding that the individual members of the same class do resemble one another in some way or other. That resemblance is a glaringly obvious fact of everyday experience is not denied by both the theories. But the controversy between them arises as soon as they come to the question of the ontological status of resemblance. According to the Identity theory, the empirical fact of resemblance is not as primitive and ultimate as it is usually supposed to be ; it can be reduced to or deduced from a more fundamental fact—the fact of identity. All the white objects of the world do resemble one another *because* all of them are characterised by a self-same quality 'white' i. e., all of them are instances of a self-identical universal called 'whiteness'. It is here that the Resemblance theory joins issue and puts forward its thesis that the resemblance among different individual members of a given class is an autonomous fact of experience which cannot be in any way reduced to identity. It stands on its own feet without being derived from identity. Hence the real issue between the Identity theory and Resemblance theory

8. Price, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

centres round one fundamental question—can the fact of resemblance be reduced to identity or is it an irreducible ultimate category of reality? The ultimacy of the fact of resemblance was first suggested by David Hume in one of the appendices in his "Treatise of Human Nature". The modern resemblance theory is merely a development of this casual suggestion made by Hume.*

The Identity theory holds the view that the so-called cases of resemblance can be reduced to the cases of identity. But the Resemblance theory challenges the Identity theory to produce a single instance of resemblance where it can be reduced to identity. The Identity theory, in answer, points out to the fact what is known as exact-resemblance. When two objects *exactly* resemble each other in one respect or other in such a way that not the slightest difference between them is discernible, it can be said with absolute certainty that the respect in which they resemble each other is identically present in both of them. The colour of the two postage stamps of the same issue and denomination resemble each other exactly, since no difference between them in respect of chroma, intensity and saturation can be detected. Hence the colour of these two postage stamps is identically the same. In the same way, a self-identical colour may characterise the different parts within a single coloured whole. A certain patch of sky is blue, and the same shade of blue is all over. All its discernible parts resemble each other exactly in colour, at any rate we can discover no unlikeness of colour between them. Hence the phenomenon of exact similarity either between two different objects or two different parts of the same object can be reduced to identity. If two shades of colour are exactly similar in respect of chroma, intensity and saturation, then, so far as their *quality* is concerned, they are one. If they are not one, where do they differ? To point to some difference other than one of shade, e. g., space, time relation etc., would be irrelevant, for it is only the shade that is in question. And if we keep to shade, it is admitted that no difference is there. Either, then, the shade is literally one, or we are

* For a further discussion as to how Hume came to conceive this theory and in what way is the modern Resemblance theory a development of Hume's suggestion—see appendix added to the conclusion of the present chapter.

contradicting ourselves. To admit that in respects to shade there is no difference and to say at the same time that the shades are two *and* exactly similar, is to talk incoherently. The position that the cases of exact resemblance can be reduced to identities is thus exceedingly strong.

It is interesting to make one important observation here. In Indian philosophy, especially in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, a distinction has been drawn between a quality (*guṇa*) and its corresponding universal (*sāmānya*). A universal has been defined there as something which is different from and yet inheres in many particular objects (*aneka-samaveta*). But if this be the only defining characteristic of a universal, then, the qualities (*guṇas*) which have been given a separate independent ontological status in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika list of categories (*padārthas*) would turn out to be universals, since the qualities also are said to be inherent in many particular objects. Hence in order to demarcate the one from the other, the Naiyāyikas observe that while the universal is numerically one (*eka*) or identical in each of its instances, the qualities differ in number in each individual object which they qualify. Even the two exactly resembling qualities of two different individual objects would not be identical, according to the Naiyāyikas. They are merely the *two* instances of the *same* universal corresponding to them. It is here that the Western philosophy in general would differ from the Indians. In Western philosophy no such distinction is made between the qualities and their corresponding universals. According to it, all predicable qualities themselves are universals. When it is said that the colours of the two newly minted coins of the same issue and denomination are *exactly* similar, what is meant is that the two shades of colour are *literally the same* in the two coins. It is not the case that they are merely the two instances of the same universal-shade. If they were, what would have made them instances of the same shade would be the presence of the universal in question in each of its instances at the same time ; but it will unnecessarily multiply the number of explanatory hypotheses. Hence for the sake of brevity, the Western philosophers drop this distinction between the qualities and their corresponding universals and maintain that the qualities themselves are universals.

Now leaving aside this sort of digressional discussion for the present purpose, let us come back directly to the point at issue—

whether the phenomenon of exact resemblance can be reduced to that of identity. The Resemblance theory may point out as against the contention of the Identity theory that in spite of their being exactly similar in respect of quality and though there is no discernible difference between them so far as the shades are concerned, the two exactly resembling shades of colour cannot be treated as identical; since both of them differ at least in point of number. In spite of the absence of all sorts of distinction, it will be probably admitted by all that they are still *two*, not one. To this the Identity theory replies that numbers are always assumed in application to mark more than numerical differences. Numbers are applied to things because they make counting possible and counting is possible only when we distinguish a first from a second, or a second from a third, by some observable difference of content which make it another case. If two things differ numerically, the difference must be based on some difference of character or content. We never ascribe twoness or otherness in the absence of any perceived distinction at all. If A is to be other than B, there must be some element of content possessed by the one which is not possessed by the other; if there is none, on what ground could it be called other? Mere numerical difference without any difference of content or character is inconceivable. As Jevons says, "The symbols $1+1+1$ are thus empty marks asserting the existence of discrimination."⁹ "Abstract number, then, is the empty form of difference; the abstract number three asserts the existence of marks without specifying their kind."⁹ In the absence of any recognizably difference to count, number would have no meaning. In the cases of exact resemblance, it is admitted that there is no such observable difference. Hence it is meaningless to say that they differ in number. They are, in essence, identical.

But a proponent of the Resemblance theory will atonce point out that even in the cases of exact resemblance, there is a difference of content between the resembling qualities and this difference is based on the spatial relation holding between them. Each of the exactly resembling qualities occupies a particular position in space which cannot, at the same time, be occupied by the other. Thus the shade A is to the left of shade B, and the shade B is to the right of the shade

9. W. Stanley Jevons, *The Principles of Science* pp. 159, 158.

A. Hence the difference and it is for this reason that the different exactly resembling qualities cannot be treated as identical. A thing according to this view, is a complex of qualities and relations, and it is the relations, above all the spatial and temporal relations, that prevent its evaporating into a mere complex of universals. Prof. W. P. Montague writes, "The given elements of experience are complexes of universals, each complex being associated with a particular position in the space and time series. It is this latter factor of position which constitutes particularity and makes each individual numerically different from each other individual.....*In short, a particular is nothing but a complex of universals endowed with a position in space and time.*"¹⁰ Mr. Montague is of opinion that what makes a thing particular is its involvement in a web of spatial and temporal relations; what makes it universal is its disengagement from this web in thought. If this be the case, then by Mr. Montague's own admission, the spatial and temporal relations themselves turn out to be universals, since they can be abstracted in thought apart from the objects which are placed in such spatial and temporal relations. Thus if the individual is a horse, "*the time at which the horse was seen, the place where he was.....* may become in turn the exclusive object of my thought."¹¹ Hence spatial and temporal relations are themselves universals. Moreover spatial and temporal relations are theoretically repeatable in different contexts. If A is to the left of B and C is to the left of D, we do not have two instances of the relation-universal 'to the left of'. What we have is the self-same relation 'to the left of' repeated in two different contexts.¹² This possibility of repetition of the spatial and temporal relations in diverse contexts also entitles them to be designated as universals, since one of the principal meanings attached to the concept of universal is that it is such an entity as can be identically repeated in diverse contexts. The original objection to the possibility of reducing the cases of exact resemblance to the cases of identity was that each of the resembling qualities occupies a particular position in space and time which cannot be occupied by

10. *Ways of Knowing* p. 77. Italics in original.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 72 ; italics mine.

12. Russell also advocates the view that relations have no particular as their instance. See *Principles of Mathematics*, Sec. 55.

the other. Hence in spite of their exact resemblance, each of them is numerically different from the other and therefore they cannot be treated as identical. Now we find that spatial and temporal relations themselves which were supposed to confer particularity to each of the qualities turn out to be universals. But a universal added to a universal cannot give us particularity. If what confers particularity is itself a universal, there cannot be any essential difference between the two. Hence the position of the Identity theory that the so-called cases of exact resemblance can be reduced to the cases of identity still retains its force.

The proponents of the Resemblance theory may now take a different line of attack. The principal argument of the Identity theory in reducing the cases of exact resemblance to those of identity was that, because we do not observe any difference of content between the so-called exactly resembling qualities, they, therefore, should be treated as identical. But the Resemblance theory may point out here that the fact that we do not observe any difference of content in the cases of exact resemblance has not the slightest tendency to prove that the resembling qualities are *really* identical in nature. At best it can prove that as a matter of fact they are indistinguishable from one another. But indistinguishability and identity are not interchangeable concepts. In spite of their apparent empirical indistinguishability, it is perfectly *conceivable* that the so-called exactly resembling shades of colour may still admit of very delicate gradation in respect to their intensity and brightness which our imperfect mechanism of eyes (even with the use of powerful instruments) can not detect. In this way, by denying the very possibility of exact resemblance, the defenders of Resemblance theory try to prove their thesis that resemblance is an ultimate fact of reality which cannot be derived from identity.

Now, a direct disproof of this kind of argument is impossible, since it rests upon a distinction between appearance and reality. What it seeks to prove is that different non-identical entities *appear* to be indistinguishable in our so-called experience of exact resemblance and this appearance of indistinguishability is misunderstood by us as their identity. But still this argument of the Resemblance theory is fundamentally weak. The defenders of the Identity theory might ask that just as it is conceivable that the different exactly resembling shades of colour are really different in respect to their brightness and

intensity, why should it not be equally conceivable that they are really identical in nature? Moreover, the empirical evidence points to the existence of identical qualities. To deny their existence would mean closing one's eyes to the fact of experience for the sake of a theory. When a conflict arises between the dictates of experience and a reasoned theory, it is the former which is to be retained at the cost of the latter.

Thus an analysis of the meaning of exact resemblance logically leads us to the notion of identity. Exact resemblance means a qualitative identity distributed atleast in two cases of itself. But it should be noted here that though two different objects may be identical *in point of quality* or character, the objects themselves are numerically different : they are two, not one. The meaning of exact resemblance says nothing at all about substantial identity or the persisting identity of a continuant through changes of its quality and relation. Only the qualities and relations of the continuant are here in question.

One of the chief defining characteristics of universal is that it must be identically present in different individual objects at the same time. Now we see that the specific qualities of the objects satisfy this fundamental definition of universal, i. e., they can be identically repeated in different objects. Hence they are universals in an important sense of the term. But these universals are absolutely specific in the sense that they are incapable of any sub-division into kinds ; they cannot stand as the genus with some lower species subsumed under them. *This shade of red colour or that degree of loudness* cannot be further divided into sub-classes. Hence the reality of specific universals in the shape of identical qualities and relations must be admitted.

III

A nominalist starts with the uncompromising position that no universal in the sense of genuine ontological identity is real. The world, according to him, consists of a plurality of particular objects which resemble one another in some respect or other. This resemblance among different particular objects serves to group the objects under a definite class. The relation of resemblance, according to a staunch nominalist, can never be reduced to identity. But a nomi-

nalist has to modify this uncompromising attitude concerning the ultimacy of resemblance when he is confronted with the cases of exact resemblance. A realist seems to have sufficient ground in holding the opinion that the different cases of exact resemblance can be reduced to qualitative identities. But a nominalist raises a fresh issue here. The phenomena of exact resemblance are very rare occasions of the world. Most cases of resemblance that we come across in our daily life are cases of inexact resemblance, i. e., resemblance less than the maximum intensity. A ripe tomato, a drop of blood, a burnt brick, a sun-set sky and a blushing face—all these objects resemble one another in being red ; but in spite of that, resemblance holding between them is not exact : there is a difference in the brightness of the red shades in each of them. Moreover, blue is said to resemble green more than it resembles red. This is also a case of inexact resemblance. In other words, all cases of inexact resemblance admit of degrees—a 'more' or 'less'. Now, what are we to say about them ? Are we to say that even these cases of inexact resemblance should also be reducible to identity ? Encouraged by their success in the attempt of reducing the phenomenon of exact resemblance to that of identity, a realist jumps to a hasty conclusion that all cases of resemblance, be they exact or inexact, be reducible to some form of identity or other. It is here that a nominalist joins issue with a realist. He argues that even if a realist be justified in contending that the phenomenon of exact resemblance can be reduced to qualitative identity, this conclusion about exact resemblance cannot be indiscriminately extended over to the cases of inexact resemblance. That would leave the cases of inexact resemblance an unexplained mystery. If a self-identical universal called redness be equally present in all the different shades of red and if this be the only ground of their resembling with one another, then it follows logically that they should resemble one another exactly ; there should not be any difference in brightness and intensity in the various shades of red colour. But this is not the case. Though all of them resemble one another in being red, yet each shade of red differs from every other shade in respect to intensity and brightness. Hence the position of the realist that all cases of resemblance be reducible to qualitative identity leaves no room for a proper explanation of the phenomenon of inexact resemblance. The realists, when they make all cases of resemblance derivative, appear to forget that resemblances

have degrees of intensity, that objects resemble one another 'more' or 'less'. And this degree of inexact resemblance cannot be successfully accounted for unless we take it to be ultimate.

But the realists may argue that it is rather the position of the nominalists than that of their own which leaves the phenomenon of inexact resemblance an unexplained enigma. For a proper explanation of inexact resemblance, it is logically necessary to postulate a genuine identity in the objective world. How can we speak with any meaning of 'more' or 'less', if it is to be 'more' or 'less' of nothing? Hence it is held that a self-identical universal is realised 'more' or 'less' in its different particular instances¹³ and that is the reason why they resemble not exactly but 'more' or 'less'. When two things or characters resemble each other inexactly, i. e., in a degree less than the maximum intensity, their similarity will be found on analysis to be based on partial identity; there will be a core in both that is the same, though this identical nature will be attended in the two cases by other differing features which serve to distinguish them.

If this be so, argues a nominalist, we should be able to mark off in thought, if not in reality, the area that the different inexactly resembling shades of colour have in common. But it will probably be admitted by all that this is beyond us. As each shade of colour is a simple unanalysable entity, we cannot break up colour blue into components, one of which belongs only to itself, while the other common factor turns up in other shades of blue or in other species of colour such as red, blue, green, yellow etc. This point has been very cleverly illustrated by Cook Wilson. He asks us to

take, for example, redness and blueness, which we naturally call species of colour. If we eliminate all that is meant by colour, nothing whatever is left, or, if we suppose some differentiating element left, it would have to be something different from colour. Thus the difference between red and blue would not be one of colour, whereas it is colour in which they agree and colour in which they differ.¹⁴

13. Hoernle's article "*Concerning Universals*" in his collection of essays entitled "*Studies in Philosophy*" edited by Daniel S. Robinson, p. 183.

14. *Statement and Inference*, I, p. 358.

One has to face this paradox when one tries to abstract an identical colouredness in different species of colour, or, an identical blueness in different shades of blue. But still different species of colour or different shades of blue resemble one another 'more' or 'less' and this inexact resemblance holding among them, argues a nominalist, must be treated as ultimate when it is beyond our comprehension to discover any identical element lying within them.

Prof. Stout's reflection on the notion of resemblance deserves a special attention here owing to its peculiarity of standpoint and novelty of character. Stout upholds a theory of universal which stands midway between orthodox realism, on the one hand, and the modern nominalism, on the other.¹⁵ He is of opinion that the universal is a special type of unity — "the unity of a class or kind as including its members or instances.." But this unity of a class, accordidg to him, cannot be derived from the possession of a common identical quality or relation by the members of the class in question. It is here that Prof. Stout deviates from the orthodox realistic theory of universal. He perfectly agrees with the nominalists that the characters of a thing or an individual are as particular and localised as the individuals themselves. They do not share any common identical nature which is usually branded as universal by the school of orthodox realism. But though he agrees with the nominalists so far as the particularity of the qualities is concerned, he distinguishes himself from the modern nominalists on one fundamental score. The modern nominalists try to explain the unity of a class in terms of the relation of resemblance holding among its members and they treat this relation as an irreducible ultimate fact of experience. It is here that Stout differs from the nominalists. He is of opinion that the relation of resemblance is not as fundamental and ultimate as it is usually supposed to be by the nominalists. It is grounded in the unity of class itself and hence can be reduced to or deduced from the latter. According to him, the thesis of the nominalists that the individual objects form a class because they resemble one another

15. Prof. Stout has propounded this theory of universal in his book *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*. Stout's position has been summed up by Dr. S. C. Chatterjee in his book *The Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 274-80.

is far from being true. The truth lies in the fact that a group of objects are said to resemble one another because they are regarded as belonging to the same class. The unity of the class is pre-supposed by the relation of resemblance among its members and so cannot be explained by it. Stout treats this unity of a class as quite an ultimate and unanalysable type of unity. It cannot be derived from the possession of some identical characters shared by the members of a class, nor can it be explained by the relation of resemblance holding among them. He writes :

Agreeing with the nominalists that characters are as particular as the things or substances they characterise, the inference I draw from this thesis is not that there really are no universals, but that the universal is a distributive unity :¹⁶

Hence, so far as the nature of the relation of resemblance is concerned, Prof. Stout differs from the nominalists on two fundamental points :—

First, unlike the nominalists, he holds that ontologically considered the relation of resemblance is not an irreducible primitive fact of the world. It can be reduced to the fundamental unity of the class which he designates as the distributive unity.

His second point of disagreement with the nominalists is a logical corollary of the first. If the relation of resemblance itself be derived from the distributive unity of the class, then it follows necessarily that the knowledge of resemblance is not direct ; it is, on the other hand, indirectly known by us. We know that a group of objects resemble one another because we have a previous knowledge that all of them belong to the same class. Stout does not deny of course that in some cases resemblance is known by us by direct inspection and the resemblance thus known is the basis of a class. In this way, argues Stout, men can be classed as black, white or yellow, and colours can be classed as red or green. But this sort of resemblance he brands as resemblance in the narrower sense of the term and he contrasts it with a wider sense of the term resemblance. In the wider sense, resemblance means the agreement among things or characters, which is discovered indirectly when we know them to belong to the same class. He illustrates it at first with a non-distributive

16. Stout, *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*, p. 388.

butive type of unity which is the basis of a class, e. g., the class 'parts of a chair'. The different parts of a chair, e. g., its legs, arms seat etc. are of most diverse nature. Yet they are said to be similar because we know that all of them belong to the same chair. Here our knowledge of the chair does not depend on any prior knowledge of similarity of its parts. Rather, their knowledge of similarity depends on our previous knowledge that all of them belong to the same class. Now, Stout thinks that similarity in the wider sense is more fundamental than the similarity in the narrower sense and the latter can be reduced to the former. Thus two species of colour can be known as similar only so far as each is recognised as being a colour, i. e., as belonging to the class of colour.

This is in brief Stout's reflection on the notion of similarity. It makes resemblance a non-ultimate fact which can be derived from the distributive unity of a class. But in spite of its attractive novelty, this theory does not stand the tests of criticism.

First, it is not true to say that resemblance among the members of a certain class depends on our previous knowledge of the class. As a matter of fact, we proceed to classify objects on the basis of some observed resemblance among them. Direct detection of similarity provides a starting point for our classification of objects. Hence the so-called distributive unity of a class is not as ultimate and unanaly-sable as it is supposed to be by Stout. It can be explained by the relation of resemblance itself.

Moreover, Stout's contention that similarity in the narrower sense may be reduced to the similarity in the wider sense is far from being true. Prof. S. C. Chatterjee writes :

on the other hand, there is an essential difference between the two senses which makes it difficult for us to reduce the ... narrower sense to the ... wider sense. Similarity in the narrower sense is open to direct inspection and does not require anything more than a comparison of two or more things or characters by themselves. As such, it cannot be reduced to similarity in the ... wider sense where the separate things or characters are not compared, but only their common relation to a whole is considered. In truth, however, similarity in the wider sense is not similarity proper. That two things are parts of the same whole is no reason for our saying that there is a similarity between them. A door and a brick may be parts of the same house and thus belong to this

class 'parts of a house'. But that will not justify us in thinking that they are similar in the strict sense of the term ¹⁷

Similarity proper, as we have already seen, is an agreement of a group of objects towards certain standard objects or exemplars which constitute the nucleus of a given class. The other members of the class resemble as closely as the standard objects resemble one another and this theory of class-exemplars does not commit us either to any mysterious unanalysable type of class-unity as propounded by Stout or to any impossible abstract identity as upheld by the realists. Hence the relation of resemblance, at least in the cases of inexact resemblance cannot be derived from either any one of the two. It should be taken to be an ultimate irreducible category of reality.

But even admitting with the nominalists that the cases of inexact resemblance cannot be reduced to any sort of identity whatsoever since no identical element can be discovered in their cases, the objection of the realists still remains—how can we measure the variation in the degree of resemblance,—its 'more' or 'less'—unless we postulate some identical element with reference to which it is pronounced to be 'more' or 'less'? What is the referent of this 'more' or 'less'? To this the nominalists answer that this measurement of the variation in the degrees of resemblance can be successfully accounted for even without taking recourse to any self-identical universal. This can be illustrated in the following way by taking into account one kind of sense-quality, viz., colour.

Different species of colour, e. g., red, green, yellow etc. and different shades of colour belonging to the same species, e. g., royal blue, navy blue, ultramarine etc. of the species blue—constitute an order or series. This order is intrinsic in the sense that no extraneous factors other than the diverse hues themselves determine the order. The nature of the order is exhausted by the hues themselves. In other words, each species of colour, or each shade of a specific colour has its fixed position in its intrinsic order, which cannot be occupied by other species of colour or other shades of colour. In the intrinsic order of hues, some hues are nearer other hues and further from others. In the same way, some shades are nearer other shades and further from others. Thus red is to orange as orange is to yellow ;

17. S. C. Chatterjee, *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 279.

orange is to yellow as yellow is to green ; yellow is to green as green is to blue. In the intrinsic order of hues, any hue stands where it stands because it is that hue. The reason why (say) a yellow is to a green as a green is to a blue is that yellow is yellow, that a green is green ; and that a blue is blue. The reason offered for this may be tautologous. But the denial of this tautology is self-contradictory. To say that some yellows might not be to green as green is to blue is to say that some yellows might not be yellows that they are. This is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of any hue in the order. The different species of colour are given the same name 'colour' not because all of them have some identical 'colouredness' in common, but because they resemble one another ; and they resemble one another because all of them belong to the same intrinsic order. This explains atonce why a hue and a sound do not resemble each other in any sense of the term resemblance ; they belong to different intrinsic orders and hence are not comparable with each other in any way. Now the degree of resemblance—its 'more' or 'less'—can be explained, urges a nominalist, with reference to this intrinsic order of hues. The diverse hues or diverse shades of the same hue resemble each other 'more' or 'less' as they are nearer to or further from each other in their intrinsic order. Thus the statement "orange resembles red more than purple" means that orange is nearer red than purple in the intrinsic order of hues. In any such context as this one, where colours are compared as 'more' or 'less' resembling, 'more resembling' or 'less resembling' will refer to the distance between hues compared. The distance consists of the number of hues which lie between the hues that are in question. Thus there are more hues between blue and red than there are between yellow and red. And, in this sense, blue is further from red than yellow ; or, conversely, yellow is nearer red than blue. Thus "yellow resembles red more than blue" means what is meant by "yellow is nearer red than blue in the intrinsic order of hues." In the same way, 'more' or 'less' resemblance holding between various shades of the same specific colour can be explained with success without postulating a self-identical universal corresponding to them.

We started our discussion in this section with the objection of the realists urged against the nominalists that unless we postulate a self-identical universal corresponding to the qualities, which resemble one another 'more' or 'less', the notion of inexact resemblance itself remains an unexplained mystery, because how can we speak with any

meaning of 'more' or 'less' if it is to be 'more' or 'less' of nothing? It was, therefore, concluded by the realists that a self-identical universal is realised 'more' or 'less' in the so-called cases of inexact resemblance. The phenomenon of inexact resemblance should not, therefore, be treated as ultimate fact of experience as it is claimed by the nominalists; it, too, can be reduced to identity. As against this contention of the realists, the nominalists put forward their theory of intrinsic order of qualities, which has been delineated above and they show that the cases of inexact resemblance can be accounted for with equal success even without taking recourse to any self-identical universal. The thesis of the nominalists, therefore, that the phenomena of inexact resemblance are irreducible ultimate facts of the world still stands.

IV

Against this ontological ultimacy and irreducibility of the relation of resemblance, an array of strong objections has been put forward by its opponents, one of which has become classical in philosophy through its able advocacy by Russell. In the present section, we propose to examine Russell's objection and see in what way a nominalist can answer it.

Russell argues that the chief reason which prompted the nominalists to advocate the ultimacy of the relation of resemblance was that they try to get rid of the ontological universals like manhood, colouredness, blueness etc. by substituting 'resemblance' in their place. But in spite of their careful attempt to dispose of universals, they cannot eventually do so, because the universal surreptitiously creeps in through the back door in the guise of resemblance itself. In other words, on the nominalistic theory of universal, resemblance itself has to be treated as a universal and in this way, it defeats its own purpose. Russell writes :

If we wish to avoid the universals whiteness and triangularity, we shall choose some particular patch of white or some particular triangle, and say that anything is white or a triangle if it has the right sort of resemblance to our chosen particular. But then the resemblance required will have to be a universal. Since there are many white things, the resemblance must hold between many pairs of particular white things; and this is the characteristic of a

universal.....The relation of resemblance, therefore, must be a true universal. And having been forced to admit this universal, we find that it is no longer worth while to invent difficult and unplausible theories to avoid the admission of such universals as whiteness and triangularity.¹⁸

Against the above argument, the proponents of the Resemblance theory would point out that the argument in question rests upon an unwarranted assumption—that corresponding to every general word there must be some general entity in the objective world. The only proof that can be offered in favour of resemblance being regarded as a universal is that it is a general word that can be applied to diverse resembling situations. But is this assumption true? This is just the point at issue and one must prove this assumption beforehand if one is to be profited by it. Therefore the argument that resemblance itself is a universal because the word 'resemblance' is a general word that can be applied to many resembling objects at the same time, involves the fallacy of *petitio principii*; it assumes the very thing which it seeks to prove.

Moreover, it can be proved in a variety of ways that corresponding to every general word, there need not *always* be present a general entity in *rerum natura*. The argument that corresponding to every general term there is a general entity or a self-identical universal is founded on nothing better than an illicit conversion of an "A" proposition. It is true of course that the same thing must be called by the same name, if we are to avoid equivocation and consequent ambiguities. This is to say that for good practical reason all cases of the same thing are cases of the application of the same name. Let us take this to be the convertend. Now, from this convertend, it is assumed to follow that all cases of the application of the same name are cases of the same thing. Yet this converse does not follow from the above convertend. In accordance with the laws of formal logic, an A proposition, when converted, gives an I proposition, not an A. Hence the legitimate converse of the above convertend will be that *some cases of the application of the same name are cases of the same thing*. Hence the fundamental assumption on the basis of which resemblance itself is pronounced

18. *Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 150-51.

to be a universal is not *universally* true. It is, therefore, to be rejected.

Further, the assumption in question would be self-defeating to the Identity theory itself. If it is assumed that corresponding to every general word there must be a self-identical universal, it logically follows that universals have their corresponding universals, since the word 'universal' is a general name which is applied to so many cases of universals. We say "cowness is a universal", 'horseness is a universal', and so on. Therefore corresponding to this general word 'universal', the Identity theory must admit another universal called 'universality'. "And if it is a universal, universality must accordingly be an instance of itself. But this is a contradiction. For according to this Philosophy (of Identity), anything which is an *instance* of a universal is *ipso facto* a particular and not a universal."¹⁹ To avoid this paradox, the Western realists might of course join hands with the Indian realists in saying that the universal of universals is not a genuine ontological identity or *jati*. It belongs to a second order of universals which are simply linguistic conveniences to classify words under a common name: it is an *upadhi*, not a *jati*. "But if this be so," answers a nominalist to a realist, "why don't you say that even the so called first-order universals are also *upadhis*, not *jatis*? If in one case, it is admitted that corresponding to a general word there is no general entity, then, in principle and for the sake of parity of reasoning, it would not be wrong to say that corresponding to all general words, there are no general entities."²⁰

The upshot of all this discussion is that though the word "resemblance" is a general word which can be applied to many resembling situations, still it cannot be said that corresponding to it, there is a self-identical universal called 'resemblance'. The resemblances holding between diverse objects are numerically different from one another. There is nothing common to all of them. Had it not been so, argues a nominalist, it would lead us to a very awkward anomalous situation in the following way. A safety-pin resembles another

19. Price, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

20. This argument of the nominalists simply purports to show that the ground offered by the realists in favour of admitting general entities is false; the ground being that, because we use general words, there must, therefore, be general entities corresponding to

safety-pin and a cow resembles another cow. But had a self-identical resemblance been operative in both these diverse cases of resemblance, it would follow that a safety-pin resembles a cow or a cow resembles a safety-pin which is absurd. Hence it must be admitted that resemblance holding between two safety-pins and that which holds between two cows are numerically different from each other.

But if resemblances are numerically different in different situations and there is nothing common to them, then how is it possible, asks a realist, that we apply a common name 'resemblance' to designate them all? In strict consonance with its philosophy, the Resemblance theory answers that different instances of resemblance are given the same name simply because they themselves resemble one another. Just as the individual members of a given class resemble one another and so enable us to group them under one class-concept, so different resemblances holding between various entities may resemble one another which enables us to designate all of them by a single common denominator.

But this answer of the nominalists, argues a realist, would entail, in effect, an unending series of indefinite regress. According to the Resemblance theory, the resemblance between A and B resembles, but is not identical with, the resemblance between X and Y, thus introducing a third resemblance between the two resemblances. This third resemblance would in turn resemble any one of the first two resemblances, and so introduce a fourth resemblance, and so on *ad-infinitum*.

As an answer to the above objection, the proponents of the Resemblance theory may answer that even admitting the infinite

them. But general entities can be admitted on ground other than this. As we have already seen while analysing the concept of exact resemblance that, when two objects resemble each other exactly in respect of some specific shade of colour, then that shade of colour which is designated by a general name, say, ultramarine, is identically present in both of them. Here the ground of admitting a general shade of colour shared by two objects is not that 'ultramarine' is a general word, but that we cannot detect any discernible difference between the two shades in question.

regress, it is not true to say that it *always* makes an argument invalid. It is interesting to note here that in Indian philosophy, a distinction has been drawn between two kinds of infinite regress—one logically permissible infinite regress (*prāmāṇiki anavasthā*) and the other, logically fallacious infinite regress (*mūlocchedikā anavasthā*). The former kind of infinite regress may be illustrated in the following way. I may identify a person as the son of a certain man whom I happen to know personally. Now, this is a sufficient condition for me to identify that person. It is admitted that the man's father had a father and he, too, had a father and so on indefinitely. But the knowledge of this infinite series of fathers is not necessary for me for the identification of the person concerned. The infinite series of fathers may be there, but my non-acquaintance with this series does not in any way affect my identification of the person in question. This kind of infinite regress is permissible, since it does not defeat the purpose one seeks to establish.

But there is another kind of infinite regress which thus defeats the purpose. To take an example : a newly appointed postmaster in a city post office may not know a person who wants to withdraw money from his personal account in the savings bank. In that case, the person will require an identifier who will identify him to the postmaster to be the real owner of money. But the identifier himself may not be known to the postmaster. So the first identifier will require a second identifier for his identification. But the second identifier, again, being an unknown person to the postmaster, will require a third identifier to identify him, and so on indefinitely. In that case, the person in question will not be able to withdraw money from the post office at all. This kind of infinite regress annuls the very purpose one seeks to achieve (*mūlocchedikā anavasthā*) and hence it is to be repudiated as fallacious.

Now, the position of infinite regress supposed to be involved in the above-mentioned case of resemblance holding between different resemblances is of the first kind and so it can not be said to be repugnant to the main contention of the Resemblance theory. In the language of R. I. Aaron :

What the Resemblance theory needs by way of pre-supposition is that we should be able to recognise a resemblance when we see one. Now we do see that the resemblance between A and B resembles the resemblance between X and Y. And we

see this without first having to attempt the impossible task of observing an infinite series of resemblances. Supposing we have a case where A is true if B is true, and B is true if C is true, and C is true if D is true, and so on *ad infinitum*. Then admittedly we could not know that A was true. But our present case is a different one. The regress is there, but we can know the resemblance in question without observing the infinity of resemblances. Consequently the argument does not refute the Resemblance theory.²¹

V

In conclusion, we may notice that the term resemblance is equivocal. There are at least two distinct and basic senses of resemblance, one of which cannot be reduced to the other. In one of the two basic senses, resemblance is used with reference to characteristics that are exactly the same. When used in this sense, the term designates a qualitative identity that is repeated in at least two cases of itself. When it is said that two entities resemble each other in point of some specific colour in such a way that not the slightest difference between them is discernible with respect to their chroma, intensity and saturation, what it means is that the specific colour in question is identically present in both the entities. Hence 'resemblance' in this sense should not be taken to be an ultimate irreducible fact of experience: it can be reduced to qualitative identity that is distributed at least in two cases of itself. Now one of the chief defining characteristics of the universal is that it is such an entity which can be repeated identically in different particular objects of the world. The existence of universals, therefore, in the shape of identity of the specific qualities must be admitted.

Now, the qualitative identity of any one of these repeated characteristics cannot be a matter of degree. In accordance with the Law of Identity, a self-identical entity is self-identical absolutely: it is intrinsically what it is. Thus, to say that A is partially, or to any degree, identical with anything other than A, would be to contradict the absolute self-identity of A. For A is not partially A, on

21. *The Theory of Universals*, p. 153.

the one hand, and to a degree *Y*, on the other : *A* is intrinsically and completely, *A*, where *A* designates any being, quality or relation whatever. Hence exact resemblance -in the sense of qualitative identity cannot admit of any degree or a 'more' or 'less'.

And yet we do make sensible statement about degrees of resemblance and degrees of difference. We say that different shades of blue, e. g., royal blue, navy blue etc., resemble each other 'more or less', or, an orange hue is *more like* a red than a blue. The phenomenon of inexact resemblance, i. e., degree of resemblance, therefore, cannot be treated on a par with that of exact resemblance ; it admits of a different explanation other than the latter. An analysis of exact resemblance commits us to a qualitative identity which does not admit of any degree. But try as we may, we cannot find out any identical blueness in different shades of blue or any identical colouredness in different species of colour. Even admitting for the sake of argument that there is an identical blueness or an identical colouredness it cannot be said, as Hoernle and some other thinkers have said, that the universal in question is realised 'more' or 'less' in different shades of blue or in diverse species of colour like red, blue, green etc. For, as has been said already, a qualitative identity is self-identical absolutely, and not identical to a degree. To say that a qualitative identity like blueness or colouredness might be itself to this degree and not itself but something else to that degree, is to fly in the face of the Law of Identity. The degrees of likeness or unlikeness of the various qualities cannot, therefore, be determined with reference to any self-identical universal realising itself 'more' or 'less' in its different instances, but with reference to their nearness to and distance from each other in their respective order or arrangement which is intrinsic to them. What this intrinsic order of qualities means has been dealt with in detail while discussing the nature of inexact resemblance. So we need not repeat it here. We conclude, therefore, that the degree of resemblance should be comprised within the second one of the basic senses of resemblance ; it is not susceptible to the same type of analysis as the phenomenon of exact resemblance is. The phenomenon of exact resemblance is not ultimate, it can be reduced to qualitative identity ; but as the fact of inexact resemblance is not rooted in any kind of identity whatsoever, it should be treated as an ultimate irreducible reality of the world.

APPENDIX

In one of the appendices of his *Treatise on Human Nature*, Hume, the British empiricist, gave the first suggestion that the fact of resemblance can be ultimate without being derived from identity. He seems to have arrived at this conclusion while reflecting on Locke's account of generalisation and resemblance. John Locke, the founder of the British School of empiricism, said in his *Essay* that our task in generalising consists in seizing the common identical elements in the resembling wholes. Two composite wholes may be said to resemble each other if amongst their constituent simples, at least one simple will be found common to the two groups. Having thus put forward this account of generalisation and resemblance, Locke was confronted with a genuine difficulty. If resemblance consists in observing a common simple component in the two resembling composites, then it ought to follow that there cannot be any resemblance among the simples themselves and that consequently we cannot generalise in their case :-

The reason whereof is that the lowest species being but one simple idea nothing can be left out of it, that so, the difference being taken away, it may agree with some other thing in one idea common to them both; which, having one name, is the genus of the other two; for example, there is nothing that can be left out of the idea of white and red to make them agree in one common appearance and so have one general name. [Locke's *Essay*, III. iv. 16]

And yet simples do resemble each other and we do generalise in their case. Locke proposed a very superficial solution to this difficulty :-

And therefore, when, to avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would comprehend both white and red, and several other such simple ideas, under one general name; they have been fain to do it by a word which denotes only the way they get into the mind. For when white, red, and yellow are all comprehended under the genus or name 'colour', it signifies no more but such ideas as are produced in the mind only by the sight, and have entrance only through the eyes. [*Ibid.*, III. iv. 16.]

The above extract from the *Essay* shows that Locke sought for a common characteristic *extrinsic* to the simples, for instance, white and red are both *visibilia*, they 'get into the mind' in the same way, and so may be said to resemble each other in this respect. But this

amounts to saying that the entities with which he now deals are in fact composites and not simples, consisting of two characteristics, for example, (a) being white and (b) being a visible. If so, his problem remains unsolved.

Hume seems to have become conscious of the inadequacy of this Lockean theory of resemblance and he realised that something must at least be said about resembling *simples*. So he added a brief note on resemblance in the appendix to his *Treatise*, which may be said to be a clear anticipation of the modern version of Resemblance theory according to which resemblance is an irreducible primitive fact of the world. The note runs as follows :-

'Tis evident, that even different simple ideas may have a similarity or resemblance to each other ; nor is it necessary, that the point or circumstance of resemblance should be distinct or separate from that in which they differ. *Blue* and *green* are different simple ideas, but are more resembling than *blue* and *scarlet* ; tho' their perfect simplicity excludes all possibility of separation or distinction. 'Tis the same case with particular sounds, and tastes and smells. *These admit of infinite resemblances upon the general appearance and comparison, without having any common circumstance the same.* And of this we may be certain, even from the very abstract terms, *simple ideas*. (Italics mine) They comprehend all simple ideas under them. They resemble each other in their simplicity. And yet from their very nature, which excludes all composition, this circumstance, in which they resemble, is not distinguishable nor separable from the rest. 'Tis the same case with all the degrees in any quality. They are all resembling, and yet the quality, in any individual, is not distinct from the degree.

[Hume's *Treatise*, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, p. 637.]

It is evident from the above note that there is a definite suggestion made by Hume that resemblance among the different simple ideas is an unanalysable ultimate fact of experience and this ultimate resemblance can be the sufficient ground for the purpose of generalisation. Hume has thus put forward a new account of finding resemblances and generalising which is other than that of Locke and the modern Resemblance theory is merely a development of this suggestion. It has developed it by applying Hume's suggestion not merely to

simples but also to complexes. Even in the case of composites, it argues, it is not necessary to find identities before we generalise. The demand for absolute identities, it holds, would raise many awkward questions. Hence it would be enough to say for the purpose of generalisation that the qualities, be they simple or composite, resemble one another directly without being grounded in identity. This will be, after all, in accordance with common sense. It is now enough to note that the solution of the problem of universal proposed by the adherents of the modern Resemblance theory was already suggested by Hume.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

In the opening chapter of our dissertation, we started our discussion with the definition of universal as given by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, a system which is largely representative of Indian realism; but as the concept of *samavāya* forms an integral part of the Nyāya definition of universal, chapter II was devoted to an elaborate discussion of the nature of *samavāya* which is supposed to be the relating tie between the universal and its corresponding particulars. Philosophers of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, though perfectly agreeing with the Naiyāyikas so far as the ontological reality of the universal is concerned, differ, however, from them and dispute the fact that the relation between the universal and its corresponding particulars is one of *samavāya*. They discard the relation of *samavāya* altogether from the list of categories (*padārthas*) as an unnecessary redundant hypothesis and replace it by the relation which is known as the 'relation of identity admitting of difference (*bhāda-sah-ṣṇu-abheda*). The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, in contradistinction from the Bhāṭṭas, admit the reality of *samavāya* as a separate relation, but unlike the Naiyāyikas, they deny its eternity (*nityatva*). These considerations led us to devote chapter III of our treatise to an examination of the Mīmāṃsakas' view of the universal, which subsequently committed us to a rejection of their view as logically untenable. Incidentally in that connection we demonstrated the inadequacy of the Advaita view of universal. In chapter IV, we tried to represent the view of the Buddhist nominalists as faithfully as possible; and in doing so, we adopted a rather sympathetic attitude towards the Buddhists which enabled us in getting a clear understanding of their point of view. But in the next chapter, i. e., chapter V, we exposed the fundamental weakness of the nominalistic theory of the Buddhists and championed the cause of Nyāya realism. Chapter VI simply enumerated the different counteracting conditions (*bādhakas*) of the universals as given by the Naiyāyikas. Hence from the opening chapter to the end of chapter VI, the realistic theory of universal as advocated by the Nyāya system stands vindicated. So far our discussion was mainly confined to Indian Philosophy.

But chapter VIII of our dissertation, which is the only chapter devoted to study the realism-nominalism problem of universal exclusively from the point of view of modern Western philosophy,

points to the fact that there are some aspects of this problem which have either been neglected or not adequately dealt with by the Indian thinkers. That the phenomenon of observed resemblance can perform the same task in the scheme of the universe, which is usually attributed to the recurring identical universals, had hardly occurred to the Indian philosophers. It is not our intention, of course, to say that the concept of resemblance did not play any part in the history of Indian philosophy. There is a group of Jaina thinkers, for example, who uphold the opinion that the notion of an identical universal can be successfully accounted for by the relation of resemblance holding among the different individual members of a class. But this view did not exert much influence on the Indian thinkers, and it stands as a minor trend isolated from the main stream of Indian philosophy. What we want to suggest here is that the treatment of the relation of resemblance in connection with the problem of universal is not as widely and acutely practised in India as we find it in modern Western philosophy. To work out a successful and cogent theory of universal, it is essential, therefore, to take help both from the Indian and the Western sides and to supplement the one, whenever necessary, by the other.

In this concluding chapter therefore, we turn to a final question :

What sort of theory of universal is suggested by the arguments and discussions of our dissertation as a whole ? In the rest of the pages, we shall engage ourselves in finding out an answer to this question.

At the outset, let us begin with a very fundamental natural fact the observation of which lies at the root of the problem of universal and it is as follows :-

The world around us, as revealed in experience, is populated by beings and things which, while being individual and distinct, have yet much in common. Not only in our thinking but in our general behaviour our conduct rests upon the assumption that individual beings, for instance, individual human beings, have many features in common. The tailor, cutting out ready-made suits knows the general run of man's sizes ; the teacher has a rough idea of the capacities of next year's freshmen ; and nursery rhymes are written on the assumption that all babies are more or less alike. So too, with animals, plants, and all living things ; we find individuals but find in them common features ; and it is these common features

which concern us in our zoological, veterinary, and botanical sciences. This then is the *fact* with which we start ; our conceptual thinking rests on the observation of recurrences. The same features recur in different individual beings and individual things and we are aware of this fact.

By universals, then, we mean, in the first place, recurrences found in the natural world. To that extent the theory here put forward conforms to Nyāya realism. In dealing with universals we are not confined to a world of imaginative constructions (*kalpanā*) as the Buddhists hold and are certainly not concerned with words only. On the contrary, our thinking rests upon foundations empirically given ; it is because our experience is what it is that we think as we do and use general words in the way we do. We are able to say that an object we saw yesterday was ultramarine, and that this present object is ultramarine, and that possibly the next object we shall see will be ultramarine, because ultramarine is a shade which recurs in the natural world observed by us. Accordingly when we speak and think, using such general words as 'ultramarine', we are not turning away from the real, that is to say, from the experienced real, but are speaking and thinking about it.

As we examine these recurrences more closely we see that they are of two sorts, identities and resemblances. We may first consider identities. In the previous chapter we have seen how the so-called cases of exact resemblance between the absolutely specific qualities of two or more different objects can be reduced to identity. The colour of this postage stamp, for example, does not merely resemble the colour of the second postage stamp of the same issue and denomination but is identical with it ; to speak of resemblance there, as we have argued elsewhere, would not be doing justice to the obvious dictate of experience. Hence it must be admitted that we do observe identical qualities which recur or repeat themselves in the so-called cases of exact resemblance. These identical qualities are absolutely specific in the sense that they do not admit of further sub-division into kinds. *This* shade of blue or *that* degree of loudness cannot further be divided into sub-classes. As they mark limit of division, their simplicity and therefore their consequent eternity (*nityatva*) must be admitted. These qualitative identities are each of them one and the same not only through a passage of time, as a thing may be said to be identical with itself,

but also as contemporaneously present at different places at one and the same time ; and this is possible because the relation which holds between them and their corresponding loci, i. e., individuals objects, is one of *samavāya* the nature of which has been fully discussed in chapter II. Hence, we perfectly agree with the Nyāya realists in holding that there are real universals in the natural world which are eternal (*nitya*), one (*eka*) and inherent in many objects (*aneka samaveta*). Our only difference with the Naiyāyikas in this respect lies in the fact that while the Naiyāyikas draw a distinction between the qualities (*guṇas*) and their corresponding universals and treat them to be different kinds of entities (*padārthas*), we drop this distinction for the sake of simplicity of hypotheses (*lāghava*) and take the specific qualities themselves to be the recurring universals.

But qualities are not the only discoverable identities in nature, there are also relations. The relation of being to the left of, for instance, is one and the same relation in different contexts, and no language except that of identity fits the case. To take another example, this line stands perpendicularly upon the other line, so forming a right angle. That relation is precisely the same wherever I find it. Here is a relation which is constantly recurring in my experience : I look around me at this moment and see many lines falling perpendicularly on other lines in this room. Here is the recurrence and, in that sense of the term, the universal, though not a recurring, identical quality but a recurring, identical relation. The Nyāya realists, though admitting the universal in the sense of qualitative identity, overlooked the importance of these recurring identical relations. But the importance of such identical relations as these in our thinking should be emphasized. A proof demonstrated of a particular right-angled triangle holds good of all other such triangles of the world, because the relation holding between the sides of that particular triangle in question recurs identically in all other figures of the same sort. Hence along with the admission of the universals in the shape of identical qualities, the universals in the shape of identical relation also have to be admitted.

But though both the identical qualities and identical relations are to be treated as universals, there is yet an important difference between them. It has already been mentioned that the relation holding between the universals in the shape of specific qualities and their

corresponding individual objects is one of inherence (*samavāya*), e. g., a specific shade of red colour *inheres in* (*samaveta*) in its corresponding locus, say, an individual red rose. But it is obvious that the relation of being to the left of cannot inhere in a pair of object between which it holds in the same fashion in which a particular shade of red is said to be inherent in a rose. A specific quality inheres *in*, whereas a specific relation occurs *between* objects. Because of this difference between the two, the relation which connects a specific, relational universal with its corresponding objects between which it occurs should be conceived in a way different from that which connects a specific quality with its corresponding individual locus. In the latter case, the relation is, as we have already said, one of *samavāya* and this relation of *samavāya* is something over and above the related entities; but in the former case, it is one of *svavāya*, a peculiar kind of relation admitted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system where the one or the other of the relata (here only the recurring relation) acts as a relation, and the relation in question is not something over and above the related entities.

So far our discussion was confined to the specific universals, i. e., universals in the form of absolutely specific qualities and relations which cannot be further sub-divided into kinds. These qualities and relations are treated as universals because they can recur identically *in* or *between* individual objects. But over and above these specific universals, philosophers frequently speak of qualitative universals and generic universals. By qualitative universal is meant one whose instances are qualities or characters of *one kind* and which can be further divided into sub-classes, for example, colour, sound, shape etc. Just as a specific shade of colour, say, ultramarine, recurs identically in many individual objects, so it is thought that there is a common 'colouredness' recurring identically in different species of colours, such as red, blue, green etc.; or, there is a common 'blueness' running identically in the various shades of blue, such as navy-blue, royal blue, ultramarine etc. Again, there are said to be generic universals whose instances are supposed to be the individual objects, for example, man, horse, stone etc. It is thought by a group of realists that there is a self-identical humanity or manhood running through the different individual men in spite of their individual differences.

Now, the ontological reality of both these qualitative and generic universals we reject on the ground that they are not discovered or

given in our experience as the specific universals, say, ultramarine, are discovered or given. The abstract blueness apart from the specific shades of blue, or the abstract humanity apart from the individual men can neither be perceived nor thought of. It is simply not true that all men have this quality, human, in common, so that we can observe it and discover it in observing them. Nor is it the case that we discover qualities *a*, *b*, and *c*, combined together to make up the complex quality human, in all men. Most men are two-legged, but some have lost a leg. Most men are rational, but some are idiots. If we say that to be human is to be two-legged and rational we are stating a standard or an ideal, what ought to be the case; we certainly do not discover two-leggedness and rationality as a common quality or combination of common qualities in all men. Similarly we do not observe and cannot discover a common identical 'colouredness' running through the different species of colour, or a common identical 'blueness' running through the various shades of blue. Nor is it possible for our thought to abstract a common universal here, because, as each shade of specific colour which we actually experience is a simple, unanalysable entity, we cannot break up the shade, say, ultramarine, into components, one of which belongs only to itself, while the other common factor turns up in other shades of blue or in other species of colour. Hence neither 'colouredness' nor 'blueness' can be a genuine universal as ultramarine is.

But if there is not an identical 'humanity' in different individual men or an identical blueness shared by the different shades of blue, how can we significantly use such general terms as man or blue covering all individual men and all shades of blue in general? Are they merely empty concepts without any referential meaning attached to them? As an answer to this question comes the next step of our theory of universal and it comes with the realisation that the recurrences examined thus far, namely, specific identical qualities and specific identical relations are not the only recurrences in our experience. Certain qualities are similar without being identical and similarities recur. For instance, different shades of blue, though not having an identical blueness in common, are yet similar as a matter of fact, and this phenomenon of similarity constantly recurs in our experience. The fact that a group of objects do not have an identical element in common is not incompatible with their being similar as a matter of actual experience. It is because

of this recurrence of the experience of similarity between the various shades of blue that we learn to speak of the colour 'blue', covering by this token all shades of blue, as a class of colour. Behind the use of the general word 'ultramarine' lies the observation of the recurrence of that identical shade in different contexts, but behind that of 'blue' lies the observation of similarity between various shades of blue. Hence it is not true to say that because we cannot detect an identical blueness in the different shades of blue, the word 'blue' is an empty concept referring to nothing; on the contrary, it refers to the observed relation of resemblance or similarity between its various shades. In the same way certain relations are similar to one another without having any identical element in common. We have shown in our previous chapter how the different instances of the relation of resemblance holding between different sets of entities can resemble one another without having a self-identical resemblance in common. The relation of resemblance, for instance, which holds between two shades of red is numerically different from that holding between two shades of blue, and yet we do apply the same term 'resemblance' to designate both these relations because the relations in question resemble each other. But once resemblances or similarities are introduced we cannot stop with qualities and relations. For *individual things* also are similar, and we classify on the basis of the similarity of things. Men are roughly alike, so are the different cats we meet, and the different spades we see. Hence it is not necessary for the purpose of classifying men and using the general word 'man' significantly to recognise a self-identical humanity common to all men; the relation of similarity observed among different individual men is sufficient to perform those tasks. And not only individual things but *processes* and *situations* also are similar. Once again parliamentary candidate seeks to win our favour, once again the post-man walks up the path or the sun sinks over the horizon. The recurrence of these similarities is as useful a basis for classification as is the recurrence of identical qualities and relations. Here, too, there are universals. Perhaps it is not so easy to pin-point them in this case as in the case of ultramarine. They are recurring likenesses. But these likenesses, too, are observed, so that our classification, using these as principles of grouping, is empirically based. Hence recurring similarities along with the recurring identities are to be treated as universals, because we consciously use them to classify and order

experience, and are thus able to use a further set of general words successfully.

To hold that the recurring similarity is a universal, along with the recurring identical quality or identical relation, is to go beyond Nyāya realism. Nor can the Nyāya realism be maintained by the argument that all similarities must rest in the end on identities, for this, as we have seen, is not the case. It is true that in the cases of exact resemblance, two objects are similar because they have identical qualities in common; but where the resemblance is not exact, e. g., where two objects resemble each other 'more' or 'less', we find no identical qualities in common between them. In other words, while the phenomenon of exact resemblance can be reduced to qualitative identity, the phenomenon of inexact resemblance must be taken to be ultimate. Moreover simple qualities can be similar where there is no possibility of an underlying identical quality. It follows then that a recurring similarity that does not, so far we can see, rest upon an identity, can nonetheless be a basis for grouping. Thus while our theory begins with a realist position it soon leaves it behind. Yet, it should be added, if we begin in this way, if we say that the universal on which grouping rests may be the recurring identity, we already rule out nominalism. Indeed we rule out nominalism when we say that we group on the basis of an observed similarity. It is curious that nominalists, whilst recognising that their theory is incompatible with realism appear to think that it is compatible with the doctrine that we group on the observation of similarities. Yet if we group objects as they are found to resemble one another, then we begin not with so many individuals, as the nominalists wish to say, but with so many *resembling* individuals. The resemblance or similarity is as much objective or natural fact as is the identity of common qualities and common relations. In other words, the Resemblance theory is as unsatisfactory a foundation for nominalism as is the Identity theory. In both cases a universal in nature is presupposed. Thus in asserting that universals are recurring similarities as well as recurring identities our theory is shown to be different both from realism and nominalism.

In order that we may not be misunderstood on this point, let us conclude our discussion with re-stating what has been already stated in our preface. In advocating the view that the different relations of resemblance holding among individual members of various classes

are as much universals as the different identical qualities are, we are using the word universal in a somewhat novel sense about which difference of opinion would naturally be expected. In the history of philosophy—both in India and West—the word universal (*sāmānya*) has been used generally in the sense of recurring identical qualities. But our contention is that the word universal should not be taken in a univocal sense; it is rather equivocal. The question 'what is a universal', cannot be answered, in one sentence, but needs two. Universals are (i) natural recurrences revealed in our experience and (ii) universals are *objective* principles of grouping or classifying. These two sentences are not, however, wholly independent of each other, since a natural recurrence can itself be used as a principle of grouping and this justifies us in talking of our theory as *one* theory of universal. Judged by this two-fold criterion of the definition of universal, the different relations of resemblance holding among the individual members of different classes should be treated as universals, since they recur in our experience and they provide us with the objective foundations for the classification of natural objects. When interpreted in this way, the Western nominalism with its weapon known as Resemblance or Similarity theory defeats its own purpose; since in its zeal to dispose of objective universals in the natural world over and above the particular objects of experience, it presupposes a set of objective universals at the outset, namely, the different recurring relations of resemblance.

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